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ABSTRACT
A significant portion of the current expansion of the 
exotic forest estate in New Zealand is taking place on 
Maori land. Because of the strong traditional ties between 
the Maoris and their land, Maori land is rarely offered for 
sale; instead large areas have been leased under long term 
agreements usually of 99 years duration.
By investing their land in afforestation, Maori land 
owners have a choice of either receiving an annual rent or 
more usually to receive a lump sum share of stumpage revenue 
at the time of clearfelllng. Because Maori land owners have 
generally preferred revenue sharing schemes, the leases have 
basically become joint venture afforestation schemes, based 
on the Maori's contribution of land and the lessee's 
contribution of forest establishment and management costs.
Three methods have been used to calculate the lessor's 
share of stumpage. Two of them (the Grainger method 
developed by Grainger (1969), and the discounted revenue 
method) are based on residual valuation techniques that use 
a predetermined rate of return on the lessee's investment 
and allocate the residual as return to the lessor's land.
The third method (the internal rate of return method) 
attempts to share revenue equitably at the time of clear- 
felling according to the respective contribution of the 
lessor and lessee. This method requires the land to be 
independently valued.
Changes in forest management practices, and errors made 
by Grainger in his calculations, have rendered Grainger's 
method incorrect and it is not recommended for use in its 
present form. The discounted revenue method contains a 
serious error in the method of calculating the lessor's 
share of stumpage which should be corrected before this 
method is used in future leases. For both the Grainger 
and discounted revenue methods, the lessor's share of
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stumpage revenue is calculated before the lease is signed 
and remains fixed for the duration of the lease. This is 
not satisfactory as the relative contribution made by the 
lessor and lessee are unlikely to remain constant during 
the whole term of the lease, usually 99 years.
Revenue sharing lease agreements effectively give Maori 
land owners equity in the forest and a share of the risk 
and uncertainty involved. As a result, Maori land owners 
have the right to participate in decision making, a right 
that has not been recognised to date, but which must be 
included in future lease agreements.
Tax concessions instigated to promote private investment 
in forestry only benefit the lessee. Because the lessor is 
also a private investor investing in forestry, changes are 
required to allocate the land owner a fair share of these 
concessions.
A comparison of the lessor's returns from an annual land 
rent with the returns from revenue sharing showed an annual 
land rent to be the best financial option available to the 
lessor. However, an annual land rent does not give the 
lessor equity in the forest or the right to participate in 
decision making.
A nationally uniform approach to Maori land afforestation 
leasing should be formulated based on the ten years of existing 
experience, thereby preventing loosely worded lease agreements 
and reducing variation in lease conditions. The task of 
collecting experience, providing information and guidance for 
potential lessors, and acting as a representative for Maori 
land owners involved in afforestation leases could be carried 
out by the Department of Maori Affairs.
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CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION AND AIMS
Leasing large blocks of Maori land for afforestation 
purposes in New Zealand started in 1966 when the New Zealand 
Forest Service leased the ll60 ha. Tainui-kawhia block from 
the Maori owners. The object of the lease was to establish 
an exotic forest for timber production and to halt the inland 
movement of sand dunes. The first private enterprise agree­
ment for afforestation of Maori land was in 1967, when Tasman 
Pulp and Paper Company negotiated with the owners to exchange 
their land for equity in a new afforestation company. All 
subsequent agreements for afforestation of Maori land between 
lane owners and private companies have been leases, whereby 
the land owners do not lose the freehold of their land.
Since that time, leasing Maori land for afforestation 
has increased rapidly. At the end of 1977 the N.Z. Forest 
Service had leased approximately 70,800 ha while private 
enterprise had leased a further 3^,000 ha. Altogether this 
represents about 13% of the total area of exotic forest in 
New Zealand. Hood (pers. comm. 1977) reported that the N.Z. 
Forest Service was negotiating a further seven leases and 
expected to be invited by various Maori Incorporations and 
Trusts to undertake more. Similar lease negotiations for 
other areas were in progress with private companies (Liley 
pers. comm. 1977), these being mainly the pulp and paper 
companies interested in increasing their future supplies of 
pulpwood.
The long term nature of most leases (generally 99 years) 
and the methods proposed for calculating the returns due to 
the Maori land owners, has often resulted in protracted 
negotiations between lessor and lessee. However, the full 
triplications of long term leasing and the methods used to 
determine the returns to the land owners are only now being 
examined in more depth. Maori land owners, who can now see
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the shortcomings of some of the earlier lease agreements, are 
now pressing for more favourable conditions, especially in 
their negotiations with private companies. However, there has 
generally been a genuine desire on the part of both parties to 
reach satisfactory agreements.
In October 1976 a report to the Minister of Maori Affairs 
proposed a Committee of Enquiry into long term leasing of Maori 
land for afforestation purposes. One of the main reasons for 
this was the "unnecessary bitter rancour developing from 
misunderstandings and the expensive and lengthy court hearings 
which should be avoided by the pooling of knowledge already 
available" (Anon unpubl. 1976a). This referred in particular 
to the Ngatihine lease, which at that time was subject to 
lengthy and expensive court hearings to resolve disagreement 
between the trustees representing the Maori owners.
Unfortunately the Commission of Enquiry never eventuated.
This essay aims to examine critically Maori land 
afforestation leases from the lessor’s point of view. 
Unfortunately lessees claimed that the terms and conditions 
of individual leases were strictly confidential between lessee 
and lessor. This meant that specific leases could not be 
examined, and only a general critical analysis of principles 
and methods can be presented.
The general background to and development of leasing of 
Maori land is discussed in chapter 2, including a discussion 
of a current controversy and the desirability of a more 
thorough investigation into long term afforestation leases on 
Maori land. Chapter 3 examines the structure of the lease 
document and discusses the legal requirements and obligations 
placed on the lessee and the lessor.
The three main parts of this essay examine critically 
the methods used to calculate the lessor's return from an 
afforestation lease, the valuation of the lessor’s
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contribution to the lease i.e. the land, and the effects 
of taxation.
Three methods have been used to calculate the lessor’s 
return; the Grainger method (Grainger 1969), the discounted 
revenue method, and the internal rate of return (IRR) method. 
An economic analysis of each method, together with a critical 
review of assumptions and shortcomings, is presented in 
chapter 4. The evaluation of each method is based on its 
ability to share revenue between lessor and lessee in an 
equitable manner, reflecting the contribution each has made 
to the afforestation project.
The IRR method requires the land to be valued. As the 
land is not sold, an objective measure of its value does not 
exist. Chapter 5 examines critically the principles and 
methods of land value and land valuation as they apply to 
afforestation leases. The effect of changes in the legal 
definition of ’land value’ and 'improvements’ is discussed.
Taxation is important both from a national and an 
individual lessor’s point of view. Chapter 6 critically 
examines firstly, taxation as it affects afforestation leases, 
and secondly the equitability of tax concessions devised 
specifically to increase private forestry investment.
Chapter 7 discusses the alternative forms in which the 
lessor can receive his returns from an afforestation lease, 
and which enable the lessor to obtain a variable level of 
equity in the forest grown on his land. Fiji is one of the 
few places, other than New Zealand, where land owned by 
traditional indigenous land owners has been leased for 
afforestation purposes. The leasing of this land for forestry 
in Fiji is examined in chapter 8. Similarities and 
differences in leases between the two countries are examined, 
and the possibilities of leasing for forestry in other areas 
of the world are discussed.
4The final discussion, together with the conclusions 
and general recommendations are presented in chapter 9.
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CHAPTER 2. 
GENERAL BACKGROUND
Two types of Maori land lease exist in New Zealand, 
agricultural leases and forestry leases. Agricultural leases 
are generally let under the auspices of the Maori Trustee (see 
appendix 1), and returns to the lessor are an annual rent 
based on the value of the land as determined by the 
Government Valuation Department (see section 5-1*)•
The returns to land owners from an afforestation lease are 
usually a share of revenue at the time of clear felling, and 
because the Maoris contribute the land and the lessee 
contributes forest development and management costs, 
afforestation leases are essentially joint ventures. Because 
forest revenues depend on factors under the control of the 
lessee, but over which the lessor has little or no influence, 
Maori land owners have a vested interest in the afforestation 
program and how it is run. One main factor is the choice of 
product ultimately sold. This lack of control or influence 
by the Maoris forms the basis of much of the current 
discussion in lease negotiations.
The lease document used for afforestation leases has 
generally been a modification of the standard Maori Trustee 
lease agreement for agricultural leases (appendix 2), but as 
the lessor’s income is a share of revenue, various obligations 
have been placed on the lessee with regard to his establishment 
of a forest. These are discussed further in chapter 3•
Purchasing Maori land is complicated by multiple owner­
ship and was usually not acceptable to the land owners. The 
consent of all beneficial owners is required before a sale 
can be sanctioned by the Maori Land Court. A. D. McKinnon 
proposed in 1965 that the N.Z. Forest Service should 
investigate leasing as a means of making available Maori
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land for forestry (Grainger 1969). Grainger proposed a 
system of deferred rentals whereby the lessor received a 
proportion of revenue when the wood grown on his land was 
sold. This proposal was based on the unsatisfactory aim of 
rough justice for all, and more recent efforts have attempted 
to develop methods to more accurately reflect the lessee's 
and lessor's equity in an afforestation project as a basis 
for revenue sharing.
Afforestation leases on Maori land have evolved 
considerably over the twelve years of their existence. The 
scene has changed from a situation where only one potential 
lessee existed i.e. the N.Z. Forest Service, to one of 
increasing competition for lease areas. Potential lessors 
now have considerable bargaining power in negotiations 
because of increased competition between potential lessees 
and a better understanding of the implications of leasing 
land for afforestation purposes. Recent lease negotiations 
have become more protracted as an increasing number of 
contentious issues are raised and discussed. Most of these 
concern the relatively complicated methods used to determine 
the lessor's return which in most leases depends directly on 
the actions of the lessee, and the desire for meaningful 
Involvement in the afforestation project by the land owner.
The general philosophy of the Maoris on land ownership 
is that the land belongs to those who have died, those who 
are living and those yet to be born, and that land is there­
fore a trust passed on from generation to generation. As a 
result, there is not as much opposition to waiting for a 
whole rotation length before income is received as might be 
found if a deferred rental was offered to a European lessor. 
This is sometimes used as an argument in favour of a deferred 
rental scheme for Maori lands. However, the present 
generations of Maoris also don't want to leave all the income 
from the land to future generations, they want something now 
and something later. Some of the later lease agreements have
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made provisions for this and allow for payments in advance 
at an interest rate of generally 6%. This move could be 
considered to be one step back to the system of annual rental 
payments, used for agricultural leases.
2.1. Literature review
Very little specific to leasing of land for forestry in 
New Zealand has been published. Grainger (1969) outlined the 
formula proposed by the N.Z. Forest Service for leasing 
undeveloped forest land on a deferred rental system 
regardless of ownership. Grainger’s approach aimed at 
converting the economic rental from an afforestation project 
to a predetermined percentage of future stumpage revenues. 
Payments to the lessor depended on a land classification 
according to topography and vegetation, and varied from 1% 
to 25% of stumpage revenue depending on land class. The 
Grainger method has been superseded by other methods but is 
more fully discussed in chapter 4 because of its historic 
importance.
A considerable amount of unpublished material on 
leasing land for afforestation is held by the N.Z. Forest 
Service, most of which was prepared by their Economics section. 
The Forest Service claimed this material was confidential, 
and as a result it was unavailable to the writer for use or 
comment.
Mathur (1975), Misra (1975) and Rustagi (1977) describe 
the leasing of land for afforestation from the State Forestry 
Department in India. Although this is not the same as leasing 
from native or customary land owners, the problem of determin­
ing a fair return to the land owner still exists. Rustagi 
suggests that compensation for the use of the land should be 
based on the use of Faustmann’s formula, using the State 
Government borrowing rate. However, he does not indicate its 
practical application, nor does he discuss the shortcomings of 
the formula. The shortcomings were discussed by Grainger (1968)
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Carter (1978) describes the background to the protracted 
lease negotiations between Carter Holt Ltd. and the Ngatihine 
trust, which have failed to reach a satisfactory conclusion 
after 7 years. Molloy (1978) discusses forestry cooperatives 
as an alternative to Maori land afforestation leases with 
reference to the Ngatihine lease. The Ngatihine controversy 
is examined in more detail in section 2.5.
2.2. Development in the use of Maori Land
Most Maori land was originally covered in indigenous 
forest, most of which had been cut and milled by the 1950’s, 
the land generally being left without further development.
Those areas near urban centres were generally leased under the 
auspices of the Maori Trustee for agricultural purposes. The 
more remote areas remained unutilised as there was no pressure 
for agricultural use. The depression years of the 1930's and 
the 1939 - 19^5 war contributed to the lack of incentive for 
the further development of these areas of Maori land, and in 
many cases developed or partially developed land was abandoned, 
or badly neglected. As a result much land reverted to scrub 
and fern or became eroded during these periods. These events 
were usually followed by a migration of Maori people away from 
their tribal lands to towns and cities (Gillanders-Scott 
pers. comm. 1978).
The Department of Maori Affairs made considerable efforts 
to get Maori lands into economic production based on a system 
of loans which the Maori owners had to pay back out of farm 
profits. However, the rapid rise in land development costs 
and failure of agricultural incomes to keep up with rising 
costs in the early 1960’s, severely curtailed further 
development of Maori farms. Although loans were on very 
favourable terms, it was over 30 years before Maori owners 
received any disposable income (Hingston pers. comm. 1978).
In Northland, which has many of the present afforestation 
leases, much of the land was dug-over kauri gum land, which 
was either too difficult or too expensive to put into grass.
In many cases no funds were available anyway (Gillanders- 
Scott pers. comm. 1978).
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In this general climate leasing for afforestation 
purposes was mooted, and naturally any proposal which would 
give a reasonable return to the land owner was considered.
The N.Z. Forest Service’s first venture into leasing was on 
a deferred share of stumpage basis. The private sector 
approached it differently. In 1966 Tasman Pulp and Paper 
Company formed a separate company to afforest the Tarawera 
valley, Tarawera Forests Ltd. After initial Tasman Pulp 
and Paper Co. proposals were rejected, the Maori land owners 
in the valley were given shares in the new company in 
proportion to the value of their land holdings, the capital 
structure of the company being based on contributions in 
land and finance at the end of the development period of the 
forest. Forest development costs were capitalised and it was 
estimated that at the end of the development period the 
nominal capital of the company would be owned 76.7% by Tasman 
Pulp and Paper Co., 8.9% by the Crown and 14 A\% by the Maoris. 
This compares to the initial land contributions of Maoris 
15,380 ha. (50$), the Crown 7690 ha (25%) and Tasman Pulp and 
Paper Co. 7690 ha. (25%). This combined venture had the 
backing of the New Zealand Forest Service, the Department of 
Maori Affairs, Treasury, the Lands department and the Maori 
Land Court (Groome pers. comm. 1977).
However, compared to the subsequent deferred rental 
schemes offered by private companies, the Tarawera Forests 
Ltd. arrangement is now considered to be very poor. The 
Maoris effectively lost the freehold of their land and are 
now only minority shareholders in a large company. Also 
returns to the Maori shareholders are delayed until about 
the 25th year, and then only come in the form of dividends 
from a Board which is controlled by Tasman Pulp and Paper 
Co. There are some hopes for a future renegotiation of 
this particular arrangement (Groome pers. comm. 1978).
Subsequent arrangements with private companies were 
based on a lease and a deferred rental.
10.
2.3* Expansion of the New Zealand forest estate
Of the approximately 300,000 hectare increase in the 
total exotic forest estate in New Zealand over the last ten 
years, about one third has taken place on leased Maori land. 
Maori leases have become of increasing importance because :
(a) it allows financially productive use of the land 
while Maori ownership is retained
(b) leasing enables the lessee to expand his forest 
without having to buy land.
2.3.1. Current expansion
New Zealand exotic forest policy in the mid 1960’s 
aimed at achieving national self-sufficiency in softwood 
products and at promoting a steady growth in softwood 
exports. This policy necessitated a steady growth in the 
forest estate to supply the anticipated increase in domestic 
and export demand for wood. In 1969 the New Zealand Forestry 
Development Council recommended a 21,000 ha per annum 
increase in exotic forests, to be shared by the private 
and government sectors, and local bodies. This was raised 
to 28,300 ha per annum in 1972 to ensure the export earnings 
from the forestry sector were maintained at at least 9% of 
total export earnings.
During the forestry boom from 1964 to 1969» internal 
cash flows formed over 60 % of the total funds available to 
private forestry companies (Smith 1974). Such funds 
generated a general climate of expansion within the private 
sector.
A report to the Forestry Development Council (1969) 
noted that "a survey of prospects in the long term indicates 
strong justification for increased planting of forests in 
New Zealand", and that "export development had taken place 
and shown the ability of the New Zealand producers to meet 
overseas requirements in regard to quality, service and 
price".
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More recently the impetus for forest expansion has been 
strengthened. Based on what 0 ’Neill(1974) called an 
"existing and increasing world shortage of forest products"> 
the 1974 Forestry Development Council decided on a minimum 
annual increase in the exotic forest estate of 44,000 ha. 
Existing forests can sustain wood using industries already 
established, and can meet projected domestic demand for 
forest products beyond the year 2000, so that new plantings 
will have to be absorbed by the export market. This market 
is anticipated to consist of both logs and processed forest 
products.
The government’s policy of increased afforestation in 
the private sector has been stimulated by forestry incentives. 
The 1965 budget introduced a tax concession whereby forest 
expenditure by private companies could be deducted from 
taxable income received from other sources. This considerably 
reduced the real cost of investment in forestry. The 
Government Forestry loans scheme was first introduced in 
1963 giving low interest, long term loans to private 
investors with provisions for writing off some of the loans. 
This was replaced in 1970 by the current Forestry Grants 
Scheme which provides for a Government grant of 50% of forest 
development costs to approved forest growers. The company 
tax concession and the grants scheme are discussed further 
in chapter 6.
2.3.2. Prospects in New Zealand forestry
Because of increasing demand for wood products at home 
and overseas, the feeling in New Zealand is one of optimism. 
Table 2.1 illustrates the increasing total production and 
the increasing reliance of the New Zealand forest product 
industries on exotics. Table 2.2. illustrates the 
significance of the log export trade.
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Table 2.1
Estimated Production of Forest Products In 
Roundwood Equivalents (000 m )
Year ending 
31 March
Total
Production
Exotic
Production
Percentage Exotic 
Production
1939 1613 226 14
49 2513 968 39
54 3118 1497 48
59 3967 2399 60
64 5156 3826 74
69 6885 5906 85
70 7810 6778 87
71 8189 7176 88
72 7960 7012 88
73 8240 7351 89
74 9924 9006 91
Source: N.Z. Forest Service
Statistics of the Forest Industries of 
New Zealand to 1974.
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Table 2.2
Use of Exotic Log Production {%)
’ear Ending
31 March Domestic Export
Saw
Logs
Peeler
Logs
Small
Wood
Pulp
Logs Chips Logs
-939 91 9
49 95 4 1
54 93 3 4
59 75 1 2 20 2
64 60 1 3 28 8
69 51 1 4 20 24
70 48 1 4 19 1 27
71 47 1 5 18 3 26
72 45 1 5 19 3 27
73 45 1 6 17 4 28
74 44 1 3 33 • 3 15
Source: N .Z . Forest Service
Statistics of the Forests and Forest
Industries of New Zealand to 197*1.
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Anon (unpubl. 1974) predicted there would be a 
general reversal of the trend of increasing significance of 
log exports shown in table 2.2 because of rising New Zealand 
demand and the raw material needs of larger pulp and paper 
plants. At that time the major log exporters said that the 
proportion of logs being exported would decline to be 
replaced by higher exports of processed wood products.
Table 2.2 suggests this trend is already apparent in 1974.
The implication for leasing is that there will be less 
opportunity to take advantage of the higher stumpage rates on 
export logs. One of the major log exporters was New Zealand 
Forest Products Ltd, who also lease Maori land. It is 
unlikely such a company would export logs grown on leased 
land when they could export logs grown on their own land and 
retain all the higher revenues within the company, although 
this depends on location and commitments.
Anon (unpubl. 1974) notes that the log export trade 
may phase out in 20 to 25 years time so that forest planning 
should consider domestic processing developments, and the 
raw material required. A three year study noted in the 
New Zealand Forest Research Institute’s 1975 annual report 
(Anon 1976c), analyzed long term export prospects and their 
effects on present day management decisions, and concluded 
that New Zealand’s greatest long term export opportunities 
lay with high quality sawn timber and plywood, and that 
forest management should aim to maximise the production of 
clear grades of radiata pine. Fenton (1972) notes that"the 
generally unexploited comparative advantage of a high rate 
of diameter increment in New Zealand, with or without added 
log quality through pruning, can be best utilised by develop­
ment of exports of peeler logs, veneer or plywood".
Considerable confidence by both the government and 
private sector in the future of New Zealand forestry is 
indicated by recent planting rates exceeding the proposed 
expansion rates outlined in section 2.3.1., especially when
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it is realised that the growth in the private sector has
exceeded that for the state sector in the last few years
as indicated in table 2.3.
Table 2.3.
Net Gains in the Exotic Forest Estate
1969 to 1976 (ha)
Year State Plantings Private Plantings Total % of Total
by Private 
Sector
1969 13,500 5,000 18,500 27
70 12,*190 5,140 17,630 29
71 11,7*10 8,320 20,060 41
72 11,830 12,790 2*1,620 52
73 16,670 12,*100 29,070 43
7*1 20,010 18,570 38,580 48
75 21,341) 22,976 *14,320 52
76 22,300 25,900 48,200 54
Source : N.Z. Forest Service
Annual Report of the Director-General of
Forests 1970 to 1977
Investment by the small investor is also increasing.
In the period 1963 to 1970, 9,300 ha were planted under the
f orestry loans scheme . From 1970 to 1973 more than 7,300
ha were planted under the forestry grants scheme, an
additional 30,000 ha being approved for planting (Anon 
unpub 1. 1974).
There are proposals for large scale expansion by at 
least two private companies, both relying heavily on leased 
Maori land, both in the King country - Taumaranui area.
New Zealand Forest Products Ltd. plans a 51,000 ha expansion 
(Anon 1977d), and Winstone Afforestation Ltd., in conjunction 
with other companies, has options to buy or lease about 10,100 
ha (Groome pers. comm. 1977).
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Based on a predicted demand for exports there appears 
to be considerable confidence by investors in New Zealand 
forestry. However, the Australian Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics (Anon 1977a) examined the export prospects for 
Australian forest products and concluded that a future world 
wood shortage was unlikely. It did, however, expect certain 
regions of the world, notably Japan and Europe, to continue 
to buy large quantities of wood from other regions for some 
time. If a world wood shortage does not eventuate and 
New Zealand fails to find markets for the wood that will be 
produced from the current expansion program, there will be 
a very large over-supply and stumpages will fall accordingly. 
Much of the wood may be unsaleable and the returns to lessors 
in revenue sharing leases will suffer accordingly.
2.4. Afforestation leases on Maori land
2.4.1. Benefits for the Maoris
The benefits to the Maori land owners in an afforestation 
lease are:
(a) Unused land is utilised without loss of ownership. 
The use of otherwise unused land may be more important 
nationally than to individual owners who may only own a very 
small piece of land.
(b) There is a financial return to the owners where 
previously there was none. This is important to rural 
communities living on or near tribal lands.
(c) The provision of work. Afforestation leases are 
generally more labour intensive than agricultural leases and 
it is not unusual to have a clause in a forestry lease 
providing for the use of local owner labour where ever 
possible. However, the owners often feel that this is only
a ’sweetener’ for the lease and the employment of local labour 
will not eventuate, especially in times of high national 
unemployment. Local investment also has its effects through 
local employment multipliers.
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Afforestation leases provide the opportunity for Maori 
land owners to play some part in a project with which they 
can be identified. This is important in some rural Maori 
communities such as is Northland for example, an area long 
considered an economic backwater. By providing work and 
some form of identity afforestation leases are helping to 
stem the urban migration of younger people. More young people 
remaining in tribal areas strengthens ties with the land and 
within the rural community (Hingston pers. comm. 1978).
2.4.2. Benefits for the lessee
By signing what is generally a 99 year lease, the lessee 
has most of the benefits of land ownership without having to 
buy the land. This means the lessee is able to afforest 
about twice as much land with the same amount of finance. 
Pressure for land in New Zealand is increasing, and as most 
of the large blocks of undeveloped land belong to Maoris and 
are not for sale, leasing allows an afforestation company to 
expand where otherwise it may not have been able to do so.
The cost to the lessee is usually a share of stumpage 
revenue at the time the timber is sold.
The stumpage payments made by the lessee to the lessor 
are tax deductable for the lessee. Where the company processes 
the timber itself, only a small proportion of its sale value 
has to be found for payment to the lessor.
2.4.3. Afforestation by Maori owners
Although keen on afforestation, Maori land owners lack 
the finance and expertise to do it for themselves. Even if 
the finance is available there is a general reluctance to go 
into a new venture on the part of the land owners because of 
lack of confidence (Hingston pers. comm. 1978).
18.
Maori land owners have access to lending Institutions 
but It is difficult to borrow money for land development 
without mortgage security. Multiple ownership often prevents 
this. The Maori Lands Board, through the department of Maori 
Affairs, may lend money for the development and settlement of 
Maori land. This procedure does not affect legal ownership, 
but the rights of the owners are suspended whilst the Board 
has the right to exclusive occupation of the land on behalf 
of the owners. However, the Department of Maori Affairs’ 
policy is for agricultural development and this means of 
financing has yet to be used for forestry development.
Although Maori land owners would qualify as private 
investors eligible for a grant under the Forestry Grants 
Scheme, the law prevents them from getting both a grant and 
a Department of Maori Affairs loan. A grant only provides 
50% of forestry costs. Thus, unless there is another source 
of finance available to the owners, there is little chance 
to undertake their own afforestation projects.
Molloy (1978) suggests forestry co-operatives as an 
alternative to leasing using owner labour, supported by the 
technical and financial backing of the N.Z. Forest Service. 
However, funds available through the N.Z. Forest Service are 
limited to the Forestry Encouragement Grants, and Molloy 
makes no suggestion as to the source of the remaining capital 
required.
One potential source of finance is income received from 
afforestation leases. By leasing some land to an afforesta­
tion concern, Maori land owners can retain the rest and 
proceed with their own afforestation with the proceeds. One 
example of this already exists involving 45 ha. A second 
has been proposed involving 400 ha (Groome pers. comm. 1978).
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2.1| . *1. Advisory services for Maori landowners
Unlike the agricultural advisory services available to 
Maoris, the Department of Maori Affairs does not provide an 
advisory service on afforestation and normally does not 
become involved in forestry except as an adjunct to large 
scale farming (Anon pers. comm. 1978a). The Official New 
Zealand Yearbook (Anon 1976a) states that Maori land 
development policy is to settle Maoris on farms which will 
provide an adequate standard of living. The general failure 
of the Department of Maori Affairs to keep up with forestry 
development is shown in the 1975 Report of the Maori and 
Island Affairs Department which notes that ’’there is a 
growing interest in afforestation as a means of using Maori 
land. Where forestry is the major undertaking, a profit 
sharing lease whereby the planting and tending of the forest 
is undertaken by the New Zealand Forest Service or a private 
timber company, appears to offer the best prospects".
However, afforestation leases are revenue sharing rather than 
profit sharing schemes, and although leasing may offer the 
best prospects of getting Maori land into productive use, 
whether or not it offers the best prospects for the land 
owners is debateable.
Although the Department of Maori Affairs has in 
preparation a booklet outlining the relative merits of 
growing pulpwood and sawlogs (see appendix 3), it invariably 
advises Maori land owners to engage professional forestry 
consultants (Anon pers. comm. 1978a).
Government advisory services to Maori land owners 
contemplating afforestation leases are poor, especially with 
respect to the long term implications of 99 year leases.
To some extent this has been overcome by the use of private 
consultants.
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2.^.5. Protection of land owner interests
Before 1968 all leases of Maori land were subject to 
confirmation by the Maori Land Court. This was to protect 
the land owner. The Maori Affairs Amendment Act of I967 
changed this and leases of Maori land are now only endorsed 
by the registrar of the court. Gillanders-Scott (pers. 
comm. 1978) considers that this change may be attributable 
to a greater ability on the part of the owners to manage 
their own affairs. As Chief Judge of the Maori Land Court 
he still sees a need to safeguard against an over-enthusiastic 
body of owners who wish to get into an afforestation agreement 
with lessees with insufficient funds for such a venture. In 
most cases the advice of an independant forest consultant is 
required and no lease agreement can be executed unless it is 
approved by a barrister approved by the court. However, as 
observed by Judge Gillanders-Scott, the Maori Land Court's 
function is to "hear and determine" applications within the 
Court's jurisdiction. The Court is not an advisory service.
2.5. A recent development
A controversy involving the Ngatihine Trust and 6000 ha 
of land in Northland has dragged on for several years and 
shows no sign of abating. The trust was set up in 197^ and 
consisted of seven members. Negotiations were initiated with 
Carter Holt Ltd, an afforestation company, to arrange a 
revenue sharing lease, such a lease requiring the signature 
of all the trustees. When negotiations were nearly complete, 
another company, Northern Pulp Ltd, offered a blanket 25% of 
stumpage revenue for all land leased, a higher percentage 
than that being offered by Carter Holt Ltd at the time. One 
of the trustees refused to sign the Carter Holt Ltd lease 
proposal, arguing that the land should be put out to open 
tender (Alexander pers. comm. 1975). The dissenting trustee 
was dismissed from the trust by the Maori Land Court but was 
reinstated on appeal to the Appelate Court, though ordered 
to sign the lease agreement. Despite an improved offer from
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Carter Holt Ltd, the trustee had not signed by late 1977, 
and a new application for his dismissal as a trustee was 
heard in December 1977 (Anon 19771)). This was successful 
and the lease was signed by the remaining trustees.
After the lease was signed, one of the signees changed 
his mind saying that not all owners were consulted in the 
proceedings, and that most owners were left out of the 
original selection process for trustees some 3 h years before 
(Anon 1977c). The originally dissenting trustee was actively 
opposing the lease and trying to return effective control of 
the land to the Maori owners. He also indicated that only 
two of the trustees signing the lease were shareholders in 
the block of land.
The Chairman of Carter Holt Ltd stated that the company 
was bound by the terms of the lease (Anon 1977c). He also 
indicated that even if the company wanted to it could not 
renege on the lease. Some of the improvements made by the 
company in the conditions of the lease included an increase 
in the share of revenue going to the lessor, a reduction in 
the term of the lease from 99 to 75 years, and substantial 
monetary payments to the lessor before harvesting commenced.
The Northland Trade Unions support the Maori owners and 
have placed a "green ban" on the land to prevent Carter Holt 
Ltd starting their afforestation program. Their reason for 
imposing the green ban is that they consider that the Maoris 
are "not getting a fair deal" (Anon 1977c).
Carter Holt's latest move has been to approach the 
trust to give the opportunity for all shareholders who are 
opposed to the lease, to withdraw and have their combined 
interest in the land partitioned out of the trust (Carter 1978
Future developments in this controversy are 
unpredictable. Ngatihine land owners have called for a 
commission of enquiry into the Maori Affairs Act and the 
powers of the Maori Land Court, who they feel has pressured 
them into the lease agreement. Even if the owners do regain 
control over their land, there is no readily available source 
of funds for them to develop their own large scale forestry 
project.
One important point arising from the Ngatihine 
controversy is that the afforestation company has not with­
drawn from the negotiations, but instead was able to 
considerably improve on its original offer to the land owners. 
This would suggest firstly, a considerable demand for land 
suitable for leasing, and secondly, the forestry companies’ 
leasing proposals are inadequate and usually not in the best 
interests of the Maori land owners.
There is little doubt that the Ngatihine controversy 
has stimulated other disputes e.g. the Te Hapua 42 block, a 
1242 ha block leased to Northern Pulp Ltd in 1974, but now 
subject to owner resistance. In addition recent negotiations 
between New Zealand Forest Products and the owners of 
Puketapu 3A broke down due to the failure on the part of the 
company to agree to meaningful participation of the Maori 
owners in the afforestation program (Groome pers. comm 1978).
2.6. Discussion
The current controversies and changes in leasing agree­
ments are part of the evolution of leasing for afforestation 
purposes. Initially a system was proposed and accepted, but 
as points of contention arose, and Maori land owners found 
their demands for better conditions were being met, the 
system and whole philosophy of afforestation leases changed. 
Should the owners, in the case of the Ngatihine trust be 
successful in regaining control of their land, an important 
precedent will have been set, and leasing agreements will
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change significantly.
A meaningful involvement in the management of their 
land is becoming the paramount factor in lease negotiations. 
Presently once a lease is signed, the owners have virtually 
no say in the use of their land for 99 years. Profit 
maximising companies are not keen to have the land owners 
partake in the decision making process.
Those land owners who signed the original lease 
agreements, and who see neighbouring leases receiving much 
better conditions, may wish to have the conditions of 
their own leases changed. This is likely to be a potential 
source of controversy and is already giving concern to the 
N.Z. Forest Service (Kirkland pers. comm. 1977). A standard 
uniform approach to the leasing of Maori land would prevent 
this .
The success of leasing as a joint venture depends on 
New Zealand's ability to export its forest produce in the 
future. The current feeling is one of optimism, but a 
failure to find markets will result in a domestic glut of 
forest products, and a minimum return, if any, to the Maori 
land owners.
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CHAPTER 3
THE STRUCTURE OF LEASES
The structure and wording of each lease agreement 
depends on the forestry organisation involved and the legal 
entity drafting the lease. Based on five lease drafts made 
available to the writer, the important sections of most 
leases are defined and some important differences between 
leases examined. Special clauses related specifically to 
a particular lease are not considered since they do not have 
general application.
Long term afforestation leases usually contain the 
following major sections
Objectives of the lease 
Duration of the lease 
Obligations of the lessee 
Obligations of the lessor 
Other agreements 
Receipts other than from the 
sale of timber 
Expiry of the lease 
Arbitration 
Returns to the lessor
Returns to the lessor, are discussed in chapter 4. 
Managerial and biological risk and uncertainty is an area 
not adequately covered in afforestation leases. This is 
discussed in section 3-9.
3.1. Objectives of the lease
The basic objective of a lease is to establish a forest 
on the lessor’s land. The following examples illustrate this;
Example 1. "The lessee shall establish a forest of Pinus 
radiata or other fast growing exotic trees on the said land.. 
manage and protect such forest and cut away and remove
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or sell for cutting and removal the produce.... operations 
shall be carried out in accordance with good forestry 
practice so as to produce a high yield of merchantable forest 
produce. . . " .
Example 2. uses basically the same wording as example 
1 except for the last phrase which becomes: "so as to produce 
a continuing yield of pulpwood from the said land".
Example 3 . states the objectives of the lease as being 
"to alienate the said land by way of lease exclusively or 
principally for afforestation purposes".
The N.Z. Forest Service sometimes includes a range of 
objectives as exemplified by the Lake Taupo Forest Trust 
lease’s objectives, which are as follows;
(a) Preventing soil erosion, reducing pollution of 
Lake Taupo....
(b) Conserving and protecting fish and wildlife....
(c) Preserving and safeguarding... graves,.... 
historic and sacred places,...areas of natural 
beauty,....scenery,....unique vegetation,....
(d) Consistent with the above purposes; establishing, 
managing and protecting a forest or forests.... 
so as to achieve the maximum financial yield."
Though all the above objectives aim at establishing, 
managing and protecting an exotic forest, and eventually 
selling the forest produce there-from, there are important 
differences.
In only one case is radiata pine (Pinus radiata D. Don) 
specifically mentioned, and then only as "Pinus radiata or 
other fast growing exotic trees". Although it is generally 
accepted in New Zealand that radiata pine is the most 
profitable exotic species, lease agreements are often not 
specific and the lessee is not necessarily obliged to plant 
the most financially productive species. The N.Z. Forest 
Service under its "maximum financial yield" policy is
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obliged to plant radiata pine wherever the climate Is suitable.
The product or products to be produced were only 
specified in one lease (pulpwood), although some lease 
agreements specify a group of products e.g. "pulp, sawlogs 
or other forest produce". However, the product to be grown 
has a very important role in determining the actual returns 
to the lessor. Should New Zealand be successful in its plans 
to become an exporter of a large quantity of high quality 
forest products, the stumpage differential between pulpwood 
and sawlogs will have a significant effect on the eventual 
income to the lessor. The following example of stumpage 
differentials applies to the United States Market for 1972 
(Anon unpubl. undated a):
Pulpwood - $US 3 per m ^ .
Low quality sawlogs - $US 20 per m^.
High quality sawlogs - $US 45 per m .
At present New Zealand stumpages are low because of 
isolation from world market forces. However, should they 
come to reflect the same differentials as the United States, 
larger shares of stumpage from pulpwood leases will have to 
be paid to equate absolute income with that from high quality 
sawlog leases. For example, using the above stumpages, only 
6.7$ of the high quality sawlog stumpage would be required to 
equate income with a lessor receiving 100$ of the pulpwood 
stumpage. The aim of "a high yield of merchantable forest 
products", or the aim of growing pulpwood but specifying 
"the maximum financial yield", are thus quite different to 
the N.Z. Forest Service’s unqualified "maximum financial 
yield". Under the latter high quality sawlogs would have to 
be grown.
3.2. Duration of the lease
Most leases are for a period of 99 years. Two notable 
exceptions are the largest existing lease areas both held by 
the N.Z. Forest Service; Lake Taupo Forest Trust of 28,640 ha
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and Lake Rotoaira Forest Trust of 32,100 ha, both of which 
have a 70 year tenure. Examples of the definition of tenure 
are as follows:
Example 1. "___do hereby lease the said land....for
a term of ninety-nine (99) years which shall commence or be 
deemed to have commenced on the 1st day of....197...M.
Example 2. MThe lessors do hereby lease unto the 
lessee .... for a term commencing on the....day of....and 
extending until the 31st day of March next following the 
99th anniversary of the commencement of planting....which 
shall have commenced within three years of the commencement 
date above stated....”.
Leases are usually quite specific about duration. The 
second example given, however, leaves the starting date open 
for three years, allowing effective tenure for up to 102 
years. There are moves to correct this (Liley pers. comm. 1977) 
so that in future terms are defined precisely.
3.3* Obligations of the lessee
The lessee has two basic obligations. These are with 
respect to the establishment and management of the forest 
and his legal obligations.
3.3.1. Forest establishment and management
All leases oblige the lessee to establish and manage 
a forest, the following example exemplifying the format used;
”The lessor.... doth hereby covenant and agree .... that 
the lessee, consistent with the objects of this lease.... 
will at its own expense establish, manage and protect a 
forest on the said land of Pinus radiata trees or other fast 
growing exotic trees for the production of....in 
accordance with sound forestry principles (including but 
not limited to) planting, re-seeding and re-planting of cut 
over areas, building of roads and fire-breaks and other 
improvements and protecting of trees from fire, insect and 
disease and generally in such a manner as will produce the
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highest yield....at the earliest reasonable and practicable 
time . "
Often a minimum establishment period is provided for, 
for example, 20 years. The definition of such a period is 
important to the lessor as the longer some of his land lies 
idle, the later his returns arise. Generally there are 
no provisions made for subsequent plantings or defining the 
maximum rotation length to be applied. Both these are 
generally controlled by the lessee, though both can have a 
considerable effect on the lessors’ returns. Both could be 
subject to manipulation by the lessee especially under 
unfavourable economic conditions.
' The afforestation obligation is generally qualified by 
a number of conditions, including;
(a) The right to cut any merchantable native timber, 
either at the ruling market rate or for final disposal by 
the lessee for the lessor. The N.Z. Forest Service allows 
for the lessor to remove any native timber with the 
permission of the Minister.
(b) The right not to plant areas the lessee considers 
too steep or too inaccessible or likely to be eroded or 
required for road works or fire breaks.
(c) The liberty not to clear and plant under or 
adjacent to any power or telephone transmission lines. For 
example ’’the lessee... .may in its discretion leave unplanted 
beneath and adjacent to such lines an area or width greater 
than the minimum area or width required....”. This seems an 
absurd condition since it could allow the lessee not to plant 
at all!
(d) Most leases make provision for the preparation of 
an initial forest management plan, a copy of which is to be 
supplied to the lessor. One purpose of these plans is to 
inform the lessor of what the lessee proposes and presumably 
to allow for discussion on contentious points, though this is 
not provided for in the lease agreements. Generally the
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lessee is able to vary the management plan as required to 
suit his requirements. In some current lease negotiations, 
lessors are asking to be allowed to participate in forest 
management. This has arisen for two reasons, firstly concern 
by lessors that the lessee may not carry out "good forestry 
practice so as to produce a high yield of marketable forest 
produce", and secondly concern by the lessors about mismanage­
ment by the lessee such that areas may require replanting.
Under the present system there is nothing to prevent such 
re-establishment costs from being charged against the total 
investment and thus reducing the returns to the lessor. Both 
concerns reflect the lessor’s interest in getting the 
maximum financial yield from their land. However, to allocate 
to each party a share in decision making appropriate to their 
shares in the investment as a whole is impractical, and the 
lessee, being the major risk taker, must be the major decision 
maker.
(e) Roading: The lessee is obliged to construct and
maintain all necessary roads, bridges, culverts, fences, 
skids and such like works.
The lease makes the lessee responsible for establishing 
and managing a forest. As long as the economic climate for 
forestry projects remains good, there is unlikely to be any 
argument over the definition of the lessee's obligations. 
However, under conditions where forestry became uneconomic, 
there are many areas that could become contentious.
3.3.2. Legal obligations
When leasing land there are a number of legal requirements 
on a land owner that pass over to the lessee. The lessee, for 
all intents and purposes, becomes the owner of the land except 
for land tax purposes. Generally a number of specific Acts are 
mentioned, including:
Fencing Act 1908: This requires the lessee to pay half
the total fencing costs of any fence between the leased land 
and an adjacent property. Most leases provide that this shall
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not apply if the adjacent land is owned by the lessor.
Although land leased by the N.Z. Forest Service becomes 
subject to the Forest Act 10^ 19, which classifies all leased 
forests as crown land exempt from the Fencing Act 1908 , the 
Forest Service generally agrees to pay half the fencing costs.
Forest and Rural Fire Act 1955- This Act authorises 
levies to cover the costs of such things as mandatory fire 
control and weather watching.
Noxious Animals Act 1956: This Act covers the mandatory
destruction of deer, thar, chamois, wild pigs, wild goats, 
wallabies, and opossums. Land owners may be rated under this 
act to cover the costs of control measures against noxious 
animals carried out by the N.Z. Forest Service.
Noxious Weeds Act 1950: This Act covers the mandatory
destruction of noxious weeds. Land owners may be rated to 
cover the costs of weed control measures undertaken by the 
Department of Agriculture.
Agricultural Pests Destruction Act 1967*. This Act covers 
the destruction of all agricultural pests. Land owners may be 
rated to cover the costs of pest destruction measures taken by 
the Department of Agriculture.
Though not all leases specifically mention all the above 
mentioned Acts, enough are generally included to ensure the 
lessee is regarded as the owner of the land for rates, levies 
and other assessments.
All leases contain a general indemnity clause the same 
as or similar to the following; "The lessee doth hereby 
indemnify and save harmless the lessor against any liability 
at law for any injury or damage occurring to person or 
property resulting from any act or omission by the lessee, its 
servants or agents in carrying out the objects of the lease or 
otherwise upon the said land."
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3.4. Lessor’s obligations
Generally the only obligation placed on the lessor is 
that he should allow "quiet enjoyment" of the leased land by 
the lessee. For example: "....the lessee shall have and enjoy 
full quiet and undisturbed occupation of the said land and 
the lessor shall abide by all reasonable directions given by 
the lessee to enable the objectives of this lease to be 
fulfilled.... the lessee is entitled to enjoy possession of 
the said land as if he owned it in a legal estate in fee 
simple".
3.5. Other agreements
The following is a list of general agreements made 
between the lessor and lessee. Although the wording may 
differ from lease to lease, the content is essentially 
the same.
(a) Subletting: The lessee shall not at any time
during the term of the lease assign, sublet or part with 
possession of the said land or any part thereof for the 
whole or any part of the term of the lease, except with the 
permission of the lessor and then only in order to achieve 
the objects of the lease. Exceptions to this are: the right 
to allow other persons to enter the land and to cut and remove 
the forest produce whether they be employees of or contractors 
to the lessee; the right to provide dwellings and the operation 
of amenities for employees and others engaged in work upon the 
said land; and in some cases the right to sublet for grazing 
purposes. The lessor may or may not get first option on 
grazing rights.
(b) Power of removal and contract: The lessee has the
power to cut, remove and dispose of forest produce from the 
said land. It also has the power to contract with other persons 
to do the same.
(c) Right of entry; The lessor's right of entry to view 
varies, but generally he has to provide seven days notice, and 
the lessee, if he wishes, can require that the person making 
such an inspection be accompanied by an officer or
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representative of the lessee. The lessee also has the right to 
defer an inspection if the proposed time is not acceptable 
"on management grounds". This includes, but is not limited to, 
the fire risk existing at any one time. In only a few cases 
does the lessor have an unrestricted right to view. Since 
afforestation leases are supposed to be joint ventures the 
general limitations on the lessor's right to view impose an 
unnecessary restriction. The lessor shares in the risks taken 
in afforestation in proportion to his input to the total 
investment and should have access at all reasonable times 
without restrictions.
(d) Generally all leases also provide for access by the 
Maori land owners with the permission of the lessee for 
preserving and safeguarding graves and any other historic and 
sacred places of the Maori people and for hunting and fishing.
(e) Notification of breach of lease: Generally all
leases provide for notification of breach of lease, generally 
by written notice. Most leases allow for a period of ninety 
days to start the work necessary to comply with the covenants 
and agreements made in the lease. As all lessees have full 
knowledge of their obligations under the lease agreements this 
ninety day period of grace should be unnecessary.
(f) Minerals and mining: Generally the lessee is not
entitled to remove as "forest produce" any earth, rock, shingle 
or other minerals as part of the utilisation of the land. 
However, such materials may be used free of charge for purposes 
connected with the objects of the lease such as building and 
maintenance of roads, bridges, culverts, fences, skids and 
buildings. Most leases allow the lessor to "extract sand, 
shingle, metal, rock or other minerals from the said land and 
to establish, maintain and work a quarry or quarries on the 
said land". If the lessor should exercise this right then he 
has to pay a fair share of the costs of any roads used by him, 
and a fair share of all rates. Some leases include millable 
indigenous timber under this section.
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(g) Default ln performance: In some cases, if the
lessee does not carry out the covenant conditions or other 
provisions of the lease agreement, the lessor may enter the 
land and rectify any defaults in performance on the part of 
the lessee. All costs incurred by the lessor can be 
recovered under the Distress and Replevin Act 1908, including 
interest charges of 10# per annum. In other cases leases 
provide for a termination of the lease at the option of the 
lessor in the event of a default for a period exceeding three 
months, three months arrears of rent for example. Since the 
Lessee has full knowledge of all the lease requirements there 
should be no defaults.
(h) Rent in arrears: All leases are subject to the
Property Law Act 1952 which allows the lessor the right to 
enter and distrain upon the land for rent in arrears and dispose 
of such distresses until all rent in arrears and any costs 
involved in such an action are met. Section 118 of the Property 
Law Act 1952 requires notice to be served before such action 
can be taken. Most leases specify a three month period before 
the Property Law Act can be invoked. The lessor has the choice 
of collecting the rent under the Property Law Act, or 
terminating the lease, or both. However, none of the leases 
make adequate provisions for such a termination as by law any 
improvements on the land (including the forest) revert to the 
landowner.although the lessee has equity in the forest. Such 
provisions should be included as a termination on the basis of 
the present agreements could lead to involved legal wrangles 
over compensation.
(i) Uncontrolled causes of default: Most leases contain
a clause releasing the lessee from all covenants and agreements 
made under the lease agreement in the case of default due to 
factors beyond the lessee’s control such as
Acts of war by the Queen's enemies.
Restrictions and prohibitions of government.
Taking of land by proclamation.
Disease, blight or infection of timber.
Any other causes beyond the reasonable control 
of the lessee.
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Any relief applies only to such areas and for such time 
as the uncontrollable factors impose themselves, except that 
if it appears that the objects of the lease may be frustrated, 
either party may apply to the other for a termination of the 
lease. Again the terms of equity in any residual crop are not 
covered in the event of such a termination. Fire as an 
uncontrollable cause of default is discussed in section 3-9.
(j) Legal and consultation costs: All leases provide
for the lessee to pay all legal costs involved in the 
draughting, compilation and registration of the lease as well 
as any consultation or advisory costs incurred by the lessors 
in the lease negotiations. In some cases this is limited to 
a predetermined fixed amount. Most Maori land owners as 
individuals, trusts or corporations have little if any finance. 
This provision allows for the signing of a lease agreement to 
the satisfaction of both parties and prevents later accusations 
of lessees having taken advantage of lessors.
(k) Registration and approval: All leases are subject
to the Land Settlement Promotion and Land Aquisition Act 1952 
which requires registration of the lease for approval by the 
Supreme Court. Before 1967 all leases of Maori land also 
required the approval of the Maori Land Court.
(l) Options to buy land: Under the Maori Affairs Act
1952, no lease of Maori land may include an option to purchase. 
Any sale must be completely independent of any rights to land 
as may apply under any lease agreement. Some leases, however, 
contain a clause which effectively gives the lessee the first 
option to buy if the lessors decide to sell. Under this 
clause the lessor must advise the lessee he wishes to sell and 
at what price. The lessee then has six months to accept or 
reject such an offer. If the offer is rejected the lessor then 
has two years to sell the land at a price not less than the 
price stated in the notice to sell. If an acceptable offer
is made by a third party less than that stated in the notice to 
sell, the lessee has two months within which it may purchase at 
that price. If the lessee again refuses, the lessor may then 
sell at any price. The provisions of the lease continue to
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apply to the land despite its sale, unless sale is to the 
lessee. These provisions restrict the rights of the lessor 
to sell to whom he pleases.
(m) Other clauses: Various other clauses exist which
are contained in some leases only, but which could be included 
in all leases. The following list is extensive but not 
exhaustive;
The lessee is deemed to be the owner of the forest.
Any areas not forested are available to the lessor 
for private use with permission from the lessee.
Provisions to add land to the lease.
Regulations concerning the lessor’s cattle.
All notices to be in writing.
All notices to be delivered by registered mail.
The lessee not to give easements or access rights 
without the lessor’s permission.
3.6. Receipts other than from sale of timber
Most leases make some provision for receipts in addition 
to those from forest products. These include grazing receipts 
and receipts by way of compensation for land taken by the 
crown or any public authority under the Public Works Act 1928. 
Generally, compensation is shared between lessors and lessees 
equitably. Thus any compensation for land or minerals belongs 
solely to the lessor, compensation for any forest produce is 
shared on the same basis as receipts from the sale of such 
produce and compensation for any improvements other than the 
forest belong solely to the lessee.
Grazing receipts are generally shared in a similar 
manner to receipts from forest produce, though cases where 
they go entirely to either the lessor or the lessee exist. 
Since afforestation leases are revenue sharing enterprises to 
which the lessor’s input is the land, any revenue derived from 
the use of the land should benefit the lessor. It could be 
argued that as the lessee does not provide any input for 
grazing all the returns should accrue to the lessor.
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Conversely, as the lessee effectively becomes the sole user of 
the land under the lease, then the lessee should profit from 
grazing returns. However, leases are a joint venture on a 
revenue sharing basis, and thus the returns from grazing should 
be shared. The basis for sharing need not necessarily be the 
same as that for stumpage sharing.
3.7. Expiry of leases
All leases make provision for lessee and lessor to meet 
at a time equivalent to about one rotation before
expiry of the lease to discuss the operation of the forest in 
the last rotation, the cost liability for those trees which 
would not be taken as a final crop during that period, and 
whether or not there is to be an extension or renewal of the 
lease. If no agreement is reached, then for the remaining 
period of the lease all costs are to be deducted from 
royalties payable to the lessor and the lessor will have full 
ownership of the forest after the expiry of the lease without 
compensation to the lessee. In some leases the lessor is 
given the opportunity to determine the state of the land at 
the expiry of the lease by being able to opt for a 
discontinuation of replanting for the last rotation period.
He is thus able to continue to receive his full share of 
stumpage revenue, and take back the land in an unforested 
condition.
The lessor can be forced to pay for continued afforest­
ation and land planted in the last few years of the lease may 
not become available for other uses for another rotation period 
effectively extending the lease for that period if the lessor 
is not interested in continued involvement in forestry.
Actual economic conditions in 99 years time are impossible to 
predict and options must be left as open as possible. The 
uncertainty involved, is an argument for leases with shorter 
terms. Should the lessor have and exercise the option not to 
reforest in the last rotation period of the lease the question 
of what happens to the land arises. Although the land remains
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under the control of the lessee until the expiry date, land 
not reforested should not be left unproductive. An opportunity 
exists here to revert the control of the land back to the 
owner as the last crop is progressively clearfelled, for the 
owner to use for other purposes.
In some leases the lessee claims another three or five 
year period after the expiry of the lease to cut and remove all 
marketable forest produce remaining. Presumably this would 
only apply in the case where the lessee had paid the full cost 
of growing the trees and not charged the costs against 
royalties due to the lessor, in which case the lessor would be 
the sole owner of the trees, or the lessee would in fact be 
forcing the lessor to sell to the lessee exclusively. Any 
such extension of the period allowed to cut forest produce 
again effectively adds to the term of the lease.
Most leases allow the lessee six months after the 
expiry of the lease to remove buildings and fixed machinery, 
unless the lessor wishes to keep them and pays compensation.
The lessor generally has to notify the lessee not later than 
six months before the expiry of the lease that he wants to 
keep such buildings and fixed machinery.
Although the conditions applying at the expiry of a 
lease may be rigorously defined, the provision for meeting 
and discussing the future of the lease and subsequent 
management one rotation length before expiry allows for 
changes of conditions and requirements by mutual agreement 
at that time.
3.8. Arbitration
All leases provide for arbitration under the Arbitration 
Act 1908 in the event of any dispute or difference arising 
that cannot be settled by mutual discussion and agreement.
The Act provides for the appointment of two arbitrators.
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Telfer (unpubl. 1977), notes that ’’laymen and some 
lawyers are attracted to arbitration because they believe 
that it provides a cheap, expeditious and ’practical’ means 
of resolving disputes. Experience in numerous cases has 
shown that these beliefs are delusive and that arbitration 
is an unsatisfactory method of settling disputes in 
comparison with proceedings in a court of law". The 
reasons quoted are:-
(a) Arbitration is generally more expensive. Much of 
the costs involved in legal proceedings are borne by the 
State, where-as arbitration is paid for by the parties 
involved.
(b) Arbitration is more time consuming. In legal 
proceedings a Judge will continue with a case until it is 
completed, everybody concerned having to attend at the 
Court’s convenience. An arbitrator may be a busy lawyer or 
other professional man, who can only sit at intervals and 
generally tries to meet at the convenience of all involved. 
This again increases expenses.
(c) Arbitration is less satisfactory. Legal 
proceedings can determine admissability of evidence, the 
meaning and effect of contractual provisions etc.throughout 
the proceedings. Generally, arbitration covers an 
unnecessarily wide area because devices adopted in a court 
of law are only used to a limited extent. Often matters of 
contention in arbitration finish up before a court of law 
anyway.
Telfer recommends that arbitration clauses be omitted 
from lease agreements. He suggests instead that leases should 
be written so there is no risk of a submission to arbitration, 
and instead, points of contention referred to an impartial 
expert who will deliver a final decision on his own.
3.9- Risk and uncertainty - Managerial and biological
The lessor is subject to risks and uncertainties 
involved in investment in forestry. Some of these risks and
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uncertainties are subject to control by the.lessee. As the 
lessor does not have a similar degree of control it is 
questionable whether the lessor should have to take a full 
share of the risk, or at least have his interest protected 
from risks over which only the lessee has any degree of 
control.
Areas of risk over which the lessee has some control are 
management and the risk of loss from biological factors such as 
disease and insects and fire. Although some leases provide 
that the lessee will "restock any area on which the trees are 
damaged by fire, weather, insect or disease, killing or 
destroying all existing timber growth", there are no 
provisions as to who should bear the costs involved.
Presumably the lessee and lessor share the cost of the loss, 
the lessor writing off the establishment and tending costs, 
and the lessor having lost his share of stumpage. However, 
in the case of mismanagement, or failure to take sufficient 
preventative action against fire, insect or disease attack, 
the lessee would be at fault and the lessor should not have to 
share the loss.
The risk from fire could be covered from compulsory fire 
insurance. Although the fire risk is not great (Fenton unpubl. 
1969) it would give some protection to the lessor's potential 
revenue. The managerial and biological risk are more 
difficult to protect against. There have been attempts to 
ensure that the lessor has some say in forest management 
(Liley pers. comm. 1977), but generally lessees are reluctant 
to allow this. They claim that as the value of the lessee's 
inputs to that of the lessor are likely to be about 9 to 1, 
the lessee has the major vested interest and should therefore 
control management.
Risk and uncertainty are not adequately covered in lease 
agreements.
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CHAPTER 4.
RETURNS TO THE LESSOR
From the lessor’s viewpoint the most important factor in 
a joint afforestation scheme is the returns that he will receive 
when the forest produce is sold. Although some afforestation 
leases offer the lessor the choice of an annual land rent 
based on land value, the most commonly used method of 
renumerating the lessor is a sharing of forest revenue, which 
for the lessor is basically a deferred rent. In this chapter 
the methods used to determine the share of revenue for both 
lessor and lessee are critically reviewed and their 
implications examined.
Most existing leases give the lessor a fixed percentage 
of stumpage revenue. One of the major weaknesses of a fixed 
share of revenue is that the share is based on expected costs, 
and consequently it cannot incorporate actual changes in the 
costs experienced throughout the term of the lease, which 
could favour one party at the expense of the other.
Forecasts of future movements in stumpages and costs based on 
the extrapolation of past trends are presented in this chapter 
in order to examine the consequences of such changes.
4.1. Returns before harvesting commences
Most existing leases provide for a ’peppercorn rental’ 
of 12.36 cents/ha/annum to be paid to the lessor until 
stumpage revenue becomes available. Such a payment was first 
suggested, but not justified, by Grainger (1969). Most leases 
do not specify whether the peppercorn rental applies to the 
gross area or the net plantable area of a lease. The 
lessor's share of stumpage revenue is not adjusted with 
respect to the peppercorn rental.
Alternatively, some lease agreements offer an annual 
payment to the lessor until stumpage revenue becomes available. 
There is no method prescribed to calculate this payment and it
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is not based on area or land value; Its value is usually 
decided upon by mutual agreement between the two parties.
The lessor's share of stumpage revenue is not adjusted with 
respect to the magnitude of this annual payment.
Most of the more recent lease agreements include the 
option whereby the lessor can receive payments in advance, 
either as a lump sum or as a series of periodic payments, from 
his share of the anticipated returns. Generally advance 
payments incur a 6% per annum interest charge, the principal 
and any accumulated interest being deducted from the lessor’s 
share of revenue when it becomes available.
4.2. Returns after harvesting commences
Lease agreements vary in their definition of revenue 
which is to be shared by the lessor and the lessee. Some 
examples are:-
1) "For the purposes of calculating rent or royalty,
(a) if the timber is sold to a third party, stumpage will be 
the amount received by the lessee in respect to the market 
value of such timber.
(b) if the timber is cut and extracted by the lessee, then 
stumpage shall be that proportion of gross sales receipts 
from the produce so as would be allocated as stumpage as 
provided for in (a) above.
(c) if the timber is utilised by the lessee, then the lessor 
may elect to have a percentage of the crop equivalent to the 
lessor's percentage share of stumpage revenue to be put out for 
public tender and the monies received shall be stumpage as 
provided for in (a) and (b) above."
2) "Stumpage is the weighted average stumpage paid by 
the lessee for wood from all other sources, excluding those 
where a special purchasing price exists."
3) "Stumpage value means the weighted average wood value 
(less reasonable logging and cartage costs) paid in a 
particular financial year and the immediately preceding 
financial year for wood landed by the lessee at the lessee’s
nearest appropriate processing plant from all sources other 
than those in which the lessee is a participant in a profit 
sharing afforestation lease or is the owner or part owner of 
the particular forest.”
4) "Current market stumpage is the amount that a third 
party might fairly and properly be expected to pay at the time 
timber is removed."
5) "The stumpage used is that stumpage which can 
properly and fairly be considered to have been received if the 
produce had been sold to a third party on the open market."
All the above examples lack a clear definition of a 
pricing point for determining stumpage, although examples 
1 and 3 suggest that the pricing point is for standing timber. 
Log sales are commonly made at three different pricing points, 
these being:-
(1) on the stump or standing timber.
(2) on the skids in the forest. This includes felling 
and extraction costs.
(3) at the mill door. This includes felling, extraction 
loading and transport costs.
Obviously the unit sale price rises with each stage of 
harvesting. Each example does, however, allude to or mention 
market stumpages i.e. the price that logs are sold for on the 
open market. This suggests that competition is involved in 
determining the stumpage. The log market is discussed in 
section 4.4 and stumpage trends in section 4.5.
Those examples using a weighted average stumpage to 
determine the revenue that is to be shared between lessor and 
lessee could be unfair in that an average can only be based 
on previous sales. Unless changing money value and changes in 
real stumpage rates are taken into account, stumpage price 
changes over time will mean that a weighted average stumpage 
will under or over-estimate the current market stumpage. As 
a result the absolute returns due to the lessor will also be 
under or over-estimated.
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4.2.1. A definition of stumpage for use In leasing
The lessor’s contribution to most afforestation leases 
is the land on which the trees are to be grown. Consequently 
his share of stumpage revenue should be calculated using the 
value of the standing trees at the time of harvesting. The 
land makes no other contribution and hence the lessor has no 
equity in any operation other than growing trees.
Any further reference to stumpage in this essay, unless 
otherwise qualified, will refer to the standing or on she stump 
value of the timber.
4.3. Methods of allocating revenue
There are three methods used to determine the lessor’s 
share of stumpage revenue in lieu of land rent.
1) The Grainger method.
2) The discounted revenue method.
3) The internal rate of return (IRR) method.
The first method was developed by Grainger (1969) who 
attempted to calculate the percentage of stumpage due to the 
lessor for six land classes based on topography and vegetation 
cover before afforestation.
The Grainger method was designed for all land without 
allowing for location or site productivity, both important 
factors in forest profitability. The discounted revenue methoc 
was introduced in an attempt to derive a percentage of stumpage 
that would be applicable to a specific lease area, rather than 
to all areas. Both the Grainger method and the discounted 
revenue method used a predetermined interest rate and were 
based on current costs and returns.
The IRR method attempts to get away from a predetermined 
interest rate and the assumptions inherent in using current 
costs and returns. It does this by calculating an internal
44 .
rate of return at the time the trees are harvested, using 
historical costs and actual revenues to divide up revenue 
rather than a predetermined sharing arrangement. This method 
was first introduced by one of the larger private forestry 
companies although it has been investigated by the New Zealand 
Forest Service (Williams pers. comm. 1977). One of the most 
important changes involved in this method is the need to value 
the contribution made by the Maori land owner to the total 
investment.
4.3.1. The Grainger method
(A) The model
The method formulated by Grainger (1969), was derived 
using the economic model constructed for a joint forestry - 
agriculture land use study based on the Maraetai block as 
described by Ward et al (1966). A full understanding of the 
model required the writer to go back to the more detailed 
forestry data used in the Maraetai model presented in Fenton 
and Grainger (unpubl. 1965). Grainger did not always explain 
where his figures came from, nor did he explain the steps 
involved in the revenue sharing calculations adequately.
The Maraetai model was based on the use of radiata pine 
with 90% of the forest managed under a sawlog regime using a 
36 year rotation, and the remaining 10% of the forest managed 
under a pulpwood regime using a 20 year rotation. However,as 
sawlogs were restricted to the first three logs from each tree, 
the actual forest yield consisted of approximately 50% sawlogs 
and 50%' pulpwood. In order to reflect more average 
circumstances, Grainger made minor changes to the Maraetai 
model which reduced forest revenue by$1.98/ha/annum from year 
20 to year 37 and $4.94/ha/annum from year 37 onwards. The 
main change was an 8 km increase in the distance from the 
forest to the mill. Costs and prices were based on 1962 values
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Essentially Grainger used the annual expenditure and 
revenue of the Maraetai model up to year 40, after which a 
uniform sustained yield (constant costs and revenues) 
situation existed. At year 40, Grainger calculated the annual 
residual revenue generated by the afforestation project and 
allocated this as a return to land. Grainger then estimated 
the percentage of stumpage revenue that this residual 
represented. Throughout his calculations Grainger assumed a 
50% tax rate on all interest and revenue that could not be 
charged against expenditure. He attempted to incorporate 
this by halving the interest rate of 6h%. Grainger’s choice 
of interest rate and its subsequent adjustment is discussed 
further in section 4.3.1. (B).
Grainger acknowledged that the degree of tending, the 
variability of roading costs, initial vegetation, topography 
and location were all likely to affect profitability. To 
overcome the degree of tending problem Grainger assumed a 
forestry enterprise of average efficiency producing mainly 
sawlogs. However, he was unable to include variable roading 
costs and location, but suggested that each lease should make 
provisions for a review of the lessor’s share of stumpage 
revenue after a lapse of 20 to 25 years, this being the period 
in which the first intermediate revenues arise in the 36 
year rotation.
The effects of topography and initial vegetation were 
incorporated into the model by varying the costs likely to be 
influenced by these factors e.g. initial clearing costs 
(vegetation type and slope), planting costs (slope - hand or 
machine plant), and logging costs (slope). Grainger combined 
the effects of initial vegetation and topography changes into 
six major land classes each with several subclasses which 
carried the same share of revenue for the lessor. The land 
classes are shown in table 4.1.
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The Maraetai block was estimated by Grainger to be class 
2 land. An expanded presentation of the calculation of the 
lessor’s share of stumpage revenue for the whole Maraetai 
block is given below.
The annual forest development expenditure compounded to
year 40 at 3h i interest rate is given in table 4.2.
TABLE 4.2.
Expenditure compounded to year 40 at 3 h l ($000)
Year Costs Compounded
costs
Year Costs Compounded
costs
1 138.2 480 21 205.6 376
2 63.8 214 22 199.0 352
3 76.2 248 23 197.2 336
4 88.8 280 24 188.0 312
5 78.8 242 25 188.0 302
6 121.4 358 26 120.6 188
7 94.6 270 27 129.4 196
8 90.4 248 28 ■=3"OCMi—1 176
9 96.4 258 29 129.4 184
10 96.6 252 30 121.8 168
11 129.0 324 31 130.6 174
12 149.8 366 32 129.6 168
13 142.6 338 33 137.2 172
14 142.2 326 34 137.2 166
15 142.8 318 35 136.6 160
16 144.8 312 36 133.4 152
17 144.8 304 37 131.4 144
18 140.6 284 38 398.8 424
19 124.6 242 39 227.4 234
20 116.6 220 40 227.4 228
$10,496
Source Grainger (1969), appendix 2.
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Costs include all direct forest costs, indirect forest costs 
and sawlog logging costs. Grainger adds certain external 
overheads, fire protection equipment costs and contingencies 
at a later stage, but gives no reason for not including these 
costs in his forest development expenditure. The total 
compounded cost of development of $10,496,000 is supposed to 
represent the value of the lessee's investment after having 
paid 50% tax on the assumed return of 6%l interest on 
invested capital.
Table 4.3 gives the compounded value of all forest 
revenue at year 40, after allowing for Grainger's adjustment 
for taxation. Revenue before year 40 is obtained from sawlog 
thinnings, pulpwood clearfellings and in years 38 to 40, 
sawlog clearfellings. Grainger treats revenue as an investment 
account earning Interest before tax. To allow for taxation,
Grainger deducts costs from revenue. The remainder is 
taxable and only half the taxable revenue is any one year 
is added into the cash flow. The compounded value, in year 
40, of all revenues received up to and including year 40, 
after allowing for taxation, amounted to $6,022,000. A 6%% 
return on this investment would given an annual income of 
$392,000 before tax each year from year 4l onwards.
To derive the lessor's share of stumpage revenue,
Grainger carries out the following calculations:-
(1) Calculation of the lessee's net forest investment 
in year 40. ($000)
Compounded forest development costs 10,496 
Other expenditure (external overheads, 
fire protection equipment,
contingencies - compounded at 3k%>) 1,074
11,570
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TABLE 4.3.
Forest revenue compounded to year 40 at 3\%o ($000)
Year Gross Forest Costs Taxable Net Compounded
revenue revenue revenue revenue
20 44 116.6 — 44.0 83.2
21 164 205.6 - 164.0 300.0
22 164 199.0 - 164.0 291.0
23 204 197.2 6.8 200.4 342.0
24 204 188.0 16.0 196.0 325.0
25 210 188.0 22.0 199.0 320.0
26 210 120.6 89.4 165.2 258.0
27 212 129 4 82.6 170.8 258.0
28 212 120.4 91.6 166.2 242.2
29 212 129.4 82.6 170.0 242.0
30 184 121.8 62.2 153.0 211.2
31 200 130.6 69.4 165.0 220.0
32 200 129.6 70.4 164.8 213.0
33 200 137.2 62.8 168.6 211.0
34 206 137.2 68.8 171.6 207.8
35 194 136.6 57.4 165.2 193.4
36 162 133.4 28.6 147.8 168.6
37 162 131.4 30.6 147.2 161.8
38 862 398.8 463.2 630.4 674.0
39 860 227.4 632.6 543.8 560.0
40 852 227.4 624.6 539.6 539.6
$6,022.0
Note: Grainger assumed that costs and revenues were centred
at the mid-point of each year.
Source: Grainger (1969), appendix 2 and 3.
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Less sawlog logging costs 
(accumulated capital and 
operating costs - compounded
at 3k%) 480
Lessee’s net forest investment $11,090
Logging costs were deducted as the land owner did not 
have any equity in the logging operations. Grainger, however, 
failed to subtract logging related salaries and logging 
related external overheads.
(2) Calculations of annual residual revenue.
($000)
Annual forest income after year 40
Interest @ 6%% on accrued income 392
Pulpwood - 94,860 m^ @ $1.10/m^ 104
Sawlogs - 89,200 @ $8.l6/m^ 728
Slabwood - 19,540 m^ @ $1.32/m^ 26
Less - annual sawlog logging costs 94
$1,250
- annual sawlog logging profit 
(10% of capital and accumulated
operating costs) 00■=r 142
Less - annual forest operating costs 166
$1,108
- interest on lessee’s net 
forest investment
(6hl of $10,090,000) 720 886
Annual residual revenue $ 222
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The annual forest income of $1,250,000 represents the 
combined actual and Imputed revenue received each year from 
year *11 onwards. The sawlog stumpage values are an ’on the 
landing’ value, and sawlog logging costs and profit are 
deducted to give an ’on the stump’ forest revenue of 
$1,108,000. Of this sum, $886,000 or 80%, is due to the 
(essor for the current year’s forest costs plus interest on 
his forest development capital. The lessee's, share of ’on 
the stump' forest revenue is $222,000 or 20%, which is the 
residual revenue after all the lessee’s costs have been met.
Grainger's calculations only applied to the class 2 
land of the Maraetai block. The lessor’s share of stumpage 
revenue for other land classes are shown in table 4.4.
Grainger calculated residual land values for each land 
class. For land class 2 he argued that $222,000 represented 
a 6h% return on the land value compounded to year 40 at 3h%, 
i.e. he assumes that the interest was taxable. For the 
Maraetai block, which consisted of 10,120 ha, the land value 
in year one was calculated as follows
____’_________discounted at ~ $99/ha
10,120 x 6.5
Table 4.4 summarises the residual land values for 
each land class.
Although Grainger's economic model would have resulted 
in a zero land value and a zero share of revenue to the lessor 
for class 6, he assigned it a nominal $5/ha land value and a 
1% share of revenue to the lessor. Although this class of land 
is so marginal that it would normally be regarded as unplantable 
it is likely to have a positive value when included as small 
areas within areas of a better class.
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TABLE 4.4.
The lessor's share of revenue and residual land values
Land class Lessor's share of Undeveloped
revenue (%) land value
($/ha)
124 
99 
74 
49 
25 
5
Source:- Grainger (1969), table 4.
1 25
2 20
3 15
4 10
5 5
6 1
The Grainger method was designed to be universally 
applicable to all potential lease areas. An example of its 
use follows:-
A field appraisal of 10,000 ha gives the following land 
classification:-
tractor terrain - 3000 ha light scrub : land class 2 
tractor terrain - 4000 ha medium scrub : land class 3 
tractor terrain - 1000 ha new cutover : land class 4 
non-tractor terrain - 2000 ha heavy scrub : land class 5
The lessor's share of revenue is calculated as follows
Ha Weighted share 
revenue(%)
class 2 3000 30% 20% royalty 6.0
class 3 4000 40% % 15% royalty 6.0
class 4 1000 10% % 10% royalty 1.0
class 5 2000 20% % 0% royalty 1.0
10000 100% Total 14.0J5
In this case the lessor is entitled to 1455 of the
stunpage revenue when it becomes available.
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(B) Critical appraisal of the Grainger method
Although the Grainger method was designed to yield a 
formula for land leasing acceptable to both land owner and 
investor, the method has serious flaws in concept and has been 
outdated by changes especially in forest management practices.
The approach taken by Grainger is basically a ’residual’ 
approach, whereby the economic surplus available to pay for 
the use of the land is dependent on the interest rate chosen. 
Rather than reflecting the true productivity of land and 
capital, the method allocates a pre-determined return to 
capital, leaving the residual as a return to land. In 
Grainger’s words "the investor who provides the capital 
necessary to render the land productive is entitled to his 
agreed financial return". Grainger recognised that if rates 
comparable to financial yields shown by industrial and 
commercial investments at the time were used, potential lease­
hold land would be negative in value. He agreed that since 
the main competitor for large blocks of undeveloped land 
was agriculture, the rate of interest that would be earned 
by land similar to that of the Maraetai block, if used for 
agriculture, should be used. Systematic surveys by the N.Z. 
Meat and Wool Board showed that this was 6h %  (Grainger 1969), 
although it was not stated whether this was before or after 
tax. Grainger did not explain why the provider of capital 
should get an agreed return in preference to the provider 
of land - both are essential forest inputs.
Grainger attempted to make his method applicable to 
private enterprise by considering the effects of taxation.
He did this by accepting that "the lessee’s investment 
cannot be credited with any interest that would be lost 
in taxation if that interest was literally receivable in 
cash". Consequently, he compounded costs at 3\ %  interest 
rather than the full 6h %. However, firstly, from the point 
of view of individual lessees and lessors, the model should 
not include any allowances for taxation because of the
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entirely different tax situations that may exist for lessee 
and lessor. The full rate of interest should be applied to 
all costs and the lessee’s equity should not be reduced 
because he has other sources of income against which he can 
charge his forest costs. Equity should be based on full 
costing; the lessee and lessor can then pay taxes according 
to the tax scale applying to them.
Secondly, in reality, ’interest’ earned by a growing 
forest is treated by the N.Z. Department of Inland Revenue 
as locked up capital, which is not taxable - only the net 
revenue from the eventual sale of the trees is taxable. As 
a result, Grainger’s model does not allow for taxation at all, 
but uses half the real interest rate. The full 6hl is only 
used in year 40 to calculate the "pre-tax” interest on the 
lessee's net investment (which was compounded at 3hi) 9 and the 
annual income from accrued revenue.
In view of the above, it would lhave been more 
appropriate for Grainger to have used a 3h% interest rate to 
calculate the 'pre-tax' interest on tlhe lessee's net investment 
and the annual income from accrued revenue. Had he done so, 
the calculation of the annual residual revenue presented in 
section 4.3*1- (A) would have been as follows:
($000)
Annual forest income after year 40 
Interest @ on accrued income 211
104
728
26
Pulpwood
Sawlogs
Slabwood
1,069
Less - annual sawing lojgging costs 94
- annual sawing loigging profit 48 142
927
5 5 .
($000)
Less - annual forest operating costs 166 
- Interest on lessee’s net 
forest investment
(3hi of $10,090,000) 353 519
Annual residual revenue 408
Lessee’s share of stumpage 519/927 = 56% 
Lessor’s share of stumpage *108/927 = 44#
In any event, Grainger’s calculation of forest revenue 
compounded to year *10 is also incorrect. Grainger made no 
allowance for the fact that forest development costs incurred 
in the years before revenue became available, could be carried 
forward under a ’cost of bush’ formula (see chapter 6) for 
taxation purposes, and charged against income in subsequent 
years. It was not until year 40 that accumulated income 
($5,918,000) exceeded accumulated costs ($5,712,000) and a 
taxable income existed. This error resulted in the after tax 
revenue being considerably understated, which in turn reduced 
the interest on accrued income, the annual residual revenue 
and the lessor’s share of stumpage.
The correct cash flow for forestry was calculated using 
the financial data from the Maraetai model provided by Fenton 
and Grainger (unpubl. 1965), and is presented in appendix 4. 
This cash flow excluded all logging costs (in which the lessor 
has no equity) and allowances for taxation. The shares of
stumpage revenue for lessor and lessee calculated at both
6h! and 3h% interest were as follows
Interest rate 3h% 6%!
Lessor’s share of stumpage revenue It9% -21%
Lessee's share of stumpage revenue 51% 121%
This compares to Grainger's results of lessee's share 
80#, and lessor’s share 20%. The reasons why Grainger's 
calculations do not compare more closely to the corrected
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results at the 3\% interest rate are:-
(1) Grainger failed to exclude all logging costs. He 
did exclude the capital and accumulated operating costs but 
failed to exclude logging related salaries and logging 
related external overheads. These costs compounded to year 40, 
overstated the lessee’s net forest investment, which in turn 
increased the interest on the lessee’s net forest investment, 
and reduced the annual residual revenue and the lessor’s share 
of revenue.
(2) Grainger charged 6h% imputed interest on the 
lessee's net forest investment and allowed for a 6hl return 
on accrued income. Both had been compounded at 3h%, and as 
the lessee's forest investment significantly exceeds accrued 
income, using the 6%% interest rate rather than the 3^ % 
interest rate effectively increased the lessee's equity in 
absolute terms.
(3) Grainger significantly reduces accrued income by 
'allowing' for taxation and not carrying forward costs 
incurred before revenue becomes available. 50% of the so 
called taxable income each year was deducted from the cash 
flow. This reduced the annual residual revenue and hence the 
lessor's equity.
The correct results at 6%% and 3h% suggest that for 
the lessor to be allocated 20% of stumpage revenue, an interest 
rate of about 4^% should have been used.
To avoid a residual approach, Grainger could hc.ve 
introduced land value and shared revenue on the basis of 
percentage cost contribution. Assuming a land value <>f $30/ha 
(1962 values), the following would apply for the tota, area 
of 10,120 ha.
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Interest rate 3\%
Land value compounded for 
40 years $1,091,198
Lessee's net forest Investment 
year 40* $10,642,000
$11,733,198
Lessor's share of revenue 9-3%
6 \ %
$3,769,520
$22,476,000
$26,245,520 
14. H
* corrected forest Investment (see appendix 4)
Grainger's use of a 3\% interest rate indicates the N.Z. 
Forest Service’s desire to get some of the large blocks of 
Maori land into production forestry. Grainger acknowledged 
that even "6\% was totally unsatisfactory for risk capital and 
therefore had to be regarded as a bedrock minimum imposed under 
duress", yet the N.Z. Forest Service was thus willing to accept 
effective returns of 3h% in order to get the land into forestry. 
Grainger's calculations allow for a 10% profit on logging 
investment. The rate of interest to be used in assessing the 
profitability of forestry by the N.Z. Forest Service in 1968 
was 7% (Fenton unpubl. 1969), and present day investment in 
forests is required to earn 10% or more, or have redeeming 
social advantages (Williams pers. comm. 1977).
Although Grainger used a very low interest rate, he 
expected a substantial improvement in forest profitability on 
a relatively long term basis due to increased revenues. 
Subsequent work by Fenton and Tustin (1972) and Fenton and 
Merle Dick (1972a,b,c) showed that increased profitability was 
possible without waiting for long term changes In revenue.
They proposed single product regimes growing sawlogs for 
export on a much shorter rotation than the regimes used for 
the Maraetai models. A much higher degree of tending was 
involved. The increased profitability was mainly due to the 
higher returns expected from export logs and to the reduced 
effect of interest charges due to the shorter rotation. As a 
result of this work regimes, management practices and cash 
flows have changed and Grainger's »average» approach is no
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longer applicable. This applies especially to land leased for 
pulpwood production, where although costs are lower, the 
eventual return is far below that envisaged by Grainger’s 
calculations.
Grainger claimed that his method would be applicable in 
the case of increased revenues, as equity was expressed only 
as a ratio. Both lessee and lessor would receive increased 
absolute amounts of money. However, their relative shares 
still remain a reflection of Grainger's view of the relative 
equity of each partner in the total project which was based on 
a 3k% interest rate, which was half the interest rate earned 
by agriculture. The fixing of relative equity in forest 
investment for periods up to 99 years cannot be said to be a 
sensible approach for either lessee or lessor. Grainger makes 
no comments on the applicability of his method should the 
rate of interest earned by agriculture change significantly.
Grainger’s average approach also had other drawbacks in 
that both lessees and lessors soon recognised special 
conditions in their lease areas which Grainger had not 
allowed for, mainly site productivity and location, both major 
determinants of forest profitability. Modifications made in 
the use of Grainger's formula after several years use 
included:-
(1) Land typing after planting. After noting that land 
types and methods of land clearing assumed by the Grainger 
approach did not always reflect the actual land clearing 
methods used, lessors opted for a classification of the land 
after planting allowing the exact share of stumpage due to the 
lessor to be calculated. This modification involved keeping 
detailed records of land preparation procedures and the areas 
involved.
(2) Provision for advance payments. Grainger's method 
was based on a rental deferred to the time of harvesting. As 
some lessors were not prepared to wait as long as this for
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returns, provisions were included in lease agreements allowing 
the lessor to obtain payments in advance (see section 4.1.).
(3) Locality allowance. Grainger’s method was based 
on an average forest and lessors were quick to note that their 
land had special advantages in some cases. In one case the 
share of stumpage revenue payable to the lessor was increased 
several percent to allow for a favourable location.
Despite the drawbacks, Grainger’s method did have the 
advantage of being simple to apply, requiring only an initial 
land class assessment to determine the percentage of stumpage 
revenue due to the lessor. Furthermore, a percentage of revenue 
was a concept easily understood by Maori land owners.
Application of the method involved no complicated calculations, 
required no detailed records to be kept and needed no 
estimations of costs and revenues.
Despite the fact that Grainger himself suggested that 
the method should only provide a basis for contractual offer, 
negotiation and acceptance, the method was very strictly 
applied. This was high-lighted in the first lease signed by 
the N.Z. Forest Service using the Grainger method, an area 
which included a large proportion of sand dunes. Although 
part of the reason for afforestation was to prevent further 
inland movement of the dunes, the area was assessed by the 
Forest Service and allocated a 25% share of revenue to be 
paid to the lessor, the maximum provided for under the 
Grainger method, as the area was all machine plantable and 
had little initial vegetation. However, sand dune forestry 
requires considerable investment in planting marram grass and 
lupins even before pines can be planted, and site productivity 
is not comparable to the Maraetai block. Also location was 
not favourable, being many kilometers from the nearest 
possible domestic market. Private companies intending to 
plant only pulpwood were also strict in their use of the 
Grainger method, despite the fact that cash flows for
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pulpwood are completely different to those used by Grainger. 
Maori owners often accepted proposals on the basis of the 
highest percentage of stumpage revenue offered* without 
realising the big difference in their ultimate returns 
between pulpwood and sawlogs.
Grainger’s method, viewed in terms of today’s forestry 
practices and economic conditions, is very much outdated and 
as such should not be used any more in assessing potential 
leasehold land. The errors and confusion resulting from 
attempts to allow for taxation mean that all that Grainger 
produced was a set of percentages that appeared attractive 
to potential lessors. However, its aim of getting 
undeveloped Maori land into production forestry on a revenue 
sharing basis was very successful. Many thousands of 
hectares were signed up based on a payment derived by the use 
of the Grainger formula.
4.3.2. The discounted revenue method
(A) The model
The discounted revenue method uses essentially the same 
approach as the Grainger method, except that instead of 
compounding to the year when normality occurs on the whole 
forest (equal annual revenues and costs), this method 
discounts costs and revenues for a single hectare for a single 
rotation. A confidential personal communication provided the 
example presented below which is from an actual lease 
agreement. The agreement aims to grow pulpwood using a 21 
year rotation and a 17 year planting period. Land clearing 
and preparation occurs in year 0, planting in year 1.
1. Revenue
Estimated forest revenue in year 22 is $3553.05/ha.
This is the value of the standing timber. Discounted for 
22 years to year 0 at an Q% interest rate this is $653*4l/ha.
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Forest
Proj ect 
year
development costs
Total costs per 
planted hectare
Costs discounted 
to year 0 @ 8%
0 $175. oo 4=- $175.
-=rco
1 123-.13 114. 01
2 6, oooo 5.46
3 9..56 7.59
6 108,.28 68. 23
9 10..87 5.44
-21 inclusive 16., 06 176. 93
$553.50
Note: all costs are incurred at the beginning
of the year.
3. Land expectation value (LEV)
LEV = discounted revenue - discounted costs 
= $653.41 - $553.50 
= $99.91
The land expectation value of $99-91 represents the 
economic surplus after invested capital has earned 8% interest, 
and if allocated as a return to land, becomes the residual land 
value at the time of clearing and preparing each hectare. The 
land expectation value therefore relates to the beginning of 
year 0 for each hectare planted.
4. Calculations of the lessor's share of stumpage 
The 17 year development period is incorporated by 
calculating an adjusted land expectation value, which represents 
the present net worth of a single hectare planted in equal 
annual areas over a 17 year period. It is the present net 
worth of a cash flow of 17 annual payments each of one 
seventeenth of the land expectation value, occurring at the 
beginning of each year.
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LEV,/(l + if - l\ (1+i) 
n \i(l + i)n J
land expectation value for one rotation, 
forest development period, 
decimalised interest rate.
Adjusted land expectation value
where LEV 
n 
i
The discounted annual payment multiplier,(1 + i)n - 1
i (1 + i)n
assumes end of year payments, so a correction factor of
(1 + i) is applied to give the adjusted land expectation value
at the beginning of year 0.
Adjusted land expectation value = $99.91 x 9.12164 x 1.08/.
ha
17
= $99-91 x 0.5792/ha 
= $57•86/ha
As a share of discounted stumpage revenue this is
$57.86
$653.41
x 100 8.8%
8.8% is the lessor’s share of stumpage revenue. Its 
derivation is further discussed in section 4.3.2. (B).
5. Calculation of annual rent
As an alternative to a share of stumpage revenue, the 
lease agreement offered the lessor the option of receiving an 
annual rental based on the lessor’s share of stumpage 
revenue calculated above. The lessor’s expected income 
(discounted to year 0) is $57.86/ha which represents 8.8% of 
discounted stumpage revenue. The annual cash rental in 
advance that this represents is calculated as follows:
(a) The lessor’s expected income is reduced by a 
’normal’ reduction of 30% for risk not taken by the lessor 
daring the life of the crop. If the lessor chooses to receive 
a guaranteed risk free annual rental, then the lessee takes 
the risk that the estimated forest revenue will not be 
realised. This reduction is further discussed in section 
43.2. (B). $57.86 x 0.7 = $40.50/ha
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(b) The $40.50 is then spread over 22 years (year 0 
plus a 21 year rotation) as equal annual payments, which if 
discounted to year 0 at 8% interest are equal to the $40.50.
Annual rent = $40.50^a 
10.20074*
= $3.97/ha
*10.20074 is the discounted annual payment multiplier 
for 22 years @ 8%.
Such annual rentals would be due to the lessor at the 
end of each year.
5. Calculation of land value
An annual rental of 6% at land value is the lessor’s 
return from most agricultural leases. On the assumption that 
the annual rental of $3*97 represents a 6% before tax on land 
value, land value for planted land is
$3-97 x 100 = $65 # 17/ha
6
The lease area to which this example applied consisted 
of a plantable area of 3528 ha out of a total of 5257 ha.
Land value based on gross area would be
$66.17 x 3528 = $44_41 /ha 
5257
This is a residual land value based on pulpwood 
afforestation and bears no relation to market land values.
(B) Critical appraisal of the discounted revenue method
Although the discounted revenue model overcomes some of 
the problems associated with the Grainger model, others are 
still inherent within themethod. Also, as presented, the model 
contains a conceptual flaw seriously affecting the results.
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The discounted revenue model again relies on a 
predetermined interest rate and does not reflect the true 
productivity of land and capital. Capital is allocated an 
Q% return and land the residual, although the choice of 
interest rate was not explained in the example. The method is 
correct in not allowing for the effects of taxation, and thus 
the interest rate of 8% is a significant increase on the 
effective 3h% used by Grainger. However, increasing the 
interest rate merely increases the return to capital, thus 
reducing the calculated residual (LEV) which is the basis of 
the lessor’s share of stumpage. As with the Grainger method, 
the use of the discounted revenue method only results in a 
share of stumpage that appears attractive to the Maori land 
owner. The lessor's share of stumpage is very sensitive to 
the interest rate chosen. For example, using the discounted 
revenue method as outlined in the example in section 4.3.2.(A), 
using a 7% interest rate would have increased the lessor's 
share of stumpage to lS.5%, and using a 9% interest rate would 
have reduced it to minus 0.3/S.
The main advantage of the discounted revenue method is 
that it can be applied to a specific lease area c.f. Grainger's 
average approach. By discounting estimated costs and revenues, 
allowances can be made for the type of product to be grown, 
the timing and intensity of tending, location, site productivity 
and rotation length. However, there is no incentive for the 
forest investor (lessee) to keep his estimated costs down as 
decreased costs only result in an increased share of stumpage 
revenue for the lessor. Furthermore, the more conservative the 
estimate of revenue, the higher the lessee's share of 
stumpage revenue. As the lessor's percentage share is 
written into the lease, there is no opportunity for the 
lessor to have the percentage adjusted if actual costs and 
revenues do not agree with the estimates used.
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The conceptual flaw in the example given is in the 
calculation of the lessor’s share of stumpage which is 
determined by allocating the adjusted land expectation value 
as a return to land and expressing it as a percentage of 
discounted revenue. Land expectation value was reduced by ^2% 
to allow for a 17 year planting period, yet the discounted 
revenue applied to a single hectare planted straight away. 
Discounted revenue should be similarly adjusted as revenue 
also arises over a 17 year period, and not all in one year.
For example, if the whole hectare had been planted straight 
away and no adjustment of the land expectation value was 
required, the lessor’s share of stumpage would have been:-
Land expectation value year 0 _ $99-91
Discounted revenue year 0 $653.^1
= 15.3$
Instead, by adjusting only the land expectation value 
for a seventeen year planting period, the lessor's share was 
reduced to 8.8%. A 3^  year planting period would have 
reduced the lessor’s share to 5.6/5. The method as used is both 
incorrect and inequitable and should not be used in its 
incorrect form.
For a 17 year development period the correct 
calculation should have been:-
Adjusted land expectation value = $99-91 x 0.5792
= $57.86/ha
Adjusted discounted revenue = $653*^1 x 0.5792
= $378.^J6/ha
True equity ratio = $57*86
$378 Jl6
= 15.3% as above.
If the discounted revenue method is used without 
correcting for this error, the lessor could suffer a drop in 
potential income as a result of a staggered planting program
designed to suit the lessee. As the percentage of stumpage 
revenue due to the lessor is written into the lease agreement, 
this is open to serious abuse. The lessor's return should be 
based on the land being used to its best advantage i.e. the 
total area planted straight away.
The annual land rent and land values, calculated as in 
the example, after correcting for the error in method are as 
follows:-
Annual land rent per planted hectare $6.86
Land value per planted hectare $114.33
Average land value (gross area) $76.73
In calculating the annual rent in advance in lieu of a 
percentage of stumpage revenue at the time of harvesting, the 
adjusted land expectation value was reduced by a ’normal’ 
reduction of 30% for risk not taken by the lessor during the 
life of the crop i.e. the risk that the predicted revenue 
would not be realised. Other lease examples state that "over 
30 years or more this risk is assessed at 50% of the land 
expectation value”.
The lessor’s share of stumpage revenue and the value of 
the annual rental he may receive as an alternative are written 
into the lease and fixed for the term of the lease. As a 
result, if the lessor chooses to receive an annual rental, he 
is prevented from regaining the reduction made in his expected 
income if the predicted revenue is in fact realised. Also he 
is prevented from sharing in the extra returns should actual 
revenue exceed predicted revenue. The lessor's income in 
this case is completely dependent on the estimated forest 
revenue.
The 30% and 50% reductions may appear large, but small 
changes in expected income have a large effect on land 
expectation value. In the example, the anticipated forest 
revenue in year 22 is $3553-05/ha, which for a yield of
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O "2600 mJ/ha is equivalent to a stumpage of $5.92/m .
Reducing the land expectation value in year 0 by 30% from 
$99.91 to $69-94 is the same as reducing the expected forest 
revenue in year 22 by $162.93 (at an 8% discount rate), or 
reducing the stumpage to $5.65, a drop of only 4.5%.
There is no reason why the lessor could not be offered 
a proportion of the rental in advance due to him and his true 
share calculated at the time the income is realised, the over 
or under payment being corrected at that time. This way the 
lessor still partakes of the risk and any reason to reduce his 
share is negated.
The annual land rent and land values, calculated as in 
the example, after correcting for the error in method and not 
reducing the lessor's expected income to allow for risk not 
taken, are as follows
Annual land rent per planted hectare $9.80
Land value per planted hectare $163-33
Average land value (gross area) $109.61
Although the discounted revenue method overcomes some 
of the problems associated with the Grainger method, it is not 
so easy to apply. While the concept of a percentage of 
stumpage revenue or an equal annual land rent is readily 
understood by most Maori land owners, the method should be used 
with care because the final result is very sensitive to minor 
changes in the estimated costs and revenues, and to the 
interest rate chosen. There is no need to maintain accurate 
records of costs and revenues, as once the revenue shares 
have been calculated, the relative equity of both partners is 
fixed. This cannot be regarded as being a sensible approach 
as it is most unlikely that the relative real equity would 
remain unchanged for 99 years. The method has potential if 
used correctly, but the relative equity still remains a 
reflection of the costs, revenues and interest rate chosen
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rather than a reflection of the relative productivity of land 
and capital.
4.3.3. The internal rate of return method
(A) The model
The internal rate of return (IRR) method leaves the final 
apportioning of revenue until after the forest has been 
harvested since it is based on actual costs and revenues. The 
method assumes that returns should be shared between lessor 
and lessee in proportion to their respective inputs. The 
lessor's input is the land, the lessee’s the costs of 
establishment, management and protection. The calculation 
after harvesting allows all inputs to earn imputed interest 
at the calculated internal rate of return i.e. that rate of 
interest which if used would result in a zero net present 
worth.
The IRR method has not been fully implemented because 
leases signed using the method have not been going long enough 
for a final tree crop to be produced. The example given below 
was taken directly from a schedule attached to a lease 
agreement to illustrate the method. Because the example given 
in the schedule was difficult to follow, it is presented here 
in an expanded form. The example is based on constant money 
values, i.e. prices can change only in real terms. However, 
as suggested in the schedule, a suitable money value index 
should be used in the actual calculation to allow for changing 
money value between planting and harvesting.
The lessor’s share of revenue determined by the IRR 
method is not written into the lease agreement, but is 
recalculated at the end of each rotation. The following example 
illustrates the method for the first and second rotations.
The lease agreement specified the use of ”pinus radiata or 
other fast growing exotic trees". Forest location and site 
quality were not specified.
69.
(a) First crop
Basic assumptions:-
Rotation length = 24 years. Planting occurs in year 3- 
IRR was calculated to be 7%.
Stumpage revenue in year 27 = $4269.89/ha 
Initial land value as determined by the Government 
Valuation Department = $123.55/ha. This is the 
value of the land before any clearing or 
preparation is undertaken.
Table 4.5 shows the calculation of the contribution 
made to investment in the first crop by both lessor and 
lessee. The lessor’s equity is calculated as follows
Lessor’s equity = $644.17 100X
$'1270.82 .1 
= 15.17.
The lessor should receive 15.1% of stumpage 
revenue.
The lessee’s share of land value arises from ’land value’ 
at the end of the rotation, as determined by the Government 
Valuation Department, including allowances for land clearing 
operations undertaken by the lessee not included in ’land value’ 
as determined before forest development. Land value is 
explained in more detail in sections 5.1 and 5.6. Improvements 
remaining refer to such items as logging roads which are used 
for access during re-establishment.
(b) Second crop
Basic assumptions:-
Rotation length = 24 years. Planting occurs in 
year 27.
IRR was calculated to be 9%.
Stumpage revenue in year 54 = $4460.16 /ha 
Total land value is now $321.22/ha of which $l60.6l 
is the lessee's share of land value. There is no
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TABLE 4.5.
Contributions to Forest Investment - First Crop
(1) Lessor’s contribution $/ha compounded 
to year 27 @ 1%
Land value $123-55 for 27 years 
Less initial land value 
Lessor's net contribution
767-72
123-55
644.17
(2) Lessee's contribution
Capital employed $7-41 for 27 years 
Less initial capital 
Initial roading $ll8.6l for 26 years 
Preparation $177-91 for 25 years 
Planting/opossum control/releasing 
$98.84 for 24 years 
Releasing $24.71 for 23 years 
Year 26 - upgrading roads for logging 
$516.44 for 1 year
Annual costs $14.83/ha/year for 24 years
Less lessee's share of land value plus 
value of improvements remaining 
Leesee's net contribution
46.04
7-41 38.63
688.81 
965-59
501.35
117-14
552.59
923-15
3787-26
160.61
3626.65
Total contributions 4270.82
Notes: (i) Capital employed - this refers to capital items 
involved in the process of growing trees but not consumed by 
it e.g. lookout towers (Allison pers. comm. 1977).
(ii) Annual costs - these are compounded using the 
compounded annual payment multiplyer which assumes end of 
year payments. A correction factor of (1+i) , where i is the 
decimalised interest rate, is applied to give the value of 
the compounded annual costs at the beginning of year 27.
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reason why the lessee’s and the lessor’s 
share of land value should be the same.
Table 4.6 shows the calculation of the contribution 
made to investment in the second crop by both lessor and 
lessee. The lessor’s equity is calculated as follows
Lessor’s equity = $1109.99 „ 100X
$4435.09 1
= 25.0%
The lessor Should receive 25.0% of stumpage revenue.
(B) Critical appraisal of the IRR method
Unlike the Grainger and discounted revenue methods, the 
IRR method does not use a predetermined interest rate to 
allocate a calculated residual as a return to land. Instead, 
equity at the time of clearfelling is based on the contributions 
made by lessor and lessee, and revenue shared accordingly.
This assumes that the lessor's input, the land, has intrinsic 
value in its own right, rather than a value based on the 
surplus economic rent as determined by a predetermined interest 
rate. Land valuation, its inherent problems and its 
applicability to afforestation leases is discussed in detail 
in chapter 5-
The IRR method is essentially a development of the 
discounted revenue method that more closely approximates true 
equity in a joint afforestation scheme by using actual land 
values, costs and revenues and an actual internal rate of 
return, rather than being based on estimated costs and 
revenues and a predetermined interest rate. ' The use of an 
internal rate of return allows the relative shares of revenue 
to vary from rotation to rotation depending on the value of each 
contributor’s inputs. This is more flexible than the fixed 
share of stumpage derived by either the Grainger or discounted 
revenue methods. Similar to the discounted revenue method,
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to year 51 @ 9%
TABLE 4.6.
Contributions to Forest Investment - Second Crop
Less initial land value l60.6l
Lessor's net contribution 1109.99
(2) Lessee's contribution
Capital employed $7.41 for 24 years 58.62
Less initial capital 7.41 51.21
Lessee's share of land value plus
improvements $l60.6l for 24 years 1270.60
Regeneration $61.78 for 24 years 488.75
Spacing $24.71 for 22 years 164.53
Year 50 - upgrading roads for logging
$247.10 for 1 year 269.34
Annual costs $14.83/ha/year for 24 years 1241.28
3485.71
Less lessee's share of land value plus
value of improvements remaining 160.6l
Lessee's net contribution 3325-10
Total contributions 4435-09
Notes: as for table 4.5*
73.
the IRR method is specific in that it allows for the type of 
product to be grown, the timing and intensity of tending, 
location, site productivity and rotation length.
The method does have some drawbacks in application. 
Firstly the share of stumpage revenue due to the lessor is 
not known until the trees are harvested. Secondly the method 
is difficult to understand by those with no economic background, 
and the inability to specify the lessor's share before a lease 
is signed is often treated with suspicion. Thirdly the method 
requires precise records to be kept of all expenditure 
associated with the leased land. Although costs such as rates, 
planting and pruning etc. can be readily identified, costs 
such as overheads and capital employed may be more diffuse, 
especially if the leased land is managed as part of a larger 
forest.
To ensure an equitable sharing of revenue is achieved 
the costs to be included in the IRR calculation should relate 
to a comparable end point i.e. the production of mature trees. 
Therefore only those costs associated with the production of 
standing timber on the leased land should be included. Thus 
logging costs, roading costs directly attributable to logging, 
and the cost of access roads to neighbouring blocks 
constructed through the leased land should not be included. 
However, as part of logging roading will serve as access 
roading for the next rotation, a portion of the cost of that 
roading will qualify for inclusion. This is a part of the 
lessee's improvements which are carried forward to the next 
rotation.
The cost of upgrading roading for logging in the year 
before harvesting was erroneously included in the example of 
the IRR calculation given in section 4.3.3.(A). This cost was 
part of the logging cost which is not involved in producing 
mature standing trees, and in which the lessor has no equity, 
although as noted above, a portion of these may be carried
7-4.
forward to the next rotation. Similarly, the capital 
employed cost should only include capital involved in 
silvicultural operations and not logging. Inclusion of 
such non qualifying costs increase the lessee's equity at 
the expense of the lessor.
Although the lessor's input is valued by an independent 
agency, the Government Valuation Department, valuation of the 
lessee's inputs are made by the lessee. As the lessee's 
equity increases with increasing costs, there is little 
incentive for the lessee to minimise his costs or to operate 
efficiently. Similarly, there is a strong disincentive for 
the lessee to obtain the highest stumpage prices where he 
intends to utilise the forest produce himself. As a result, 
there is a need for independent control over firstly the type 
and level of lessee's costs to be included in the calculations, 
and secondly, the determination of stumpage rates. While these 
services could be provided by private forestry consultants, 
impartiability would have to be assured.
Overall, the IRR method appears to be very satisfactory 
provided
(a) an acceptable basis for land valuation can 
be decided on, including an acceptable basis 
for determining the lessee's share of land 
value (this is discussed further in chapter 5)
(b) agreement is reached on the types of cost which 
are valid for inclusion in the revenue sharing 
calculation
(c) a suitable form of control can be exercised over 
the level of those costs
(d) a satisfactory basis for determining stumpage 
is agreed upon
(e) agreement is reached on the money value index 
to be used to calculate the real values over 
time.
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Ideally, all these provisos should be considered and 
acceptable solutions agreed upon before a lease agreement is 
signed.
(C) Returns to factor inputs
In an afforestation project both land and capital 
cooperate to produce an economic surplus. As the IRR 
calculation gives the same rate of return to both factors, 
the share of revenue accruing to each factor depends on the 
individual values given to them.
In theory, the price of each factor of production in a 
perfectly competitive market should reflect its value of 
marginal product, and in the IRR calculation each factor would 
be equitably rewarded according to its marginal product. 
However, the market for land and capital is not perfectly 
competitive because of institutional factors which influence 
the prices of these inputs. In this situation, the economic 
returns jointly produced by two or more cooperating factors 
can be apportioned by Clark’s theory of marginal products 
(Samuelson et al 1975). The difficulty in applying economic 
theory to practice is the determination of marginal products 
for land and capital in forestry. A.s well as being difficult 
to measure, the productivity of the land directly influences 
the growth rate of the capital or growing stock. Therefore 
the productivity of both factors are inseparably related.
Provided the values placed on the lessor’s land and the 
lessee’s forestry operations reflect their relative 
contribution to generating the economic returns, the IRR 
calculation will share the forest revenue in an equitable 
manner.
4.3.4. The N.Z. Forest Service approach to leasing 
Maori land
The Forest Service examines each lease proposal on the
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basis of several regime options, future market options, 
protection values (if any), and the costs involved. From these 
comprehensive models are prepared and the most profitable 
option, compatible with protection requirements is selected.
The economic model gives the percentage of stumpage revenue 
which the Forest Service can offer the lessor. The Forest 
Service compounds its costs using a 10% interest rate and also 
Includes a percentage of direct costs for overheads. An 
interest rate of 10# is a minimum rate only; the Forest Service 
would prefer to use higher rates of return where possible 
(Williams pers. comm. 1977).
The internal rate of return method was examined by the 
Forest Service for possible use in leasing agreements 
(Kirkland pers. comm. 1977)5 but has so far been rejected for 
the following reasons:
(a) The method of sharing revenue has to be agreed 
on before the lease is signed. However, the IRR method is 
difficult to explain to Maori land owners who prefer to base 
their leasing decisions on a concrete proposal giving a 
definite share of stumpage.
(b) The results are unpredictable. Exact models 
cannot be constructed as future trends are unknown.
The unpredictability, however, is a problem with all 
models.
The Forest Service, therefore, continues using a 10# 
rate of return on its own capital, the land owner receiving 
the calculated residual. How the Forest Service allocates 
revenue in models that show very high rates of return is not 
known.
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4.4. Risk and uncertainty - the market
4.4.1. The market
The lessor's income share depends heavily on the state 
of the market at the time of sale and to a lesser extent on 
the lessee's marketing ability. As the decision to fell lies 
solely with the lessee, there is scope for the lessee to gain 
financial advantage when marketing the forest produce. His 
financial gains will depend on whether the wood is to be 
utilised directly by the lessee or sold on the market. Where 
the lessee utilises the wood himself, he will gain the most by 
cutting timber on leased land when stumpages are low, and 
cutting from his own forest (if he has any) when stumpages are 
high. Although all leases make provisions for arbitration 
when disagreements arise, the lessor could be at the mercy of 
the lessee with regard to stumpage levels. Molloy (1978) is 
of the opinion that "when the lessee develops a forest for a 
particular end use, such as pulp, and owns the treatment 
facility, the operation of the usual market influences to 
determine timber price is difficult or impossible, with the 
result that the (land) owners have no way of learning 
whether they have been fairly treated".
The risk and uncertainty associated with marketing is 
greater because forestry is a long term investment.
Decisions taken today affect revenue at the time of marketing. 
As a result the main uncertainty is the state of the market 
at the time of sale. The assumption is always made that a 
demand will exist for the products being grown. This being 
so, the price will depend on the strength of that demand. As 
New Zealand's current forest expansion program is based on a 
predicted world wood shortage, there is the .risk that a 
shortage will not occur.
Some lessors are retaining a small portion of their land 
and establishing their own forest, under the supervision of 
private consultants, in order to monitor management costs and
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market prices.(Liley pers. comm. 1977).
The N.Z. Forest Service’s objective of "maximum 
financial yield” implies their marketing strategies will 
take advantage of any benefits that can be obtained by 
varying the cutting cycle. To this end Forest Service leases 
provide for annual consultation with lessors on the sales 
policy to be pursued during the following year, and the 
express agreement of the lessor is required before any sales 
can be completed. The Forest Service has honoured this 
agreement in the case of the Lake Taupo Forest Trust lease 
from which the first saleable wood was produced this year 
(Groome pers. comm. 1978). Such consultations are not 
provided for in leases held by private companies.
4.4.2. The lessee’s effect on the market
In New Zealand, the Forest Service is almost the sole 
supplier of sawlogs for open market sales, and only three 
pulping companies in the North island buy pulpwood. 
Consequently, as both the Forest Service and the pulping 
companies are major holders of leased Maori land,they are in 
a strong position to influence market stumpage rates, 
especially if New Zealand remains remote from world timber 
markets. These aspects place the lessor’s return largely 
under the control of the lessee.
4.4.3. Forced risk sharing
The three methods used for determining the lessor’s 
share of stumpage revenue all force the lessor to partake of 
the risks and uncertainties involved in forestry, as his 
return depends on the price obtained and the volume of 
timber produced. As long as his land is physically 
productive, should he not receive a risk free return? 
Agricultural leases generally pay 6% or 7% of the land value 
as annual rent, and based on land values determined by 
current land sales and current stumpage rates, the 
capitalised annual land rent far exceeds the share of
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stumpage based on the range of percentage share being 
offered in existing forestry leases. By choosing an annual 
land rent, the risk and uncertainty in forestry is fairly 
left to the lessee who has a large degree of control over 
eventual revenues.
However, should the Maoris be successful in their 
current demands for meaningful involvement in the use of 
their land, then they too will be liable for some of the risk 
and uncertainty, but in return, they should also gain some 
control over the management and sale of the produce.
4.5. Trends in costs and revenues
4.5.1. Stumpage trends
Specific stumpage information is difficult to obtain, 
most sellers and buyers preferring to keep their sales 
agreements confidential. The data that were available are 
presented in appendix 5, and the trends in real stumpages 
presented in figure 4.1.
The stumpage trends show a continuing divergence 
between stumpages for export logs and pulpwood. Although 
export log stumpages have fluctuated considerably, the trend 
has generally been an increasing one. Export log stumpages 
reflect world stumpage prices rather than the lower domestic 
stumpage price. The trend for pulpwood stumpages decreased 
slowly over the period for which data were available. If both 
these trends continue the choice of the final product giving 
the highest return for the lessor is obvious.
The N.Z. Forest Service stumpage sales need to be 
interpreted with care. While the proportion of peeler logs 
included in the data was extremely small, the bulk of the 
pulpwood sales go to Tasman Pulp and Paper Company under a 
long term sale agreement. Although the actual price is 
confidential, it is generably accepted as being extremely low,
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even for pulpwood. In addition, the Forest Service has on 
occasions sold sawlogs below their market price where 
special social benefits are involved. However, as the Forest 
Service is the major supplier of sawlogs in New Zealand its 
stumpage sales should indicate the trends in actual and real 
sawlog stumpage rates likely to be achieved by a major grower 
under similar conditions. Figure 4.1. shows this trend to be 
fairly flat i.e. actual stumpage prices have risen at the same 
rate as inflation.
The sawlog stumpages paid by the State sawmills to the 
Forest Service are based on decisions made by the Forest 
Service rather than open market forces. One objective of the 
State run sawmills has been to control sawn timber prices.
Even so - real stumpage prices have remained reasonably 
constant between 1969 and 1976.
The conclusion that sawlog stumpages are remaining 
constant in real terms is supported by the Timber Price Index 
for radiata pine (appendix 6) which has closely followed 
movements in the consumer price index between 1946 to 1972.
4.5.2. Cost trends
Detailed information on the costs of forestry 
operations were difficult to obtain. The data which were able 
to be obtained are presented in appendix 7. In many cases the 
available data did not indicate whether overheads were 
included or not, neither did it indicate the inclusion or 
otherwise of other factors, such as an allowance for 
transporting labour to the site and allowance for holiday pay.
It was difficult to discern any significant trends in 
real costs. The real costs for some operations increased 
relatively little, while others decreased. Generally the rise 
and fall was not significant compared to the variation in.real 
costs over the years. Although the figures suggested a small
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rise in real costs over the period analysed (1962 to 1977), 
there was no statistical evidence to support this. As a result, 
it is assumed that real costs have remained constant.
4.5.3. The interaction of stumpage and cost trends
In those methods which calculate the lessor’s share of 
stumpage as a fixed percentage over the duration of the lease, 
the real income accruing to both lessee and lessor will depend 
entirely on real stumpage trends. This implies that 
afforestation leases based on pulpwood crops will be subject 
to decreasing real returns over time, and those based on 
export logs would receive increasing real returns. As export 
log stumpages significantly exceed pulpwood stumpages, the 
level of income actually received by the lessor is heavily 
dependent on the type of product grown by the lessee.
Where the IRR method is used to calculate the lessor's 
share of stumpage, the trend in the real value of the lessor's 
land also influences the result. Table 5-7 indicates that 
real land values are increasing. Assuming real forestry costs 
remain constant, this implies that the lessor's share of 
revenue will increase over time.
Overall, trends for costs and returns indicate that from 
an investment point of view, export logs will result in the 
highest returns for both lessor and lessee. As some leases 
only specify pulpwood regimes( where the lessee makes his 
return from processing rather than growing wood, a part of the 
lessee's investment in which the lessor has no equity), the 
lessor is likely to receive only minimal total returns, even 
though his share of stumpage revenue may be•relatively high.
4.6. Discussion
There is a need to deal with each Maori lease area as a 
separate entity rather than treating them en masse on a single 
formula. It is now recognised that the Maoris contribute a
8 3 .
productive factor to the total investment which is entitled to 
earn a return as a right, rather than be allocated a residual 
after capital invested has received a fair return. Inherent in 
this recognition is the need to place a value on the Maoris 
contribution in order that an overall rate of return may be 
calculated.
The IRR method most closely approximates true equity in 
a joint afforestation scheme. It is specific to a particular 
lease area in that it uses actual costs and returns, it 
recognises the fact that the Maori’s contribution has value as 
a factor input, and it allows the percentage due to the 
lessor to vary over the duration of the lease. Although 
current costs, revenues and land values can be used to 
illustrate the method, the eventual outcome depends on the 
relative trends exhibited over time.
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CHAPTER 5
LAND VALUATION FOR AFFORESTATION LEASES
The IRR method of sharing stumpage revenue requires that 
the lessor's land be valued to determine his contribution to 
the total investment in an afforestation lease. A valuation 
is not required for either the Grainger or the discounted 
revenue methods. This chapter examines the concept of land 
value and the process of land valuation which are relevant to 
afforestation leases.
5.1. Definitions of land value
While land valuation can be undertaken from a number of 
different viewpoints and purposes, there are only three methods 
which have any wide acceptance in practice. They are:-
(a) Government valuation
(b) Expectation value
(c) Market value.
The Government Valuation Department is required by the 
Valuation of Land Act 1951 to value all land every five years 
to determine three values: capital value, land value and the
value of improvements. As land is valued by local authority 
areas, the valuation process is continuous but an individual 
piece of land is valued only once every five years.
Capital value is defined by the Valuation Department as 
its estimate of the selling or market value of the land plus 
improvements. In concept the highest and best land use is 
used to determine capital value, though in practice the 
highest and best land use is generally considered to be the 
present use. The value of standing trees is included in 
capital value.
'Land value' is a new term created by the Valuation of 
Land Amendment Act (No. 2) 1970 to replace unimproved land 
value. Land value is defined to mean "the sum which the
85.
owner’s estate or interest.... might be expected to realise....
if offered for sale on such reasonable terms....as a bone fide
seller might....impose, and if no improvements had been made
on the said land”.
The Amendment Act also re-defined Improvements as work 
done or materials used for the benefit of the land by the 
expenditure of capital or labour, whose benefit is unexhausted 
at the time of valuation. The Act specifically lists the 
following which are not deemed to be improvements:-
(a) Draining, excavation, filling or reclamation.
(b) Grading, levelling of land or the removal of
the substance of the land.
(c) Removal, destruction or changing of the
vegetation.
(d) The alteration of soil fertility or soil
structure.
(e) The arresting or elimination of erosion or
flooding.
The rationale behind the new definitions are difficult 
to understand, and have been the subject of numerous Court 
discussions (Watt and Fraser unpubl. 1978). The new definit­
ions effectively include invisible land improvements in land 
value, including roads, vegetation clearing and fertilisation. 
This has important consequences for the IRR method of 
determining the lessor’s share of stumpage as both lessee and 
lessor will contribute to land value. This is further 
discussed in section 5.6.
Expectation value is based on the estimated present net 
worth of all future incomes and costs discounted using a 
selected interest rate. In this approach land has no intrinsic 
value, but has an income generating capacity which can be 
realised by investing labour and capital. After satisfying the 
required rate of return on labour (wages) and capital 
(interest), the residual is a return to land. Capitalising
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this return in perpetuity gives the expectation or residual 
value of the land. Different land uses would result in 
different expectation values. This is the basis of both the 
Grainger and discounted revenue methods of determining the 
lessor’s share of stumpage revenue as described in chapter .
Market value is the price at which land changes hands.
The IRR method treats the lessor’s land as an ’investment’ 
earning imputed interest. This investment character of the 
land provides the basis for valuation of leased land. As an 
alternative to leasing, Maori land owners could sell their land, 
the price which they would receive effectively measuring the 
land owner’s input to the total investment. The cost to the 
Maori owners of retaining ownership of their land is measured 
by the extent to which returns from alternative investments 
may exceed those earned by forestry. Market land value should 
be used to value the lessor’s input to an afforestation lease.
Rothery (19^5) notes that market value is not how much the 
seller would like to receive or the buyer would like to pay 
for property, it is the price that both hypothetical buyer and 
seller would mutually agree upon as sound and fair. This is 
the basis of the willing seller/willing buyer concept used by 
valuers to assess the market.
5.2. The economic theory of land value.
Economic theory explains land value in terms of the land’s 
ability to earn economic rent. Because of differences in 
fertility, proximity to markets, topography and climate, land 
varies in its ability to produce goods and services.
The term rent has multiple meanings (Clark 1973,
Samuelson, Hancock and Wallace 1975), and in discussing the 
economic theory of land value it is useful to define economic 
rent and distinguish it from rent as understood by the layman.
In layman’s terms rent refers to the payment made by a tenant 
to a landlord, usually for the use of fixed improvements
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as well as for the use of the land Itself. Most economic texts 
refer to this as "rental" to distinguish it from economic rent.
The definition of economic rent is a broad one.
Samuelson et. al. (1975) define it as "the amount by which 
proceeds actually received exceed the minimum amount which 
would have been necessary to evoke the supply of the various 
factors of production required". This rent is then allocated 
to the various factors including land. The capitalised 
economic rent attributable to land in perpetuity is the 
economic worth or value of the land, and in determining the 
economic value of land, the land is required to be used to its 
best economic advantage. Clark (1973) describes several 
methods that may be used to calculate land values based on 
potential productivity using both production functions and 
mathematical programming.
In economic theory land sells at a price because it has 
attributes that allow people to earn a rent or income from it, 
and because it is relatively scarce. Part of this income may 
be the utility of ownership endowed by tradition. The economic 
land value is the maximum sale price since it represents the 
maximum earning capacity of the land in perpetuity.
5.3* Market land value
Since land used for an afforestation lease is not 
actually sold, a market value is not readily available and a 
land valuer must make an estimate of what it should be. The 
term market value implies the existence of an active and 
competitive land market where the price is determined by the 
interaction of demand and supply. However, where transactions 
are few and irregular an established market' price is usually 
not available. The latter situation is more typical in 
New Zealand, especially for large blocks of undeveloped land.
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5-3.1. Ascertaining market land value
Three methods of ascertaining land values were outlined 
by O'Keefe (197[0
(1) Comparison with similar land sold in a similar 
condition. Sales of this type are usually of agricultural 
land, although land purchases for forestry purposes have 
increased and have had a direct effect on market values (Watt 
and Fraser unpubl. 1978).
(2) Hypothetical development method. This method gives 
an unimproved residual land value by deducting the estimated 
costs of hypothetical improvements from an inferred capital 
value.
(3) Capitalised net rental method. This method arrives 
at the unimproved land value by deducting the value of 
existing improvements from the capitalised net rental.
Only method (l) gives a direct estimate of market value 
and is recommended as being the most suitable method for 
valuing land in a joint afforestation scheme. It is also the 
most reliable method, although distortions occur in the market 
price when agriculture is subsidised. O'Keefe claims methods 
(2) and (3) have serious mathematical flaws.
Cairncross (1973) and Rothery (1945) note a set of 
criteria which should apply in order to derive a fair market 
land value when land is to be sold:-
(1) There must be a certain date.
(2) The market must be open.
(3) Bargaining must be voluntary.
(4) There must be a willingness to deal.
(5) There must be no anxiety which would cause
ordinary business considerations to be 
overlooked.
(6) The parties must be perfectly acquainted with the 
land, and cognisant of all circumstances which might positively 
or negatively affect its value.
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(7) They must have knowledge of the current demand for 
land and the factors likely to affect rise and 
fall of price.
Where a valuation is required for leased land, the land sales 
used as a basis for determining the value of that land should 
be limited to sales which occurred under the above conditions.
5.3.2. Government influence on market land values
The New Zealand Government has exerted some control over 
land prices from as early as 1853 when Governor Grey fixed the 
price of Crown land at $2.47/ha for good land and $1.24/ha for 
poor land (Wendleken and Hannan 1974). Since that time a lot 
of legislation has been passed to keep down land prices and 
make land available to everybody. The latest of these is the 
Land Speculation Tax of 1973 which taxes excessive profits 
made from land sold after less than two years ownership.
Although these measures may have prevented land from 
finding its own free market value, they do not alter the 
concept of land value as it applies to leasing agreements, 
since it is the current selling price which measures the amount 
of money the land owner is contributing to the joint 
afforestation project and which he cannot use on other 
investment opportunities.
5.3.3. Valuing leasehold land for forestry in practice
Generally the Government Valuation Department’s valuation
is used as a measure of the value of the lessor’s input to an 
afforestation lease. Although the Department does base its 
valuations on consideration of sales of land in a similar 
condition, and therefore should reflect current market prices, 
in practice the Government valuation is usually regarded as a 
minimum value when land is sold. As well as the five yearly 
revaluation of land required by law, the Valuation 
Department will provide valuations on request, should a more 
recent valuation be required.
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Government valuations are generally used because they are 
completely impartial and readily available.
5.3.4. The market value of forestry land
Table 5.1. shows the average prices that have been paid 
for land for afforestation purposes in recent years. Forestry 
land sales were not recorded separately by the Valuation 
Department until 1970.
TABLE 5.1.
Land Values In New Zealand - Forestry Land
Year Number of Average price Average price ($/ha
____ sales ($/ha)____  Dec. '74 values)
1970 54 50 74
71 58 35 47
72 53 37 47
73 81 77 90
7 4 91 178 187
75 60 195 178
76 69 165 129
Source: Valuation Department N .Z.
C.P.I. - appendix 6.
5.4. The demand and supply of Maori land for forestry
Since only a small number of Maori land blocks have been 
leased for afforestation to date, the returns being offered to 
the land owner are unlikely to be a realistic measure of demand 
and supply forces. However, with increasing interest in the 
leasing of Maori land for forestry by both potential lessee’s 
and the Maori land owner's themselves, competition for lease 
areas is likely to increase, and returns offered to land 
owners will increasingly reflect the interaction of demand and 
supply. Future demand and supply are examined in the 
following section.
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5.^.1. Demand
The demand for Maori land for afforestation will depend 
on the expansion rates proposed for the national exotic forest 
estate which have been discussed in section 2.3«
The planned expansion rate for the exotic forest estate 
is at least 44,000 ha per annum. Although only part of this 
will take place on Maori land in any one year, many of the 
remaining large blocks of undeveloped land belong to Maori 
owners, and the demand for such land is likely to be fairly 
strong.
A N.Z. Forest Service survey of undeveloped and under­
developed land (O’Neil 1974), irrespective of tenure, showed 
that at the maximum planting rate suggested by the 1974 
Forestry Development Conference, of 55,000 ha per annum, there 
was enough land suitable for forestry development to sustain 
the planting program well beyond 1984. Since forestry is more 
profitable than agriculture on certain land types, Thomson 
(1974 ) expects that the Fore.st Service will be allocated a 
generous portion of the as yet uncommitted Crown land free of 
charge. However, the Forest Service is keen to develop Maori 
land for social as well as economic reasons and will generally 
give preference to Maori land. This also means the Forest 
Service will have Crown land available at a later date.
The demand for Maori leasehold land from private 
companies is likely to be greater than that indicated by the 
demand for forestry land in general. Leasing based on revenue 
sharing agreements allows a faster rate of expansion to be 
financed from the same amount of capital than would occur on 
land that has to be purchased outright.
Bunn (1974) considers that agricultural prices for land 
will determine the location of much of the exotic forest 
estate in the 1980’s. However, the early part of any
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expansion is likely to be determined by the location of 
leasable Maori land blocks because of the economic 
advantages they confer. Once all the available Maori land 
blocks have been leased, attention may then turn to under­
developed and marginal agricultural land.
To date no Maori land block offered has failed to find 
a leasee. It is very likely that a significant proportion 
of new plantings in the next ten years will take place on 
Maori land.
5.4.2,. Supply
Maori land represents 5-9% of New Zealand's land surface. 
The 1965 Committee of Enquiry into Laws Affecting Maori land 
and the Powers of the Maori Land Court noted that in the North 
Island there were approximately 479,000 ha of unoccupied 
Maori land. Of this, the Committee considered that 43% was 
"unsuitable for development", 34% "suitable for forestry" 
and the remaining 23% "probably of no use". "Suitable for 
development" meant suitable for agriculture, so the area 
which could be afforested would be approximately 370,000 ha.
By the end of 1977 about 104,800 ha of Maori land had been 
leased leaving about 265,200 ha still available for 
afforestation leasing, assuming none has been developed for 
agricultural purposes. This represents five years planting 
at the maximum national target rates of 55,000 ha per annum, 
and if planted in those five years, Maori leasehold land 
would represent about 46% of the total exotic forest estate 
by 1982. The potential importance of Maori land to forestry 
is clearly indicated. As the bulk of Maori land (94%) is 
located in the North Island, the South Island will not 
contribute significantly to the total area of Maori land 
likely to be afforested under a lease system.
The supply of Maori land for forestry generally depends 
on land owners approaching an afforestation concern to 
indicate that the land is available and that they are
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interested in an afforestation project. With some blocks 
already leased and successfully put into production, there is 
evidence to other Maori land owners that afforestation is a 
tangible option. As a result increasing numbers of owners 
have come forward to indicate their willingness to lease 
their land for afforestation purposes. One Company alone, 
Winstone Afforestation Ltd., reported that in late 1977 
it was negotiating a further five leases with a combined 
area of 16,000 ha (Mercer pers. comm. 1977).
5.5. Forestry versus agriculture - profitability and land
prices
Prices for rural land have usually been determined by 
agricultural values. The economic fortunes of agriculture 
are thus a prime determinant of rural land prices on the open 
market, though there are an increasing number of sales of land 
for forestry purposes (Watt and Fraser unpubl. 1978). While 
land values based on returns to agriculture may not be a 
fair measure of their value for afforestation, the returns from 
forestry have been at least equal to, if not greater than 
agriculture. Consequently, the use of rural land values 
determined by agricultural considerations is a valid basis 
for valuing forestry land. If agriculture is more profitable, 
then in those leasing agreements where the land is suitable 
for agriculture, the agricultural value of the land should be 
used, as this represents the amount of money the land owner 
has invested in the lease.
5.5.1. A comparison of the net earnings from forestry 
and agriculture
The net earnings that can be achieved by a particular 
land use will determine the value of the land. Extensive 
specific data on net earnings per unit area were not available 
for either forestry or agriculture, and tables 5.2. and 5.3* 
can only suggest what they might be.
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The net returns for agriculture are based on extensive 
grazing i.e. the type of agricultural land use most likely 
to compete with forestry. As most Maori land is in the North 
Island, the returns for grazing are presented for the North 
Island only. To avoid the problem of choosing a specific 
interest rate for forestry, the results of using several 
rates are presented.
TABLE 5.2.
Net Annual Income From Forestry 
($/ha Dec. '74 values)
Product grown Rate of Interest
Export logs
Sawlogs
Pulpwood
6% 8% 10% 12% 1H%
99.6 75.6 56.3 41.1 29.1
62.9 47.2 34.5 24.5 16.6
23.4 17.0 11.8 7.5 4.1
Source: appendix 8.
TABLE 5.3.
Average Net Annual Income From Grazing - North Island 
($/ha Dec.'74 values)
Year Average net annual 
income
1970
71
72
73
74
75
14.06
17.03
21.43
50.60
30.94
8.94
Mean $23.83
Source : appendix 8.
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Tables 5.2. and 5*3. indicate that the net returns from 
forestry compare favourably with those from grazing. Returns 
from forestry for export logs exceed returns from grazing by 
a substantial margin, but pulpwood earnings are only equal to 
earnings from grazing at the lowest interest rate shown. 
Consequently, the use of agricultural land values as a basis 
for valuing land for forestry is acceptable.
Information supporting this conclusion is presented in 
appendix 9 where the rates of return on investment in 
forestry and agriculture are compared. The comparison indicates 
that the rate of return from forestry is at least equal to, 
if not greater than the rate of return from agriculture.
5*5.2. A recent land use study
A recent land use study comparing forestry and pastoral 
development on the same piece of land (Anon 1977d) , gave the 
net present worths shown in table 5.^. using a 10% interest 
rate.
TABLE 5.4.
Net Present Worths for Alternative Land Uses
Pulp Develop Develop Scrubland
project existing for pasture
pasture
Net present worth 
($/ha) 3^8 421 134
Area involved (ha) 15,300 13,600 1,700
The pulp project would involve afforestation of both 
pasture and scrubland. Despite the fact that the weighted net 
present worth for developing both existing pasture and 
scrubland for agriculture ($389/ha) exceeds the net present 
worth for forestry, the study concluded that "forestry can 
compete for farmland and scrubland with development potential,
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although the results are sensitive to F.O.D. pulp prices and 
start up time for the mill". The results of further study 
on the alternatives for farmers are shown in table 5.5.
If the percentage of logs shown in the right hand 
column of table 5.5 can be exported, forestry and farming will 
have the same net present worth and land values will be 
similar. If 100$ of logs were exported, forestry would be 
the most economically productive land use on all categories 
of land. Based on domestic log prices, agricultural 
development is more productive, except in the case of forest 
farming on scrub or cutover bush.
The fact that forestry is shown to have a higher net 
present worth than pastoral development for land not already 
partially developed for pasture, i.e. scrubland and cutover 
bush, again indicates that using agricultural land values as 
a basis for valuing land for forestry is valid.
5.5.3. Discussion and free market land values
Since the net annual income for both forestry and grazing 
are not significantly different, and the net present worth of 
developing undeveloped land for forestry exceeds that for 
pastoral development, the prices paid for grazing land can be 
used as a basis for valuing land for forestry. This means 
that ascertaining land values for forestry leases can be based 
on sales of comparable land sold either for forestry or 
grazing purposes.
Table 5.6. shows actual free market prices paid for 
forestry and grazing land. The grazing land values are based 
on the sales of whole farm units and do not include grazing 
land sold as small parts of farms of other categories.
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TABLE 5.5.
Alternative Land Uses Facing Farmers
Net present worth 
% 10$
Agricultural development
pasture 421
scrubland 134
cutover bush 75
Forest farming
Domestic log prices 332 r^OJ
Export log prices 703
Woodlot forestry - on farmland
Domestic log prices 8 52%
Export log prices 814
Woodlot forestry - on s crubland
Domestic log prices -58 26%
Export log prices 675
Woodlot forestry -
on cutover bush
Domestic log prices -179 35%
Export log prices 553
Source: King Country Land Use Study - Stage 1
Report Dept, of Land and Survey
Calculated 
log exports 
required to 
break even 
with pastoral 
development
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TABLE 5.6.
Free Market Land Values 
($/ha current prices)
Year Forestry Land Grazing Land
1970 50 im
71 35 158
72 37 12»l
73 77 131
7^4 178 206
75 195 171
76 165 225
Source Valuation Department. N.Z.
Table 5.6. shows how the free market price paid for 
forestry land has increased substantially and is now comparable 
with agricultural land values. The table further justifies the 
use of agricultural land values for assessing the land owner’s 
contribution to afforestation leases.
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Likely reasons why prices for forestry land have not 
exceeded prices for grazing land to a greater degree, despite 
the fact that the net annual returns from forestry generally 
exceed the net annual return for grazing, are that investors 
may not be aware of the higher returns from forestry, and 
that they may be reluctant to invest in forestry because of 
its long term nature.
5.6. Land values and land clearing costs
In an afforestation project, the clearing of existing 
vegetation is usually a major cost. The existing vegetation 
has a depressing effect on the value of the land and the sale 
price for the same piece of land in a cleared state would be 
correspondingly higher. Before 1970, the definition of 
improvements in the Valuation of Land Act 1951 > was such that 
vegetation clearing or alteration was included as a legitimate 
improvement which was treated separately from the value of the 
land. This was consistent with the general approach to 
determining land expectation values and internal rates of 
return for forestry, as land preparation costs were considered 
an integral part of the cost of growing the first crop of trees.
The valuation of Land Amendment Act (No 2) 1970 modified 
the definition of improvements, and vegetation clearing and 
alteration are no longer considered to be improvements. Strict 
application of the new definition leads to all site preparation 
costs being classified as part of land value. This has 
important implications for leasing in that the value of land 
clearing accrues to the land rather than to the forest, and 
as a result, land clearing by the lessee will have a direct 
effect on land value. However, as part of the benefit of 
land clearing will accrue to the forest, the increase in land 
value will only be part of the cost of land clearing.
To the extent that the increase in land value has been 
bought about by expenditure by the lessee, when using the IRR 
method to share revenue between lessor and lessee, it would
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not be equitable for the increase In land value to be credited 
to the lessor. As noted by Allison (pers. comm. 1977), this 
would have the effect of the lessee paying rent to the lessor 
on expenditure incurred by the lessee. This problem does not 
arise when using the Grainger or discounted revenue method to 
share revenue, as when using these methods the value of the 
land does not have to be specifically quantified to be 
used in a formula, but is negotiated implicitly.
Legally the lessee has no equity in the value of the land, 
and should the lease be terminated, any increase in land value 
that has arisen because of expenditure on land clearing by the 
lessee will accrue directly to the land owner.
Prior to the redefinition of improvements, when using the 
IRR method to share revenue between lessor and lessee, all of 
the land clearing cost would have been charged as a cost of 
growing the first crop of trees. However, this was also not 
strictly correct, as it cannot be said that the benefits of 
the lessee’s land clearing operations are exhausted at the end 
of the first rotation. Some of the benefit still applies to 
the second and subsequent rotations, a contribution for which 
the lessee would have received no credit. The lessee was 
credited with a share of land value in the second rotation 
in the example of the IRR method shown in section *1.3.3. (A) 
in order to give him credit for the contribution initial land 
clearing makes to the second and subsequent rotations.
The redefinition of improvements has created considerable 
confusion and a strong source of potential disagreement in 
that there is no exact basis for allocating the lessee a share 
of land value, nor is there an exact basis for deciding what 
portion of this share should be carried forward as a measure 
of the benefit initial land clearing makes to subsequent 
rotations. Where the IRR method is used to share revenue, 
agreement on the method to be used to determine the lessee's 
share of land value is essential before the lease is signed.
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Existing leases based on the use of the IRR method have left 
such decisions to the time when the first revenue is to be 
shared, and as the magnitude of the lessee's share of land 
value directly affects the lessor’s share of stumpage revenue, 
there is likely to be considerable disagreement.
A more simple equitable solution to this problem would be 
for the lessor to compensate the lessee for the increase in 
land value that results directly from the lessee's land 
clearing operations. A valuation of the land before and after 
land clearing by the Government Valuation Department would give 
an impartial assessment of the increase in land value. The 
total land value would then belong to the lessor, and the 
contribution initial land clearing makes to the second and 
subsequent rotations, which form part of land value, would 
then form part of the lessor's contribution to the 
afforestation project. As a result there would be no need 
to apportion the value of the land between lessor and lessee. 
The lessee could charge that portion of land clearing costs 
for which he had not been compensated by the lessor, as a cost 
of growing the first crop of trees.
5.7. Increases in real land values
In the example of the IRR method shown in section 
4.3.3-(A), land was ascribed an initial value which was main­
tained throughout the rotation. Because the IRR method 
measures the relative contributions made by the lessor and 
lessee to the lease, and shares revenue accordingly, changes 
in real land values must be included. The contribution the 
land owner makes to the lease over a single rotation period is 
the average value of the land over that period, not the value 
of the land at the beginning of the rotation,and in order to 
credit the land owner with changes in the real value of his 
land, a periodic revaluation is required. Failure to allow 
for increasing real land value would result in the lessor 
receiving credit for only a portion of the real value of the
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land in the latter years of the rotation. Conversly, if land 
were to decrease in real value, the lessor would receive credit
for an inflated land value. Table 5.7- shows the trend for
rural land values.
TABLE 5.7.
Trends In Real Rural Land Values
Year Number of 
' properties 
sold
Average price 
($/ha)
Average price 
($/ha Dec,’74 
values)
Change from 
previous yea] 
(%)
1965 8642 293.5 960.3
66 9281 293.7 540.9 + 17.5
67 8914 285.7 496.0 - 8.3
68 7566 313.1 521.0 + 5.0
69 7329 279.6 993.1 -I5.O
70 8480 320.7 477.2 + 7.7
71 9080 326.0 939.9 - 7.9
72 9106 369.6 466.1 + 6.1
73 10,760 420.3 489.9 + 5.1
74 14,494 529.9 550.8 + 12.4
75 11,173 713.9 652.7 + 18.5
Compound rate of increase for 10 year period 
in real terms = 3.6%.
Increase in real land value over a 25 year 
rotation = 242%.
Note: This table includes all freehold rural properties
transferred under the Land Transfers Act.
Source: N.Z. Official Yearbook 1976 (Anon 1976a).
C.P.I. -- Appendix 6.
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However, as noted by Allison (unpubl. 1975)3 if the 
lessor's contribution to the lease is revalued periodically, 
then so should the lessee's. Because the lessee's expenditure 
is staggered throughout the rotation, and the lessee's 
contribution to the lease is taken as the cost at the time 
it is incurred (after allowing for changing money value), 
the lessee's contributions will already have had the benefit 
of a period of change in real costs. However, if the lessor's 
contribution is revalued after the lessee has incurred a 
particular cost, then the contribution that cost makes to the 
total investment should also be revalued.
As land values are increasing at 3*6% per annum in real 
terms, and the real cost of forestry operations is remaining 
constant (see section 4.5.2.), by not allowing for changes in 
real costs and values, the lessor's contribution to the lease, 
and his share of stumpage revenue, are considerably understated.
In practical terms, as the IRR calculation is not under­
taken until all the costs and returns are known, changes in 
real costs and land values are easily included.
5.8. Discussion
Where the IRR method is used to share revenue between 
lessor and lessee, there are many aspects of land value and 
land valuation that need to be carefully considered by both 
parties, and the long term effect spelt out so each side has a 
clear understanding of all the implications. This applies 
especially to an understanding of the term land value as 
determined by the Valuation Department, and how the lessee 
can fairly claim a share in land value, a situation which 
will undoubtedly be treated with suspicion by potential 
lessors.
To avoid contention at a later date, the process and
10 4.
basis of land valuation, as it applies to afforestation leases, 
must be clearly defined before a lease is signed.
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CHAPTER 6.
THE EFFECTS OF TAXATION
The effects of taxation are important in a joint 
afforestation lease in that it affects the returns of the 
lessor and lessee through both income tax and forestry tax 
incentives. From a taxation point of view there are three 
groups involved in leasing Maori land for afforestation; 
the N.Z. Forest Service, the private forestry companies and 
the Maori land owners, and each group is subject to different 
tax considerations. A detailed treatise on all aspects of 
forest taxation in New Zealand is presented by Roper and 
Fraser (unpubl. 1978).
6.1. The N.Z. Forest Service
As a Government Department, the N.Z. Forest Service 
pays no tax and can claim no tax incentives. The Forest . 
Service’s share of stumpage revenue from an afforestation 
lease is credited to the Government’s consolidated revenue 
account.
If the Forest Service were to use the IRR method to 
share revenue, then the actual forestry costs incurred are 
the true net cost contribution the Forest Service makes to 
the total forest investment.
6.2. Income tax
6.2.1. Private companies
Private companies in New Zealand are taxed at 45 cents 
in the dollar for every dollar of assessable income, 
assessable income being gross income less expenses which are 
deductable for income tax purposes (Anon pers. comm. 1978c).
In commercial forestry no deduction can be made for 
expenditure until income is derived from the sale of timber. 
Until the mature timber is disposed of (say 20 to 25 years
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for sawlogs), all costs of planting, maintenance and 
development incurred by the company must be capitalised 
to a 'cost of bush’ account. The cost of bush account does 
not attract interest. It is only when income is eventually 
derived from the mature forest that the cost of bush account 
can be deducted for tax purposes.
6.2.2. Maori land owners
Maori land invested in an afforestation lease is 
generally administered by a trust or a committee representing 
the owners (see.appendix I). For tax purposes, any person 
or body of persons administering land for Maoris are deemed 
to be Maori Authorities, which are divided into two classes; 
those with more than twenty beneficiaries, and those with 
twenty or less (Anon pers. comm. 1978c). The reason for the 
distinction is that if the number of Maoris is substantial, 
each individual has very little, if any, control over the 
assets and operations carried out by the authority.
However, if the number is small the position is analogous to 
a partnership with each individual in a position to exercise 
some control.
Authorities with more than twenty beneficiaries are 
liable to tax at the rate of 7-5 cents in the dollar on their 
taxable income and a further 12.5 cents in the dollar on 
undistributed income. The distributed income is treated as 
dividend income in the hands of shareholders, and is subject 
to personal income tax.
Authorities with twenty or less beneficiaries act as 
agents for the shareholders who pay tax on their share of 
income based on personal income tax tables whether the 
income is distributed or not.
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If a Maori authority receives income from timber sales 
or timber royalties, only a certain proportion of income is 
assessable for income tax purposes. If the income is derived 
from indigenous timber only one sixth the income is 
assessable; if the income is derived from exotic timber only 
one half the income is assessable. These special conditions 
apply only to Maori authorities.
Generally in a joint afforestation lease there are three 
methods available for giving the lessor a return for the use 
of the land:-
(a) A deferred rental as a lump sum at the time the 
forest is harvested.
(b) Advances on the deferred rental on an annual or 
periodic basis. These payments are taxable in 
the year in which they are received (Anon pers. 
comm. 1978c).
(c) An annual land rent based on land value. This is 
independent of stumpage revenue. As an annual land 
rent is not ’income from timber sales or timber 
royalties', the tax concessions described above do 
not apply if the lessor chooses to receive his 
return as land rent.
The method of payment, the tax laws and the type of 
Maori authority all interact to determine the disposable 
income accruing to the lessor.
6.3. Tax incentives
As an incentive to promote investment in forestry by the 
private sector, the 1965 budget introduced a special tax 
concession allowing forestry companies to deduct certain costs 
from income derived from forestry or other sources, in the 
same year. Expenditure deducted on this basis can produce a 
loss which can be carried forward to subsequent years.
Expenses which can be claimed are
(a) Costs incurred in planting or maintaining 
trees or in preparing or otherwise
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developing the land for forestry.
(b) Rents, rates, land tax, insurance premiums or 
other like expenses.
(e) Interest on borrowed money.
The net effect of this concession is a reduction of 
assessable income resulting in immediate assistance to the 
forest grower.
For smaller companies and individuals, who do not have 
current income from forestry or other sources, there is a 
similar incentive to invest in forestry in the Forest 
Encouragement Grant scheme (Anon 1977f), which provides for 
a cash grant of 50% of all qualifying costs as listed above, 
providing the total expenditure on forestry projects does not 
exceed $300,000 per annum. Forestry Encouragement Grants are 
not granted automatically, but are subject to approval by the 
N.Z. Forest Service. In considering an application for a 
grant, the Forest Service will take into account whether:-
(a) the project is in the national interest.
(b) the project is technically and economically 
feasible.
(c) the applicant’s financial position is adequate 
to enable him to complete the project.
(c) the applicant has, or has access to, acceptable 
forestry knowledge and expertise.
Grant approval is generally for a maximum of 10 years 
consecutive planting, and the maximum claim on any one hectare 
is $450.
Forestry expenditure which cannot be’ claimed against 
other income, or is not eligible for a 50% grant, can be 
carried forward under the cost of bush formula and charged 
against income from the sale of timber when the forest is 
harvested.
109.
The effect of the tax concession/Forestry Encouragement 
Grant on leasing is in determining the lessor's share of 
stumpage. Lessees able to claim forest expenditure against 
current income, or able to claim a 50% grant, only pay the 
remaining 55% or 50%(whichever is applicable) of the cost 
involved. The remainder is available for investment elsewhere, 
and the actual costs of forestry operations do not reflect 
the true cost to the lessee. Table 6.1 shows the revenue 
sharing calculation presented as an example of the IRR 
method for the first rotation in section 4.3*3.(A), after 
allowing the lessor to claim all his forest costs against 
current income i.e. all the lessee’s expenses have been 
reduced by 45%. Basic assumptions are:
Rotation length = 24 years. Planting occurs in year 3.
IRR was calculated to be 9.4%.
Stumpage revenue in year 27 = $4269.89.
Initial land value = $123.55/ha.
The lessor’s equity is calculated as follows
Lessor’s equity = $1273-80 „ 100
$4306.31 1
= 29.6%
The lessor should receive 29.6% of stumpage revenue.
The tax concession nearly doubles the percentage of 
stumpage revenue due to the lessor from the 15.1% given in 
section 4.3.3. (A) to the 29.6% given in table 6.1. Where 
the lessor was eligible for a Forestry Encouragement Grant 
the return to the lessor would be even greater when only the 
net cost of the lessee’s operations were included in the IRR 
formula.
Regardless of the method used to share revenue, if the 
lessor is granted a Forestry Encouragement Grant or can claim 
all his forestory costs against a current income, the New 
Zealand taxpayer subsidises the lessee’s forestry expenditure
TABLE 6.1.
Contributions to Forest Investment - After Tax
year 27 @ 9-4$
Land value $123.55 for 27 years 1379-36
Less initial land value 123-55
Lessor’s net contribution 1273-80
(2) Lessee’s contribution
Capital employed $4.08 for 27 years 46.15
Less initial capital 4.08 42.07
Initial roading $65-23 for 26 years 674.37
Preparation $97-85 for 25 years 924.68
Planting/opossum control/releasing 469-56
$54.36 for 24 years
Releasing $13-59 for 23 years 107-30
Year 26 - upgrading roads for 
logging
$284.00 for 1 year 310.7^
Annual costs $8.15/ha/year for 
24 years 664.40
3193-12
Less lessee’s share of land value 
plus value of improvements
remaining 160.61
Lessee's net contribution 3032.51
Total contributions $4306.31
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and revenue share by either 45% or 50% and consequently makes 
a substantial investment in the afforestation project.
However, the taxpayer has no direct claim to his contributed 
’share’ of stumpage at the time the trees are sold; this goes 
entirely to the lessee.
The special concession and grant were originally 
introduced as an incentive to increase private sector 
investment in forestry. Where the forest grower is also the 
owner of the land, all the benefits jusifiably accrue to him. 
Because the incentives were limited to a tax rebate or grant 
on forest establishment and operating costs, in a joint 
afforestation lease, the lessor can only benefit indirectly 
by negotiating a higher annual rental. Because of the limited 
number of large organisations involved in afforestation in 
New Zealand, the lessor is generally in a poor position to 
capture the full amount of the increase in economic rent which 
could be attributed to these incentives.
6.4. Export Incentives
Various tax concessions exist as an Incentive for 
Increased exports. However, the concessions only apply to 
goods which have had some degree of domestic processing.
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Export logs do not qualify. As the lessor has no equity in
processing the timber produced on his land, he can only 
benefit indirectly by negotiating a higher annual rental 
for the land and, as noted earlier, he is generally in a 
poor negotiating position to capture the full amount of the 
increase in economic rent involved.
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CHAPTER 7.
COMPARISON OF REVENUE SHARING AND ANNUAL RENT
Although revenue sharing is the basis of most of the 
currently existing lease agreements, the option of receiving 
an annual land rent based on land value still exists. N.Z. 
Forest Service offer an annual rental scheme as an 
alternative to revenue sharing (Kirkland pers. comm. 1977), 
and an information booklet prepared for potential lessors by 
N.Z. Forest Products Ltd states that that company is also 
prepared to offer an annual rental scheme. The method of 
payment selected by the lessor is written into the lease 
and cannot be changed during the term of the lease, unless 
by mututal agreement with the lessee.
Current feelings among Maori lessors is that revenue 
sharing offers them better prospects, although in many cases 
Maori owners are also demanding some current returns, either 
as revenue paid in advance or as land rent. For this reason 
it has been suggested that leases could use both methods of 
payment (Anon unpubl. 1976a).
7.1. The advantages and disadvantages of annual rent
Annual land rent is usually expressed as a percentage 
of land value as assessed by the Government Valuation 
Department. In agricultural leases rent is generally 
6 to 7% of land value, and the N.Z. Forest Service offers 
a similar percentage if no revenue sharing is involved 
(Williams pers. comm. 1977).
The advantages of an annual rent are:-
(a) The lessor is completely aware of the basis of 
his income from the lease.
(b) The basis of the lessor’s return is independently 
assessed by the Government Valuation Department.
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(c) The lessor is not subject to all the risks and 
uncertainties of investment in forestry.
(d) The lessor’s return is not subject to the actions 
and decisions of the lessee i.e. rate of planning, product 
to be grown, marketing strategy and ability.
(e) The lessor enjoys increased returns if the land 
value increases.
(f) The lessor receives an annual income rather than 
a lump sum at the end of each rotation.
(g) An annual land rent avoids complicated lease 
documents.
(h) An annual land rent avoids many areas of potential 
conflict between lessor and lessee.
(i) There is an incentive for the lessee to utilise 
cost control and operate as efficiently as possible.
(j) An annual land rent avoids the need to keep 
accurate records of all forest expenditure by the lessee 
which would be required if the IRR method was used to share 
revenue.
The disadvantages of an annual rent are:-
(a) The lessor does not have the opportunity to share 
in potentially high returns from log exports. However, 
future trends are probably towards increased domestic 
processing.
(b) As land rent is not ’income derived from the sale 
of timber’, there is no 50% reduction allowed in the lessor’s 
taxable income derived from the lease.
(c) The lessor has no case for meaningful involvement 
in the use of his land as he has no equity in the forest 
being grown. This is beginning to concern land owners and 
they are demanding an increased say in the use of the land.
7.2. The advantages and disadvantages of revenue sharing
The leasing of land for forestry based on revenue sharing
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methods was originally instigated to avoid the large initial 
cost of buying land. However, rather than receive their 
return from an afforestation lease at the time the trees are 
harvested, Maori land owners are increasingly pressing for 
intermediate returns. The willingness of lessee's to comply 
with these demands would suggest that avoiding early 
expenditure on land purchases is not as important as it may 
have been, although paying intermediate returns to the lessor 
is still less costly than the outright purchase of land.
Of the three methods used to share revenue discussed 
in chapter 4^, the IRR method gives the most equitable 
sharing of revenue. Most advantages and disadvantages of 
revenue sharing apply regardless of the method used.
The advantages of revenue sharing are:-
1. All methods.
(a) The lessor has the possibility of sharing in 
possible future increases in stumpage values.
(b) The lessor is able to claim a 50% reduction of
his income derived from the lease, assessable for tax purposes.
(c) As the lessor has equity in the forest, he is more 
involved with the entire project on his land. This equity 
also provides a basis for demanding lessor participation in 
forest management.
2. Advantages that only apply to the IRR method.
(a) Both lessee and lessor earn equal rates of return 
on their respective investment in the joint project.
3. Advantages that only apply to the Grainger and 
discounted revenue methods.
(a) The lessor's share of stumpage revenue is set before 
the lease is signed.
The disadvantages of revenue sharing are:-
1. All methods.
(a) The lessor is subject to all the risks
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and uncertainties Involved in forestry, including the 
management and marketing abilities of the lessee.
(b) The lessor’s returns are subject to the actions 
and decisions of the lessee.
(c) Unless special arrangements are made, the lessor 
has to wait at least to the end of the first rotation before 
he receives any substantial returns.
(d) Revenue sharing is more expensive to administer 
than an annual rental scheme.
(e) The possibility of disagreement is much greater 
with revenue sharing than with an annual rental lease as the 
lessee’s obligations and intentions have to be clearly 
stated in writing.
2. Disadvantages that only apply to the IRR method.
(a) The IRR method of sharing revenue is complex and 
difficult to understand, yet the method has to be fully 
explained to and understood by the lessor.
(b) The share of stumpage revenue receivable by the 
lessor is unknown until the trees are clearfelled.
(c) Accurate records of all the lessee’s expenditure 
must be kept.
(d) As the costs incurred by the lessee directly 
increase his share of revenue, there is no incentive for him 
to keep down his costs and operate efficiently.
7.3. Combined annual land rent and revenue sharing
It is possible to obtain the best of both systems by 
paying the lessor a reduced annual rent and giving him a 
smaller share of the actual stumpage revenues at clearfelling 
This combined approach would be relatively simple to 
implement. The lessor, for example, could be paid an annual 
rental on half his land, and enter into a,revenue sharing 
lease on the remainder. Alternatively, he could receive half 
the annual rent for his total land area, plus half the 
revenue he would have received without rental payments, 
the end result being the same. One such lease already exists
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In the Paehinahina Mourea lease, the lessor receives 4\°}0 of 
land value as an annual rent, and 4% of stumpage revenue 
(Groome pers. comm. 1978).
7.4. Comparison of alternatives
Land rent and revenue sharing lease agreements have been 
compared by examining the stumpage required to equate the 
lessor’s returns with an annual rental based on 6% of market 
land value. Results are presented for a range of percentage 
shares of revenue due to the lessor, and to avoid the problem 
of choosing an interest rate, the results of using several 
different rates of interest are shown. Basic assumptions 
made for the comparison are:-
Market land value is $150/ha (Dec 74 values).
Merchantable yield is 576 mJ/ha (Fenton and 
Tustin 1972).
Rotation length is 22 years.
Stumpages (Dec 74 values)
Export logs $9.00/m^
Sawlogs $6.00/m
Pulpwood $2.50/m^
Table 7.1 shows the value of the compounded annual land 
rent of 6% of land value in year 22. Table 7.2 shows the 
stumpages that would have to be received from the sale of 
forest produce to equate the lessor’s share of revenue with 
the income he would have received from an annual, rent.
Table 7.1. does not include real changes in land values 
which are increasing at approximately 3.6% per annum (see 
table 5.7). Also changes in real stumpage prices are ignored. 
Assuming land values and stumpages remain constant in real 
terms, table 7.2. indicates that over the range of values 
examined it was more profitable for the lessor to accept 
an annual rent (based on 6% of land value) than to receive 
his income as a share of pulpwood stumpages. Annual rent
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TABLE 7.1.
Annual Land Rent Compounded to Year 22
($/ha)
Interest Rate
6% 10% 12% lb% 16%
6% of $150 per annum
compounded to year 499.11 642.62 832.52 1083.92 1416.96
22
TABLE 7.2.
Stumpages Required To Equate Lessor’s 
Income With Annual Land .Rent 
($/m3)
Lessor’s share of 
stuinpage revenue
Interest Rate
ö% 10% 12% 1435 16%
10% 8.67 11.16 14.45 18.82 24.60
16% 5-78 7.44 9.64 12.55 16.40
20% 4.33 5.58 7.23 9.41 12.30
26% 3-47 4.46 5.78 7.53 9.84
Note : if a mixture of products was grown , the above
stumpages would refer to the weighted average 
stumpage required.
was also more profitable than a share of revenue based on 
domestic sawlog stumpages except when the rate of interest 
was low and the share of revenue was high. The share of
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revenue based on export stumpages was, however, more profitable 
than an annual rental except when interest rates were high and 
the revenue share was low. Since interest rates for mortgage 
finance vary between 1 2 - 1 per annum (Young pers. comm. 1978), 
the lessor would be better off by accepting an annual land rent 
unless export logs are to be grown. Leases based on a share of 
revenue from growing pulpwood gave the lowest returns of the 
options examined.
Since land values are increasing in real terms and 
pulpwood stumpages are decreasing, there is a strong case 
against the lessor opting for a share of revenue from pulp­
wood regimes. Because real domestic sawlog stumpages are 
remaining constant, a share of domestic sawlog revenue will 
also become less favourable to the lessor as land values 
increase. The comparative profitability of sharing revenue 
from export log production will depend on the rate of increase 
in real export log stumpages. If the increases in the real 
value of export stumapges fail to keep up with increases in 
real land values, then an annual rent will become increasingly 
attractive; alternatively the converse could apply, especially 
if compound interest rates are low and the lessor is to receive 
a high share of export log stumpage revenue.
Log exports are expected to decrease in importance over 
time with the bulk of the logs produced being processed 
domestically (see section 2.3.2.). Therefore domestic 
rather than export stumpages will be more relevant when 
examining alternative leasing agreements. Consequently 
annual land rent is likely to be the best financial option 
available to the lessor.
Table 7.2 simplifies the real situation and can only 
be regarded as a rough indicator, especially as the comparison 
of alternatives has not taken into account the effects of 
taxation discussed in chapter 6. Unfortunately it was not
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possible to examine the combined effects of stumpage rate, 
share of revenue, interest rate, rotation length, tax rate 
and method of receiving income because of the limited time 
period available for this study.
7.5. Combined forestry and grazing leases
With increasing interest in New Zealand in combining 
growing trees and grazing, it was inevitable that farm- 
forestry should be suggested for leased land. However, to 
the writers knowledge only one such lease exists to date.
Revenue payments to the lessor have so far been based 
on a proportion of the standard land rent offered for grazing 
leases plus a proportion of the stumpage revenue that would 
have gone to the lessor if the lease had been purely for 
forestry. This is similar to the combined annual rent and 
revenue sharing method outlined in section 7.3, except that 
the lessee receives the returns from grazing as well as his 
share of stumpage revenue.
In farm-forestry leases tree stocking per hectare is 
deliberately reduced to allow for pasture development, and 
consequently a minimum stocking must be mutually agreed 
upon.
7.6. Increased investment by the lessor
In accepting the possibility of a mixed annual rent 
and revenue sharing arrangement, the further possibility 
arises of the lessor wanting to increase his equity in the 
forest by monetary investment. Most lessors receive 
substantial income once harvesting starts; reinvestment in 
afforestation is one possible use of this income. Investment 
in the forest could take the form of the lessor paying for 
certain forest operations, or allowing the lesse to retain 
all or part of the lessor’s revenue and use it in 
re-affores tation.
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The lessor’s wish to increase his equity would depend 
on his alternative uses of funds and the yields from other 
investment opportunities, as well as the general desire on 
the part of Maori land owners to partake in the management 
of their land. Increased equity would give them a strong 
basis for obtaining direct involvement in management.
7 - 7 - Discussion
Apart from the financial effects of the alternative 
methods of determining returns to the lessor, non-monetary 
effects also need to be considered. The main non-monetary 
effect of importance to Maori land owners would be the amount 
of control they could exercise over the use of their land.
The trend for Maori land owners to want increased control in 
the use of their land (see Chapter 2), partly results from 
the afforestation leases nearly all being revenue sharing 
agreements. Since the land owners have an equity in the 
forest they are keen to protect that interest and ensure 
it is used to best advantage. Maori owners opting for an 
annual land rent are excluded from equity in the forest. 
Another strong reason for Maori lessors wanting increased 
control over the use of their land is related to the strong 
ties between them and their tribal lands.
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CHAPTER 8.
LEASING IN FIJI AND POSSIBILITIES ELSEWHERE
8.1. Fiji afforestation leases.
8.1.1. General background
Developments in land leasing for afforestation in Fiji 
were quite independent of those which have occurred in New 
Zealand, although some aid in the form of finance and forestry 
expertise has been supplied by the New Zealand Government. 
Leasing in Fiji has only occurred between the Fiji Government 
and the native land owners, the whole project being administered 
by the Fiji Pine Commission.
Afforestation in Fiji developed after research under­
taken between 195^ and 1968 by the Fiji Forestry Department 
showed that Caribean pine (Pinus caribaea Mor.) would grow 
successfully on relatively infertile soils. All land in 
Fiji had previously been surveyed and registered under 
tribal ownership. This made leasing for afforestation 
relatively easy since ownership was undisputed. Also, since 
most land was owned by natives or by the crown, and most 
Indian sugarcane farmers operate on leased land, the concept 
of leasing was well established. The first leases were 
either directly with the Forestry Department or to the 
Forestry Department through the Native Land Trust Board, who 
acted on behalf of the land owners. The Native Land Trust 
Board is responsible for administering all agreements on 
native lands.
An intensive study of pine afforestation in Fiji by 
the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) 
in 1971 indicated that Fiji was in a good position to carry 
out large scale pine afforestation, both on economic and 
social grounds (Thompson unpubl. 1975)* FAO proposed an 
afforestation scheme which to be economically viable would 
require approximately 5^,250 ha of land with approximately
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20,200 ha being required by 1978. Some 7,300 ha of exotics 
had already been established by 1971, but this area was 
rapidly increased to 15,800 ha by 1975 and to 20,150 ha by 
1976 (Anon undated). By then some 68,900 ha had been leased 
for afforestation which indicated the willingness of native 
land owners to ’invest’ their land in the project.
A Ministry of Information reference paper describing 
the scheme indicates that it is expected harvesting and 
processing into wood chips or pulp will begin in 1981.
8.1.2. The basis of afforestation and the role of 
Government.
The Fiji Government implemented FAO's proposals in 
1972, largely because of the programme's expected impact on 
economic development in Fiji, and the benefits that would 
accrue to the rural areas and the indigenous Fijian land 
owners. The project was estimated to cost $F 6^  million 
by 1989 if no revenue was available before that date (Thompson 
unpubl. 1975). While the project only generates its first 
revenue in 1982, they should be sufficient to clear all debts 
by 1989. Development loan capital had been obtained by the 
Fiji Government from the Commonwealth Development Corporation.
As the development was primarily for the tribal groups 
who invested their land in the project, all leases contain 
provisions for each tribal group to take over management of 
the forest on their land after they form a legal corporate 
entity, with the necessary knowledge and experience. In each 
case, this takeover of forest management requires the agree­
ment of the Fiji Government and the Native Land Trust Board. 
Training schemes are being run to enable the land owners to 
gain the necessary experience and knowledge.
In 1976 the Fiji Pine Commission was established as the 
statutory body responsible for administering the Pine Scheme. 
Apart from payments to the land owners (as provided in the
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terms of the leases (see section 8.1.3)) all revenues 
generated by the project are to be used by the Gommission to 
repay loan funds and recoup the costs of development. Once 
all debts have been repaid, the only benefit the Government 
will receive from the project will be its share of revenue 
from the 13# of the total proposed plantation area it owns 
as crown land (Anon undated). The role of the Fiji Pine 
Commission after all debts have been repaid is uncertain, but 
since a body will be needed to co-ordinate the activities 
of the groups of land owners, it is likely to fill that role.
8.1.3. Returns to the land owners
Before the FAO proposals were implemented the 
Government paid a nominal annual rent to land owners of 
$F0.12/ha (Thompson unpubl. 1975). Economic evaluation of 
an expanded afforestation project carried out by FAO 
indicated that better lease terms could be afforded. In 1973 
the terms were adjusted so that the annual rent on planted 
land rose to $F 1.24/ha with a payment of $F 0.25/ha for a 
maximum of five years on land waiting to be planted. 
Unplantable land within the leased area also received an 
annual rental of $F 0.25/ha. Rents are to be reviewed every 
10 years with a maximum increase at any one review of 40#.
The lessor's share of revenue was set at 3% of the stumpage 
revenue received with a minimum payment to the land owner of 
$F 49.40/ha providing rotations exceed 20 years. For shorter 
rotations pro rata rates apply. Land owners were also given 
a lump sum payment of $F 3-09/ha when the lease agreement was 
signed. The term of the leases was 99 years.
Rent payments were based on 5# of the unimproved capital 
value of the land (Kamikamika 1977). The $F 1.24/ha annual 
rent would give an unimproved land value of $F 24.80, but 
since there is no active market for land in Fiji and land 
values were determined by the FAO study , land values must 
have been based on estimates or calculated residuals.
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Individual members of tribal groups investing their 
land in an afforestation lease are usually given preference 
for seasonal work as one of the benefits accruing to land 
owners and to train land owner’s in forestry. Once forest 
development costs have been met by the Fiji Government out 
of forest revenue, substantial income will accrue to land 
owner groups which may be used for housing and community 
development, though both Thompson (1975) and Anon (undated) 
suggest land owner groups could use the income to buy 
logging equipment which will be required from 1982 onwards, 
thus providing more jobs.
8.1.4. Comparison to land leasing for forestry 
in New Zealand
The basic differences between leasing in Fiji and New 
Zealand have arisen because of the different objectives. 
Afforestation leasing in Fiji is specifically for the benefit 
of indigenous land owners, while in New Zealand benefits to 
the Maoris arise because they own the land required for the 
expansion of the New Zealand exotic forest estate; leasing 
was not developed primarily for their benefit. The New 
Zealand Government is not prepared to develop Maori land for 
the owners using forestry as a means of development, although 
it has done so in the past using agriculture. Private 
companies leasing land for forestry do so to ensure future 
supplies of raw materials which they attempt to obtain at 
minimum cost.
Leasing in Fiji is coordinated nationally, with 
uniform lease conditions and co-operative marketing. In New 
Zealand there is no coordination of Maori leases, which are 
generally treated differently by different lessees, and even 
individually by the same lessee. The lessor’s returns are 
dependent on the actions and decisions of the lessee as 
applied to their individual leases.
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There is also different emphasis placed on the 
importance of land (Watt pers. comm. 1977). The Fiji Pine 
Commission usually obtains land wherever the owners are 
prepared to enter into a lease agreement. Land use is not 
planned or determined by market forces, and economic land 
value is of no direct importance as a result. In New 
Zealand, however, land use is mainly determined by market 
forces, although some land use planning has been done 
e.g. for afforestation in the King Country (Anon 1977d).
8.2. Possibilities elsewhere
Leasing land from native land owners for afforestation 
has potential in places other than Fiji or New Zealand.
Timber producing areas such as South East Asia and the Pacific, 
still rely on exploitation of native forests which must be 
replaced by plantations at least in part, if the countries 
concerned wish to maintain their forest industries.
As a prerequisite to leasing, land must be surveyed and 
registered by ownership to facilitate leasing and to identify 
beneficiaries. Ownership can be vested in a tribal group or 
clan, requiring only the definition of inter-tribal or inter­
clan land boundaries.
A forestry lease scheme must be profitable, especially 
if forest development capital is obtained as loans. This 
implies efficient production and access to markets willing to 
pay the necessary price or prices. However, where land 
owners also work on the project, they will derive benefits 
even if the project breaks even financially.
If development capital is obtained as loans, develop­
ment will benefit the land owners exclusively as in Fiji. 
Alternatively, forest development can be financed by private 
interests as in New Zealand. Although this option means that 
some of the returns will accrue to the private concern, there 
is the added advantage that a private concern provides
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forestry expertise and usually has access to marketing 
facilities.
Forestry projects on native owned land confer national 
benefits as well as benefits to the owners of the land. 
National benefits include rural development, improved per 
capita income in rural communities, reduction of urban drift 
and the utilisation of idle resources including land and 
labour. These benefits can be of special importance to 
developing countries.
Leasing offers a method of implementing rural 
afforestation to benefit both land owners and the nation as 
a whole.
128.
CHAPTER 9. 
DISCUSSION
Although leasing has brought into production large 
areas of previously unutilised Maori land, there are some 
aspects which may be undesirable from the Maori point of 
view and require examination and possible modification.
Most importantly, each lease agreement must be 
thoroughly examined and all the implications clearly 
explained to Maori land owners. Since Maori land owners 
generally prefer to get their return from an afforestation 
lease as a share of revenue rather than an annual land rent, 
afforestation leases are joint investments and Maori land 
owners share risk and uncertainty with the lessee. Maori 
land owners are now recognising that they should consider 
not only the percentage of stumpage revenue offered in a 
lease proposal, but also the afforestation proposal and 
likely revenue, and the extent to which they are involved 
in management.
The contribution made by Maori land owners to 
afforestation leases has generally been determined by 
residual valuation procedures where the lessee calculates 
the amount he can afford to pay the land owner for the use 
of the land after meeting all other costs and an allowance 
for profit. This approach is the basis of the Grainger 
and discounted revenue methods of sharing revenue, and does 
not recognise the land owner as an investor in his own right. 
Only the IRR method recognises the land owner as an investor 
and requires the land to be independently valued, the 
lessor’s share of revenue ultimately depending on that 
valuation.
Recognising the Maori land owner as an investor is 
important because it helps to ensure that he gets a fair
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return based on the use of his land and in the absence of 
any Government protection there is no other means of doing 
this. Investors normally either require a risk free return, 
as, for example those investing in Government bonds or 
securities, or they are prepared to carry a degree of risk 
and uncertainty in the expectation of a correspondingly 
higher return in compensation. To be able to evaluate his 
options, the investor should know the risks involved and his 
likely returns. An investor may try to safeguard his 
investment, either by seeking security for his loans, or by 
obtaining some control in the operation of the company, as 
in the case of share holders who can vote to accept or 
reject management proposals which affect their returns.
Loan or debenture holders only invest their capital for the 
term of the loan which rarely exceeds 20 years. Shareholders, 
on the other hand, can recoup the current market value of 
their investment by selling their shares. Maori land owners 
are not receiving comparable treatment when investing in 
most afforestation leases.
In revenue sharing afforestation leases, not only does 
the lessor partake in all the risks and uncertainties 
involved in forestry, but in addition he generally has no 
control over the species to be grown, the management of the 
crop, the end product or its marketing. All these factors 
affect the return to the lessor and there is no guarantee 
he will gain a greater return than if he had opted for a 
risk free annual rent. Further most leases signed to date 
have a 99 term which is an exceedingly long time to tie up 
an investment yielding uncertain returns.
Lease documents are generally not specific enough 
to allow a full evaluation of the lessee's proposals. In 
view of the special problems and the long term nature of most 
forest investment, it is essential that Maori land owners 
are given much more information on the proposed use of their
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land than has occurred in the past. Those aspects which 
require clearer definition in most lease agreements are
(a) A statement specifying the product to be grown.
Terms such as "a high yield of marketable forest produce" 
are not specific enough.
(b) Timing and rate of development. Land left idle 
reduces both the volume of wood that can be produced and the 
land owner’s return. One method of reducing these effects 
would be for the lease to specify that the lessee pay the 
lessor an annual rent on unplanted land, as is done in Fiji.
(c) The forest management practices and rotation 
lengths to be followed. Although it would be undesirable 
to make any proposed management regime rigidly binding 
regardless of changes in technologies and markets, an 
indication of the management regimes likely to be used is 
essential for the evaluation of any lease proposal. Some 
existing leases did indicate in general terms the plans of 
the lessee but these were usually not given in sufficient 
detail.
The N.Z. Forest Service lease agreement is perhaps the 
best in this regard although it was still rather vague. The 
N.Z. Forest Service agreed to grow a forest "to achieve the 
maximum financial yield". This at least provides a 
criterion on which to base decisions of species selection, 
product choice, rate of development, management regime and 
rotation length.
Shorter lease terms seem to be highly desirable. They 
would allow the lessor to re-evaluate his decision to invest 
his land in forestry more frequently. Ideally this should be 
at the end of each rotation, although this would affect the 
availability of forestry land to the lessee. A move towards 
shorter leases of 70 to 75 years has already occurred, but 
many Maori land owners feel this is still too long as it will 
prevent several generations of owners from having any effective
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control over the use of their land.
The general conditions outlined in lease agreements 
also require tighter definition. The following areas are 
frequently poorly defined:-
(a) The starting date, the term of the lease and the 
expiry date should be clearly defined and should not depend 
on some action of the lessee, such as the date of planting.
(b) The condition in which the land is to be left at 
the expiry of the lease should be clearly stated and the 
lessor should have the power to direct the lessee as to 
whether or not he wants the land reforested in the last 
rotation period of the lease, at the lessor’s expense.
Some leases allow the lessee to continue with afforestation 
until the lease expires and then charge the cost of the 
forest, which will not be harvested before expiry of the 
lease to the lessor, whether the lessor wants this or not. 
This situation is totally unacceptable.
(c) The lessor should not be constrained in any way 
should he decide to sell his land. Some leases confer first 
option to buy on the lessee.
(d) Where the lessor has no say in forest management, 
the lessee should insure the forest against loss of stumpage 
income, covering at least that part of revenue which would 
have been paid to the lessor had there been-no fire or other 
calamity. This protects the lessor against those risks over 
which only the lessee has any direct control e.g. fire 
protection.
(e) The lessor should have some control over the 
marketing and sales of the product or else these aspects 
should be subject to agreement with the lessor. This would 
reduce the lessor’s dependence on the marketing abilities
of the lessee.
(f) Allowable reasons for terminating a lease in the 
event of default should be explicitly defined and an 
equitable method of apportioning ownership of the remaining 
forest specified. Both parties should have power at all times
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to apply to the other for a termination of the lease.
Diversity of conditions between existing leases which are 
not related to differences in the land’s productivity or 
location may give rise to contention. Improvements in 
lease terms over the last ten years may induce some of the 
lessors in early leases to press for a renegotiation of their 
lease. After ten years leasing experience a more uniform 
basis for all afforestation leases should be formulated.
Maori lessors could then draw on available experience before 
signing new leases.
Of the three methods that have been used to calculate 
the lessor's share of stumpage revenue, only the IRR method 
recognises the Maori land owner as an investor and shares 
revenue equitably according to the contributions lessor and 
lessee make to the lease. However, two aspects of the IRR 
method require more explicit definition. Firstly, a clear 
explanation of the method should be given for the benefit 
of Maori land owners, particularly as suspicion is created 
because the method does not define the percentage of stumpage 
due to the lessor before the lease is signed. Secondly, 
the costs to be included in the IRR calculations need to be 
clearly defined. The time at which the lessor’s land 
ceases to contribute to the forest investment is just prior 
to clearfelling and only those costs which contribute to 
growing a standing mature forest, and to the operation of 
the lease, should be included.
Market land value should be used to measure the lessor’s 
cost contribution in the IRR calculation since this 
effectively measures the value of the contribution. Because 
returns from forestry and grazing are similar, market land 
values for grazing land are an acceptable measure of the value 
of the land if used for forestry. Real changes in land value 
should be recognised and included in the calculation.
1 3 3 .
The most inequitable treatment received by Maori land 
owners arises from provisions of the Department of Inland 
Revenue by which incentives for increased investment in 
private forestry were introduced. The benefits of the 
incentives accrue to the provider of capital, whereas the 
land owner receives none even though he invests his land 
in forestry. To restore equity, the lessor must be 
recognised as an investor, and the incentives should be 
redistributed to benefit both the provider of capital and of 
land. Although the N.Z. Forest Service cannot claim any tax 
incentives, Maori land owners investing their land with the 
Forest Service should also benefit as the land owner is 
still a private investor.
These criticisms apply mainly to revenue sharing 
agreements where the lessor is forced to share in the risks 
and uncertainties. A risk free annual rent overcomes most 
of these criticisms as the lessor’s return is independent 
of the actions and decisions of the lessee. The lease 
document would also be simpler, and many potential points of 
contention removed, generating better relationships between 
the lessor and the lessee.
The Department of Maori Affairs has, for a long time, 
overseen agricultural leases on Maori land, but has not 
become involved in afforestation leases. Assisted by the 
Maori Land Court (which has statutory powers to deal with 
Maori land matters), the Department of Maori Affairs could 
provide an advisory service for lessors and could act on 
their behalf when the need arose. Manpower requirements 
would not be excessive as the number of leases negotiated 
at any one time is not large. Should Government funding 
be unavailable, the cost of providing such a service would 
represent only a small portion of the potential income to 
lessors. Since the N.Z. Forest Service is a lessee, forestry 
expertise would have to be provided by an independent 
authority.
These suggestions, however, go against the recommen­
dations of the Pritchard report (1965), which were based on 
the belief that Maoris had achieved a greater ability to 
manage their own affairs. Ten years of experience with 
afforestation leases has shown that Maoris are not familiar 
with European competitive and bargaining methods, and have 
only limited knowledge of and experience in dealing with 
afforestation leases. The availability of expert advice 
and the benefit of previous leasing experience is a 
prerequisite to giving the Maori equal bargaining power.
The best prospects for leasing Maori land for forestry 
depend on the Maori land owners’ desire for meaningful 
involvement in the use of their land. Leases based on an 
annual rent give the best financial return to the land 
owner when recent trends in land values and stumpages are 
taken into account. Also annual land rent gives the lessee 
complete freedom to act as he sees fit in his forestry 
development and management, and places all the risks on 
him as the sole decision maker. However, an annual land 
rent does not allow the lessor to claim involvement in 
management. Only through a revenue sharing agreement does 
the lessor obtain equity in the forest and have a justifiable 
claim to involvement in decision making. Should the Maori 
land owner opt for a revenue sharing lease agreement, the 
implications should be clearly explained to him. The current 
situation where the Maori land owner receives a share of 
revenue but does not have involvement in forest management 
is unacceptable.
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Anpondix 1.
KAORI LAND LAW.
This appendix presents a brief outline of the development 
of Laori land law. The current provisions covering the 
alienation of i aori land are described.
Appendix 1.
Maori Land Law.
English law was formally established in New Zealand in 
18^0 by the treaty of VVaitangi, which guaranteed the Maoris 
"the full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their land 
and estates forests fisheries and other properties which they 
may collectively or individually possess as long as it is their 
wish and desire to retain the same in their possession". It 
went on to provide that the Naoris yielded to the Crown the 
exclusive right of pre-emption over such lands as the owners 
may desire to alienate at a price agreed upon between the owners 
anc persons appointed by the Crown to treat them on that behalf. 
The Maoris were thus at once given full ownei-ship rights to 
their land and protected by the Crown from unscrupulous land 
deals whereby previously large parcels of land were bought by 
Europeans for as little as an axe or a blanket.
Prior to English law, Maoris had no known system of 
succession to land in general. The present practice of granting 
succession developed from the ancient custom of only passing on 
rights to small areas of land which ’were personally held for 
cultivation (Smith I960). Under that custom, the successors 
to such limited rights were the next of kin to the deceased 
by that line of descent through which the rights were derived.
It was not until tribal land became subject to titles 
recognisable to European law that the so called Maori custom 
of succession became established. Under present law, regardless 
of whether a will was left or not, the beneficiaries are the 
children of the deceased, each of whom gets an equal share 
of the- land. As the descendants die, their children in turn 
divide their parents share.
Today, Maori owned land falls into three categories 
(Brown 1966):-
(1) Customary land, the title to which has not been 
established by th< i aori Land Court, very little remains in 
this catogory.
(2) Customary land, the title to which has been 
established by the Maori Land Court. The Maori owners receive 
either a Crown grant or a certificate of title under the Land 
Transfer Act 1090, which gives them freehold tenure.
(1) Freehold land.
Cnly land of categories 1 and 2 are ’Maori* land for the 
purposes of \ aori land law.
The Maori Land Court was established by the Native Lands 
Act 1265 for the following purposes (Smith 1960):-
(1) To settle and define the proprietory rights of Maoris 
on the land held by them under their customary tenure.
(2) To convert the Maori customary title into a title 
recognisable under English law.
(3) To facilitate dealings with Maori lends and the 
peaceful settlement of the country.
(4) To remedy the invidious position occupied by the 
Crown. Prior to 18695 the Crown often found itself in the 
invidious position where it haa recognised a doubt full claim
to title or alternatively where it had to pay twice to contesting
claimants for the same piece of land, l'herc was no doubt
that the Maori wars began through disputes over title to land.
The I'aori Land Court upheld all titles as they stood 
when the treaty of ‘.Vaitangi was signed in 1840, and refused to 
recognise titles founded on inter-tribal warfare since tnat 
year. It changed the then common warfare over land into a verbal 
contest in the court itself.
when initially established, the Maori Land Court had no 
authority to control the sale of Maori lands. At that time 
Maoris did not yet appreciate the value of land ownership 
and many were encouraged to exchange their land for European 
goods. Grave abuses resulted and the Government passed the 
first Native Lands Frauds Prevention Act in 1870 to protect 
the Maoris in their land transactions with Europeans. This Act 
was repealed by the Native Lands Frauds Pin volition Act 1881, 
which was also re placed by the Native I,and Court Act 1894«
The N a t i v e  Land C o u r t  Act  gave  t h e  I a o r i  Land C o u r t  t h e  power  
t o  c o n f i r m  a l l  a l i e n a t i o n s  o f  Ma o r i  l a n d  i . e .  b o t h  s a l e s  and 
l e a s e s .  The Act  a l s o  e s t a b l i s h e d  t h e  Ma o r i  A p p e l a t e  C o u r t  
s p e c i f i c a l l y  t o  d e a l  w i t h  a p p e a l s  a g a i n s t  o r d e r s  o f  t h e  Maor i  
Land C o u r t .  The J u d g e s  o f  t h e  Ma o r i  Land  C o u r t  a r e  a l s o  t h e  
Nudges  o f  t h e  A p p e l a t e  C o u r t  and any two o r  more  o f  them had  
t h e  power  t o  a c t  a s  t h e  A p p e l a t e  C o u r t .
The Ma o r i  A f f a i r s  Act  1933 p r o v i d e d  f o r  t h e  c o n t i n u a t i o n  
o f  b o t h  t h e  Ma o r i  Land  C o u r t  and  t h e  A p p e l a t e  C o u r t .  However ,  
t h e  1 a o r i  A f f a i r s  Amendment Act  1967 r e s t r i c t e d  t h e  power  o f  
t h e  Ma o r i  Land C o u r t  t o  c o n f i r m a t i o n  o f  a l i e n a t i o n s  o f  Maor i  
l a n d  by way o f  s a l e  o n l y .  The Modern Ma o r i  Land  C o u r t  i s  i n  
e f f e c t  a g u a r d i a n  o f  t h e  Ma o r i  l a n d  o w n e r s  and Ma or i  i n t e r e s t s .
The i n e v i t a b l e  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  so c a l l e d  Ma o r i  c u s t om o f  
s u c c e s s i o n  t o  l a n d  a r e  o b v i o u s ,  and i t s  c o n t i n u e d  u s e  would  
h a v e  s e r i o u s  c o n s e q u e n c e s  on t h e  f u t u r e  i n t e r e s t s  and w e l f a r e  
o f  t h e  Maor i  p e o p l e ,  and t o  t h e  b e s t  and m o s t  eco n o mi c  u s e  
by thorn o f  t h e i r  l a n d .  The Maor i  t r u s t e e  was c r e a t e d  i n  an 
a t t e m p t  t o  s o l v e  t h i s  p r o b l e m .  The Maor i  T r u s t  O f f i c e  i s  p a r t  
o f  t h e  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  Maor i  A f f a i r s  and i s  h e a d e d  by t h e  Maor i  
T r u s t e e ,  who l i as  s i m i l a r  s t a t u s  and f u n c t i o n  t o  t h e  P u b l i c  
T r u s t e e .  The Maor i  t r u s t e e  i s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
and l e a s i n g  o f  l a r g e  a r e a s  o f  Ma or i  l a n d  and f o r  d i s t r i b u t i n g  
t h e  p r o c e e d s  t o  t h e  o w n e r s .  The Maor i  T r u s t e e  h a s  e x t e n s i v e  
l e n d i n g  p ow e r s  u s e d  p r i n c i p a l l y  f o r  t h e  s e t t l e m e n t  and 
i m p r o v e m e n t  o f  I a o r i  l a n d ,  f o r  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  M a o r i s  
i n  b u s i n e s s ,  and  f o r  h o u s i n g  p u r p o s e s .  Most  a d v a n c e s  a r c  made 
on t h e  s e c u r i t y  o f  Ma o r i  l a n d .
The Ma or i  A f f a i r s  Act  1993 and ame n d me n t s ,  o u t l i n e s  t h e  
means  by w h i ch  M a o r i s  may a l i e n a t e  t h e i r  l a n d .  A l i e n a t i o n s  
may be e f  f  e c t  cci by : -
( 1 )  The o w n e r s  a s  i n d i v i d u a l s .  Here  t h e  o n u s  i s  on t h e  
p o t e n t i a l  l e s s e e  o r  b u y e r  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  a l l  t h e  b e n e f i c i a l  
o wn e r s  a g r e e  t o  on a l i e n a t i o n .  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  a l e a s e ,  i f  a l l  
t h e  b e n e f i c i a l  o w n e r s  do n o t  s i g n ,  t h e  l e s s e e  would  n o t  h a v e  
e x c l u s i v e  r i g h t  t o  p o s s e s s i o n  o f  t h e  l a n d ,  and t h e  l e a s e  would
be a joint possession with those owners who had not signed.
(2) The owners as a group. The majority of owners may resolve 
to alienate the land regardless of the wishes of the minority. 
However, the rights of the minority are protected bg their
right to apply to the Maori Land Court for a partition of 
their interest in the land.
(3) The Maori Trustee. Maori owners may elect to pass 
control of their land over to the Maori Trustee who acts on 
behalf of the Crown. The Maori Trustee then becomes the 
statutory agent of the owners, and acts on their behalf in the 
matter of alienation and for the variation of the terms and 
conditions of any lease.
Maori owners may also elect to have their common interest 
in land represented by a corporate body or a trust set up 
under the direction of the Maori Land Court. Where Maori land 
is owned by more than three persons as tenants in common, those 
owners may be incorporated. Administration of a corporation 
is by a committee of management elected by the owners and 
appointed by the Court. A trust can be set up by the Court 
either on application to it by land owners, or of its own 
decision during the course of any proceedings before it. The 
oraer vesting the land in the trustees must be approved by 
the Minister of Maori Affairs, loth a corporate body and a 
trust act as trustee for the land owners, have the power to 
alienate the land as if they were the beneficial owners, and 
can raise loons using the land as security. Most existing 
afforestation leases are sign*a by a corporate body or by 
trustees representing the land owners.
Under the provisions of the Maori Affairs Act 1933» oil 
I aori land leases are limited to a term of MG years including 
t' ri. s of renewal. As afforestation leases are specifically 
excluded from this provision, there is no legal limit on 
tlisir term.
Appendix 2.,
STANDARD CONDITIONS OS LEASE - AGRICULTURAL LEASES.
The following are the standard terms and conditions 
of agricultural leases held by the haori Trust Office. 
Afforestation leases are generally based on these, except 
that agricultural requirements are removed, and the lessee' 
obligation with respect to establishing a forest and the 
method and basis of paying the lessor are included.
MAO KI TRUST OFFICE
STANDARD
TRIMMS AND CONDITIONS OF LEASE.
THAT the Leasee will pay Iho rent hereby renerved -it. the times hereinbefore 
appointed for the payment of the came free of exchange at the Maori Trust 
Office at Rotorua or ouch other place or places as the Lessor may from time 
to time direct.
The Lessee will during the said term and as and when the same shall become 
due and payable duly and punctually pay and discharge all rates taxes 
charges including electric light and power charges and assessments (other 
than Landlord's Land Tax) which during the said tei-m may be rated taxed 
charged assessed or made payable in respect of the said land (all such 
rates charges and assessments in respect of the first and lust years of the 
said term being apportioned between the parties and the Lessee will pay hi« 
portion thereof whether or not the same shall be due and payable before the 
commencement or after the termination of the term hereby created).
THAT the Lesseo and his successors in title respectively shall not assign 
sub-let or part with the possession of the land hereby demised or any part 
thereof without the consent of the Lessor in writing first had and obtained 
PROVIDED THAT such consent shall not bo unreasonably or arbitrarily withheld 
in the case of a reputable assignee sub-tenant or under-loanee,
THAT the Lessee will within two years of the commencement of the term of the 
within lease erect and put upon the boundaries of the land herein demised or 
upon such boundaries upon which no substantial fence exists a "sufficient 
fence" within the meaning of the Fencing Act 1908.
THAT the Lessee will at all times during the continuance of the said term 
repair and keep and maintain in good and substantial repair all buildings 
and other erections fences gates hedges culverts dams drains crossings 
fixtures stockyards and every description of improvement now or hereafter 
standing or being upon or growing on the hereby demised land and will renew 
all such parts thereof as shall become decayed or unserviceable and will at 
the end or sooner determination of the said term yield up the some in like 
good order and condition and the Lessee will during the term and at interval« 
of not more than five years paint in a workmanlike manner all the outside 
(including the roof) woodwork and ironwork of all buildings now or hereafter 
to be erected upon the land hereby demised with two coats of proper oil 
colour or synthetic paints suitable for use in the locality.
THAT the Lessee will insure and keep insured to the full insurable value 
thereof all buildings of on insurable nature for the time being erected upon 
the demised land in the name of the Lessor or os the Lessor shall direct in 
some responsible insurance office in New Zealand to be approved by tho 
Lessor and in the event of tlie said buildings or any of them being dostroyed 
or damaged by fire (but subject always to the prior rights of any mortgagee 
of the said land) all moneys received by the Lessor under and by virtue of 
any such insurances shall forthwith be expended by the Lessor in reinstating 
or repairing the building or buildings so destroyed or damaged provided 
always that the Lessor shall in no ovent be bound to expend in reinstating 
or repairing such buildings or building any greater amount than that received 
by him as the proceeds of ouch insurance.
THAT the Lessee will prior to the expiration of the year of the
term hereby created and in each of the next succeeding years
clear stump and lay down in permanent English grasses and clovers of the 
descriptions and proportions usually sown in the district and suitable for 
the land not less than acres of the land hereby demined.
THAT the Lessee will during the term cultivate use and manage all such parts 
of the sold land as now are or shall hereafter be broken up and converted 
into tillage in a proper and husbandliko manner and will not impoverish or 
waste the same but will keep th® sums in good heart and condition and will 
at the end or sooner determination of the term and subject to the provisions 
of clause 15 hereof leave all such parts of the said land us shall be broken 
up in good permanent English grasses and clovers as provided in the 
preceding clause.
THAT the Lessee will use the most approved modern methods to suppress and 
eradicate all noxious weeds and plants that are such by law from time to time 
in the district in which the said land is situate growing on the said land or 
upon the near half of any adjoining road and will grub up and destroy all 
gorse growing as aforesaid otherwise than in or upon the true line of fence 
without contribution from the Lessor and will duly and punctually comply with 
all directions of the Lessor or his agent as to the methods to be used or 
otherwise and also with all the provisions of the Noxious Weeds Act 1950 and 
all amendments thereof and regulations made thereunder respectively provided 
always that the Lessee shall have no claim against, the Lessor in respect of 
the reasonable expenses mentioned in section 1Ü of the said Act and the 
Lessee shall indemnify the Lessor against all arid any contribution or 
contributions costs charges and expenses which the Lessor may be called upon 
or compollod to pay under tire said Act.
THAT the Lessee will at loast once in every year of tho said term clean and 
open all ditches drains and watercourses on the said lond and will keep the 
same clear and unobstructed at all times during the continuance of the said 
term.
THAT the Lessee will not at any time during the term hereby created over­
stock the said land and «ill not during the lust year of the said term 
depasture upon the said land a greater number of stock than he shall have 
had depasturing upon the said land during the previous twelve months of the 
said term.
THAT the Lessee will while using the said land as a dairy farm in all 
respects comply with all the provisions of the Dairy Industry Act 1952 and 
its amendments and every Act that may hereafter be passed in amendment 
thereoi or in substitution therefor and all the rules and regulations made 
or to be made thereunder so far as the same relate to the demised premises 
and under no circumstances shall the Lessor be liable to pay or to 
contribute to expenditure by the Lessee on buildings or other improvements 
upon the demised premises notwithstanding the provisions of the said Act 
or of any Act that may be passed in amendment thereof or in substitution 
therefor.
THAT the Lessee will not at any time during the continuance of the term 
hereby created without the written consent of the Lessor first had and 
obtained request or permit any Electric-power Board to install any motor 
electric wires electric lamps or other electrical fittings or equipment 
on or about the premises hereby demised or to do or cause or permit to be 
done any act deed matter or thing whereby any charge under section 119 of 
the Electric-power Board’s Act 1925 or any amendment thoroof shall or may 
be created upon the said premises in respect to the same.
THAT the Lessee will in a husbandlike manner and at the proper season for 
so doing in each year topdreea so much of the land herein demised aa shall 
be laid down in pasture with artificial manure auitablc to the nature of 
the soil with not less than 3 hundredweight of such manure to the acre, 
and shall not less than twice a year in like manner harrow all pasture 
lands with tripod or other suitable harrows.
THAT the Lessee will not during the said term take or permit or suffer to 
be taken from the said land or ony part thereof more than three crops in 
succession one of which shall be a root crop and either with or immediately 
after a third crop of any kind the said land shall be laid down under 
pasture or summer fallow and be fallow for at least three years from the 
harvesting of the lost crop before being again cropped and will at the 
expiration of the said term leave at least two-thirds of such land an has 
been cropped as aforesaid in good permanent English grasses and clovers 
as provided by clause 7 hereof.
THAT the Lessee will at his own cost and expense do all things necessary 
to comply with the provisions of the Babbits Act 1955 and of any Act. or 
Acts passed in amendment thereof or in substitution therefor and to keep 
the said land free and clear of rabbits and other noxious vermin and will 
indemnify the Lessor against all and any contribution or contributions 
costs charges and expenses which the Lessor may be called upon or compelled 
to pay under such Act or Acts.
THAT the Lessee will not allow pigs to roam at large over the said land but 
will at all times keep them in proper pig-proof enclosures not exceeding 
acres in extent.
THAT the Lessee will pay all costs and expenses incurred in the preparation 
and completion of these presents and all costs and expenses incurred by the 
Lessor in relation to any notice or any proceeding under the provisions of 
the Property Law Act 1952 and its amendments relating to forfeiture and 
relief against forfeiture (notwithstanding that, and whatever the means by 
which, such forfeiture may be avoided).
THAT the Lessee will keep any native bush or shrubbery shelter ornamental 
or other trees at any time growing upon the said land in good order and 
condition and will not without tho consent of the Lessor cut down damage 
or destroy or permit to be cut down damaged or destroyed any of the said 
native bush shrubbery shelter ornamental or other trees at any time growing 
on the said land and will use all proper and reasonable means to preserve 
tho same and will not without the like consent remove or permit to be 
removed from the said land any fencing posts timber or firewood PROVIDED 
HOWEVER that the Lessee may use for his own requirements on the said land 
for repairing or erecting fonces and for firewood any logs or dead timber 
on the said land.
20. THAT the Lessee will not call upon or compel the Lesßor or the owners to 
contribute to the coat of erecting, repairing and maintaining any 
boundary fence which may now or hereafter be erected between the land 
hereby demised and any land adjacent thereto in which the Lessor may have 
any estate or interest either in his own right or as agent or trustee for 
any owner: PROVIDED ALWAYS that this covenant ©hall not enure for the 
benefit of any purchaser or Lessee from the Lessor of such adjacent land 
eo ao to deprive the ©aid Lessee of any rights ho would have (but for thin 
covenant) against the occupier (other than the Lessor) of any adjoining 
land*
21. THAT in burning off or lighting firea upon the demised premises the Lessee 
shall in all respects comply with the provisions of the Forest an 1 Rural 
Fires Act 1955 and shall use every care and precaution to prevent fires 
from spreading to adjoining properties and will indemnify the Lessor and 
the owners against all claims for damage caused by any fire lit by the 
Lessee or hia agents and so spreading o aforesaid and against all 
contributions costs charges and expense*' which the Lessor or the owners 
may be compelled to pay pursuant to the provisions of the Forest and Rural 
Firea Act 1955 or otherwise howsoever.
22. The Lessor may at all reasonable times during the continuance of the ter* 
hereby created enter upon the said land by any agent officer or servant 
of the Lessor for the purpose of viewing the state and condition thereof 
and of the buildings and erections thereof.
23. THAT there are hereby excepted and reserved from this demise all milling
timber, timber, flax, coal, lignite, stone, clay, kauri-gum and other 
metals or minerals whatsoever in or upon the land hereby demised, with 
full power and liberty to the said Lessor, his agents, servants, grantees, 
or licensees to enter upon the said land for tho purpose of searching for, 
working, winning, getting and carrying away all such metals, minerals and 
other things so reserved as aforesaid, and for this purpose to make such 
roads, erect such buildings, sink such shafts, and do all such things as 
may be necessary: PROVIDED ALWAYS that the Lessor shall pay a fair
compensation to the Lessee for all loss or damage sustained by the Lessee 
by the exercise of any such powers by the Lessor. The amount of any such 
compensation shall, in default of agreement, be determined by two 
arbitrators and in case the arbitrators cannot agree, by their umpire, in 
accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration Act 190Ö; and these 
presents shall for the purpose be deemed to be a submission under that Act.
24. THAT if the Lessee shall at any time make default in the performance of 
any of the covenants, conditions or provisions on the part of the Lessee 
herein expressed or implied it shall be lawful for the Lessor (without 
prejudice to any right of re-entry or other right) to perform any such 
covenant condition or provision on behalf of the Lessee (and if necessary 
for so doing to enter upon the said premises) and all monoys paid and 
expenses incurred in so doing and also all costs incurred by the Lessor 
in connection therewith shall be forthwith repaid to the Lessor by the 
Lessee together with interest thereon at the rate of ten pounds (£10) per 
centum per annum and shall be recoverable by distress under the Distress 
and Replevin Act 1908 or otherwise as if the same were rent in arrear 
hereby reserved and it shall be lawful for the Lessor or tho Agent of tho 
Lessor at all times for the purpose aforesaid and for the purpose of 
viewing the demised premises to enter upon the said premises with such worknu 
and other persons as the Lessor or the Agent of the Lessor shall think fit ai 
to remain there for such time as in the circumstances shall be reasonable an< 
proper.
25 THAT in case the rent payable hereunder or any part thereof shall be unpaid 
on any day on which the same ought to be paid and shall remain unpaid for 
thirty (30) days thereafter whether the same shall have been lawfully 
demanded or not or in case the Lessee becomes bankrupt or compounds with or 
assigns his estate for the benefit of his creditors or in case of the breach 
non-observance or non-performance by the Lessee of any covenant condition or 
restriction herein in the Lessee's part contained or implied then and in 
every such case it shall be lawful for the Lessor forthwith or at any time 
thereafter without notice or suit to enter upon any part of the said demised 
land in the name of the whole and thereby to determine the estate of the 
Lessee under these presents but without releasing the Lessee from liability 
in respect of any breach of any of the said covenants conditions and 
restrictions.
26. It is hereby declared that the covenants powers and conditions implied in
leases by the Property Law Act 1952 shall be implied herein except in so far 
as the same are hereby modified or negatived.
Appendix 3«
"FOHLST PLANTING"
An information booklet prepared by the Department of 
Maori Affairs, Wellington, as a guide for Maori land owners 
contemplating an afforestation lease.
FOREST PLANTING
This is a guide to help Maori Trusts and Incorporations 
decide the relative merits of planting for saulogs or pulp. 
Because of cartage costs to an anticipated pulp mill, 
planting for pulp only may not be viable. Because of soil 
type or terrain, planting for saulog3 may not be possible.
The ideal uould.J&a to seek the advice of an independent 
forestry consultant, i.e., an expert not tied to a 
commercial timber company.
The tuo most common exotic forest crops managed in N.Z. 
are saulogs and pulpuood and each one has its advantages 
and disadvantages. Subject to independent expert advice 
and before making any decision on the type of forest crop 
to be planted on an area of land it is vital that all the 
advantages and disadvantages be considered. These fall 
under a number of headings
STUMPAGES
Stumpage is a technical term meaning the amount of money 
paid for uood before logging commences i.e., standing on 
the stump.
By the period 199Ü-200B (15-25 years auay) there uill 
be massive surpluses of uood available in N.Z., far more 
than can be consumed locally and these surpluses uill 
have to be exported. Prices paid for uood on the uorld 
market are dependant on quality. In 1972 for instance 
the price paid for pulpuood on the U.S. rnarket^uas S3 per 
cubic metre, for lou quality sgulogs $20 per m and for 
high quality saulogs $45 per rn . This gap has boon 
getting uidor ever since.
At the present time in N.Z. 3tumpages are held artificially 
lou. This is possible because vory littlo uood is 
exported. In future uhen the majority of N.Z.'s annual 
uood output is exported pricos uill be determined inter­
nationally just as they are nou for beef and uool.
OVERSEAS FORESTS
Here in N.Z. uo can grou the typo of high quality saulogs 
that are fotching such high pricos overseas in as little 
as 25 years. These grouth rates are far higher than can 
be achieved in Northern Hemisphere coniferous forests. 
Those northern forests aro being logged at such a rate
2 .
that by the period 1990-2000 thu original virgin 
(ia. never logged) forests uill bo completely cutover 
and the quantities of high quality saulogs available there 
uill be severely reduced. From then on second grouth 
stands only uill bo available. Those stands are of lou 
quality, trees are small and compared to N.Z. grouth is 
slpu. These trees are eminently suitable for pulp and 
paper production but not for high quality timber. Thus 
the supplies overseas of lou quality uood aro more than 
adequate but the opposite is true for saulogs. Since ue 
can grou saulogs in 25 years uo aro in an excellent 
position to provide such material to overseas markets just 
uhen it is becoming scarce there.
STUMPAGE SHARING AND THE EFFECT OF TINE
Most leases of potential forest land are based on a share in 
the final profits as uell as interim payments of relatively 
small amounts of money. The percentage of profits paid 
varies uith the agreement. The percentage negotiated is 
of lesser importance than the royalty or stumpage received. 
It is easy to see this if the percentage offered in a 
pulpuood situation is say 2b% and only 1 is offered in 
a saulog situation. Uorking on the prices given earlier 
25^ of S3 is 750 uhereas 18/£ of S20 is S3.60 and 1Q^ 
of $45 is $8.10.
This is not the complete situation houever as in forestry 
ventures the effect of time must be taken into account.
Normally the length of rotation (time period from planting 
to logging) is 25 years for saulogs and 15 years for pulp­
uood. Time is taken into account through tho use of 
compound interest. Using a compound interest formula at 
a rate of 10/£ the figures change to:
25$ of $3/m^ over 15 years = 18c/m'
18$ of $20 " 25 " zz 33c "
18$ of $45 " " 25 " 7 5c M
Thus even though saulogs take longer to grou and in this 
case the percentage is considerably less the return is 
substantially higher.
PULPUOOD FROM SAUL0G REGIMES
It is essential to realise that pulp and paper are very 
valuable products and their production in the future from 
N.Z.’s forests uill no doubt bo even more important than 
it i3 today. The point is houever, that it is unnecessary 
to grou forests specifically for pulp as saulog crops 
provide 50^ of their total timber volume in uood available 
for pulping. An average radiata pine tree at clearfelling
3 .
contains 4-5 logs, only the bottom two of which contains 
high quality timber. The top logs aro available for 
pulping. Also, within a sawmill only 50% of the log is 
actually converted to sawn timber the remainder is in 
sawdust and slabwood. The slabwood is available for 
pulping. This type of material is already usod in N.Z.'s 
pulpmills.
PULPUDQD REGIMES
Once a decision has been made in the early years of a 
crop, either at planting or at 4-5 years not to carry out 
pruning or thinning the forest is committed to a low 
quality end use - chip and pulpwood. Thus there is no 
flexibility in the end product. If for some reason no 
plant is built it will be difficult or impossible to use 
the timber crop elsewhere and of course no use means no 
royalties. Further it cannot be argued that such material 
could be exported as countries overseas have large quantities 
of similar low quality wood.
In contrast to this, wood grown in sawlog crops is available 
for a multitude of end uses including pulping if absolutely 
necessary.
The only real advantages that pulp wood crops have are!
1. Very little capital is spent on the crop and the 
money can therefore) be used elsewhere by the 
forest owner or lessee.
2. Rotation lengths are shorter than for sawlog crops, 
this means that not only is a financial return 
received earlier but the trees are at risk from 
natural forces for a shorter time.
The chancGo of windthrow .increase as trees grow larger and 
where cyclonic storms occur this can be important.
ROTATION LENGTHS
The fact that pulpwood crops are cloarfellod earlier than 
sawlog crops means that if a forestry venture is starting 
from scratch the first royalties come in sooner, perhaps 
as much as 10 years sooner. But it must be remembered 
that once a venture has been going for a period of time 
the yearly return is larger under a sawlog regime. Cal­
culations show that despite time, compound intorest and 
having less area felled per year a fully planted sawlog 
forest will produce at least 3 x (throe times) aa much 
royalty per annum a3 a pure pulpwood forest. It i3 obvious 
that the 10-year initial difference in start of royalties 
will very soon become insignificant if sawlogs are grown.
4 .
ENERGY REQUIREMENTS
P u l p m i l l s  r e q u i r e  f ro m 16- 44  t i m e s  as much e n e r g y  as 
s a w m i l l s  do t o  c o n v e r t  one c u b i c  m e t r e  o f  r o u n d uo od  t o  a 
f i n a l  p r o d u c t .  U i t h  s c a r c e  e n e r g y ,  a . p r o b l e m  nou and no 
doub't a p r ob l em i n  t h e  f u t u r e  huge m i l l s  c onsumi ng  l o t s  o f  
e l e c t r i c a l  e n e r g y  u i l l  be u n d e s i r a b l e .
EMPLOYMENT
Grouing o f  t i m b e r  f o r  s a u l o g s  i s  f a r  more l a b o u r  i n t e n s i v e  
than g r o u i n g  t i m b e r  f o r  p u l p .  M a i n l y  t h i s  i s  because  
the r e  a r e  more o p e r a t i o n s  c a r r i e d  o u t  on t h e  c r o p  a f t e r  
p l a n t i n g  and b e f o r e  f e l l i n g ,  i . o . ,  p r u n i n g  and t h i n n i n g .
Also c l e a r f e l l i n g  o f  p u l p u o o d  c r o p s  i s  b e t t e r  s u i t e d  t o  
au to mat io n  because  o f  t h e  s m a l l  s i z e  o f  t h e  t r e e s  and t h e  
l ack  o f  need t o  s e g r e g a t e  l o g s ,  i . e . ,  a l l  l o g s  go t o  t h e  
pulp m i l l .  I n  t h e  case o f  s a u l o g  f e l l i n g  o n l y  some 1 o g 3 
go t o  t h e  p u l p  m i l l .  I n  t h e  case o f  s a u l o g  f e l l i n g  o n l y  
some l o g s  i n  a t r e e  (2 o u t  o f  4 - 5 )  a r e  o f  h i g h  q u a l i t y  and 
so s e g r e g a t i o n  i s  r e q u i r e d ,  a l s o  t r e e s  a r e  f a r  l a r g e r  and 
not  so easy t o  l o g  c o m p l e t e l y  m e c h a n i c a l l y .
U i t h i n  t e n d i n g  o p e r a t i o n s  a l o n o  i n  a s a u l o g  r e g i m e  t h e r e  i s  
one more p e r ma n en t  j o b  f o r  e v e r y  e x t r a  227 ha o f  f o r e s t  o v e r  
and above t h a t  r e q u i r e d  f o r  p u l p u o o d  c r o p s .  T h i s  u o u l d  moan 
t h a t  a 5 , 0 0 0  ha s a u l o g  f o r e s t  u o u l d  employ  20 more men 
( p e r m a n e n t l y  i n  t e n d i n g  o p e r a t i o n s  a l o n e )  t h a n  a c o m p a r a b l e  
pu lp  f o r e s t .  I f  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  l o g g i n g  and o t h e r  m i n o r  employ  
ment o p p o r t u n i t i e s  a r e  c o n s i d e r e d  t h e r e  u o u l d  bo s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
more j o b s  ( p e r h a p s  d o u b l e )  by g r o u i n g  s a u l o g 3  i n s t e a d  o f  
pu l pu ood .  F u r t h e r m o r e  t h i s  has o n l y  c o n s i d e r e d  u o r k  on 
the f o r e s t ,  i f  t h e  uood p r o c e s s i n g  p l a n t s  a r e  c o n s i d e r e d  
t h e r e  a g a i n  more o p p o r t u n i t i e s  i f  s a u l o g s  a r e  g r o u n .  A 
modern s e m i - c h e m i c a l  p u l p m i l l  i s  v e r y  h i g h l y  a u t o m a t e d  and 
employs m a i n l y  h i g h l y  s k i l l e d  t e c h n i c i a n s .  I n  c o m p a r i s o n  
s a u m i l l s  a r e  more l a b o u r  i n t e n s i v e  and p r o v i d o  employment  
f o r  p e o p l e  l e s 3  h i g h l y  t r a i n e d .
POLLUTION
E f f l u e n t  ( u a s t e  p r o d u c t )  f r om  p u l p m i l l s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
c h e m i c a l  o r  s e m i - c h e m i c a l  ones i s  v e r y  e x p e n s i v e  t o  r e n o v a t e  
and i n  f a c t  t h e r e  i s  no 100$ e f f e c t i v e  method knoun a t  t h e  
moment.  I n  c o m p a r i s o n  s a u m i l l  u a s t o s  a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  easy 
t o  t r o a t .
F i n a l l y ,  i n  summary t h e  a d v a n t a g e s  and d i s a d v a n t a g e s  o f  
s a u l o g  and p u l p u o o d  c r o p s  a r e  as f o l l o u s :
G.
SAULOGS
Advontaqo3
1. Groat floxibility in uso of ond product.
2. Command very high stumpagoc.
3. Provido largo employment opportunities.
4. Labour doos not have to bo highly trained.
5. Ready and expanding overseas market.
6. Louor energy requirements in processing.
7. Sawmill wastos havo low environmental impact.
8. Provide 50^ of wood volume in pulp material.
Disadvantages
1, Long rotation
2. Relatively high investment in crop.
Advantages
PULPU00D
1. Short rotation
2. Low capital investment in the tree crop.
Disadvantaqos
1. No floxibility in end product.
2. Low stumpages.
3. Low labour requirements during crop life mean low
employment opportun!tios.
4. Automated, highly complex processing plant employing
skilled technician.
5. Largo areas of forost overseas only suitable for
chip or pulp ond uso. Low oxport opportunities.
6. Large quantities of energy required.
7. Effluent difficult to ronovato.
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M AKA ETAI M0DEL CASH FLO 17S.
The corrected cash flows (forest costs mid forest 
revenues) for the afforestation of the f1 araetai block are 
calculated in this appendix. The correct results are 
compared to those obtained by Grainger (1969) in chapter A*
Appendix l\.
Faraetai model cash flows.
The following forest model is based on the 10,120 ha 
Faraetai block using the financial information presented by Fenton 
and drain/1;er (unpubl. 1965)* Fenton and Grainger calculated a
cash flow which included direct forest costs, indirect forest 
coots and sawlog logging costs. Indirect forest costs included 
protection, repairs and maintenance, salaries, accomodation, 
administration vehicles and general administration costs, 
dot included were allowances for external overheads, fire 
protection equipment and contingencies which Fenton and Grainger 
felt should be allowed for if the forest was to be developed 
by private enterprise rather than the state forest service.
The following model incluaeds all costs, but as in an 
afforestation lease tne lessor has no equity in the logging 
operations, all costs which could be related to logging are 
excluded. Costs and revenues are calculated to year 40 when 
a constant annual cost/constant annual revenue situation arises. 
The following changes were made to Fenton and Grainger's 
costs lo exclude logging costs:-
1. Direct forest costs. The exclusion of sawlog logging
costs.
Y ear 
3b
39
40
Capital equipment 
& 172,000
Direct logging costs 
;;94,600 
394,600 
«9*1,600
2. Indirect forest costs. ' 
salaries.
1 0/C lo ging year
2 logging foremen year
2 general clerks year
2 logging rangers year
L’he exclusion of logging related
21 onwards It 2 600/annum
21 onwards g 3600'/annum
21 onwards 33600/annum
23 onwards i 4 2 0 0/annum
3. External overheads. Part of the external overheads is 
an extra administration vehicle used for logging purposes 
which is excluded in this model.
Year 21 - capital cost ’[2000
Year 21 to 40 inclusive - annual cost $1200
4. K’evenues. Sawlog revenue was based on an ’on the 
truck' pricing point, so annual revenue must be reduced by
sawlog logging costs and sawlog logging pro fit.
Year Direct sawlogging costs hawlogging profit
38 »94,600 $48,000
39 494j 600 »48,000
40 »94,600 $48,000
Logging profit was assessed by Grainger (1969) and is 
based on 10% of capital and accumulated operating costs to 
year 40.
The cost schedule shown in table 4A is derived by taking 
Fenton and Grainger's total costs, subtracting logging costs 
and adding those costs not included by Fenton and Grainger 
i.e. external overheads, fire protection equipment costs and 
contingencies.
To maintain comparability with Grainger's (1969) work, 
forest revenue is taken from Grainger (1969) who made minor 
changes to the revenue schedule derived by Fenton and Grainger. 
The forest revenue schedule shown in table 4P is derived by 
subtracting sawlog logging costs and profit from Grainger's 
revenue schedule.
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20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
T a b i c  l\B
K o r e s t  f . c v c n u c . 
( 3 0 0 0 )
G r o s s  r e v e n u e L o g g i n g  c o s t s  a nd  
p r o  f i t
N e t  r e v e n u e
4 4 . 0 4 4 . 0
16 4 . 0 1 6 4 . 0
164*0 1 6 4 « 0
2 0 4 . 0 2 0 4 . 0
2 0 4 . 0 2 0 4 . 0
2 1 0 . 0 2 1 0 . 0
2 1 0 . 0 2 1 0 . 0
2 1 2 . 0 2 1 2 . 0
2 1 2 . 0 2 1 2 . 0
21 2 . 0 2 1 2 . 0
1 8 4 . 0 1 8 4 . 0
2 0 0 . 0 2 0 0 . 0
2 0 0 .  .0 2 0 0 . 0
2 0 0 . 0 2 0 0 . 0
2 0 6 . 0 2 0 6 . 0
1 9 4 . 0 1 9 4 . 0
1 6 2 . 0 1 6 2 . 0
1 6 2 . 0 1 6 2 . 0
8 6 2 . 0 142 . 6 7 1 9 . 4
8 6 0 . 0 1 4 2 . 6 7 1 7 . 4
8 5 2 . 0 1 4 2 . 6 7 0 9 . 4
Met f o r e s t  i n v e s t m e n t  compounded t o  y e a r  40 [12.2., 4 7 6 , 0 0 0
N et  f o r e s t  r e v e n u e  compounded t o  y e a r  40 A Gl-yC 1 9 >303»000
Met f o r e s t  i n v e s t m e n t  compounded  t o  y e a r  40 @ 3i% lj-10 , 6 4 2 , 0 0 0  
N et f o r e s t  r e v e n u e  compounded t o  y e a r  40 A S' 7 , 0 3 5 , 0 0 0
A s s e s s m e n t  o f  l e s s o r ' s  s h a r e  o f  r e v e n u e .
I n t e r e s t  r a t e
61% 3i%
A n n u a l  f o r e s t  incom e a f t e r  y e a r  AO ( j t O O O )
I n t e r e s t  on compounded r e v e n u e 609 229
P u l p  wood -  9 4 , 8 6 0  r r ry A 1 . 1 0 / n r 104 104
S a w lo p s  -  6 9 , ^ 0 0  ©  UÖ.16/m3 726 728
SI  ab wood -  1 9 ,5 4 0  nr" @ % 1 . 3 2 / m 3 26 26
467 a  o s?
L e s s  -  a n n u a l  s a w lo g  l o g g i n g  c o s t s 94
a n n u a l  s a w lo g  l o g g i n g  p r o f i t A 6 142 142
0  325 1 9 4 5
L e s s  -  a n n u a l  f o r e s t  o p e r a t i n g  c o s t s
from t a b l e  4 A 1.36 136
I n t e r e s t  on n e t  i n v e s t e d  c a p i t a l 1461 3 4 6
A nnua l  r e s i d u a l  r e v e n u e -6  272 8 463
L e s s o r ' s  s h a r e  o f  r e v e n u e  e" 6}% i n t e r e s t - 2 7 2 / 1 3 2 ' .  = -2 0 .5 %
L e s s o r ' s  s h a r e  o f  r e v e n u e  @ 3v% i n t e r e s t 4 6 3 / 9 4 6  = 4 9 . 0 %
Appendix cj.
STUMPAGü TKENDS.
Stumpage trends in December 1cj74 values are calculated 
in this appendix. The trends are interpreted and presented 
graphically in chapter 4«
GTIJKPAGE TRENDS.
(1) Export logs.
F.O.l. values for export logs are derived from figures 
presented in the Annual Report of the Director-General of 
Forests. To estimate the cost of getting logs from 'on the 
stump' to their F.O.l. sale point, a confidential personal 
communication with a log exporting firm produced the following 
costs in 1976 values.
a. Port costs (direct)
Commission to agents (i;% of F.O.E.) 0.09
1.35
2.74 
1 .36
0.05
harshailing 
Stevedoring
Wharfage storage 
Inspection
b. Forest to port costs (direct)
Cartage
loading
Logging
5.41
0.20
4.32
c. Sale costs
Travel, negotiation, accounting, 
legal, tallying, commission 
Rejects ( 1 % of total export volume)
0.9Ö
0.01
d. Other costs
27% allowance for profit and risk 
Administration
C.h1
C./+9
Total il.i7 .4 i
Deflated to Dec. 1974 values - 4 1 3 . 6 3
T a b le  5A shows th e  c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  e x p o r t  l o g  s tu m p ag es  
i n  Doc. 1974 p r i c e s .
T a b l e  9A.
E x p o r t  Log S t u m p a g e s .
Year E x p o r t E xpor t E .C .B. De f l a t e d P r o d u c t i o n Stumpage
Volume Revenue V a l  u e F.O.B C o s t s V a l u e
(000  m-2 *5) ( S m i l l ) ( ( % / m " '  Dec ( 1 / m J  Dec (Dec 1971
74 v a l u e s ) 1974 v a l u e s ! ) v a l u e s )
1966 538 4 • 8 8 .9 2 16 .43 13 .63 2 . 8 0
67 793 7.1 8 .9 5 15.54 13 .63 1 .91
68 1444 16.5 11.42 19.00 13 .63 5 .3 7
69 1670 2 2 .6 13 .53 21 .44 13-63 7.81
70 1820 2 4 .8 13 .63 2 0 .2 8 13 .63 6 . 6 5
71 1821 2 8 .5 15.65 21 .09 13 .63 7 .4 6
72 1855 30 .6 16.50 20.81 13 .63 7 .1 8
73 2000 3 4 .0 17.00 19.81 13 .63 6 .1 8
74 1450 3 4 .0 2 3 . V; 24.61 13 .63 10 .98
75 695 18.0 2 5 .9 0 2 3 .7 0 13 .63 10 .07
76 986 2 7 .2 27 .5 8 2 1 .6 0 13 .63 7 . 9 7
S o u r c e : Expor t . volume and e x p o r t r e v e n u e  -  N. Z.
F o r e s t  S e r v i c e ,  Depor t  o f  t h e  D i r e c t o r -  
G e n e ra l  o f  f o r e s t s  1967 to  1977. 
P r o d u c t i o n  c o s t s  -  a s  c a l c u l a t e d  
p r e v i o u s l y .
( 2 )  P u l p w o o d ,
A s e r i e s  p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  ' d e l i v e r e d  a t  t h e  m i l l '  c o s t  
o f  pulpwood was p r e p a r e d  by t h e  D epar tm en t  o f  S t a t i s t i c s  from 
1966 to 1972. u n f o r t u n a t e l y  t h i s  was d i s c o n t i n u e d  i n  1973.
F e n t o n ,  G r a i n g e r ,  S u t t o n  and T u s t i n  ( u n p u b l .  1968) g i v e  a 
h a r v e s t i n g  c o s t  f o r  pulpwood o f  ; 1 . 4 4 / m - .  T h i s  i s  1 2 .4 1 i n  Dec.  
1974 v a l u e s ,  ' h e r e  was no d a t a  a v a i l a b l e  on pulpwood t r a n s p o r t
c o s t s ,  hence  an a r b i t a r y  c o s t  o f  1.2.00 v;as u s e d .  T h i s  means t h a t  
t h e  c a l c u l a t e d  s tum pages  may n o t  be c o r r e c t ,  b u t  t h e  t r e n d  i s  
i m p o r t a n t .
Table chows the calculation of pulpwood stumpages 
in Dec. 1974 prices.
Table 5B.
Pulpwood Stumuages. 
(5/m3)
Y ear Delivered at the Deflated cost of Logging/ S tumpage
mill cost of pulpwood transport Value
pulpwood. delivered at the costs (Dec 74
mill (Dec 74 (Dec 74- values)
values) values )
1966 5.43 10.00 4 . 4 1 5.59
67 5.88 10.21 4.4-1 5.80
68 5-57 9.27 4.41 4 • 86
69 5.70 9.03 4 . 4 1 4.62
70 6.18 9.20 4.41 4.79
71 6.68 o.OO 4 .4 1 4 • 59
72 6.51 8.21 4.41 3.80
Source: 'Industrial Production Statistics' and
supplements to 'Monthly Abstract of 
Statistics', Department of Statistics.
bote: In the case of processing companies supplying 
wood from their own forests, the stumpage component of the 
del Lvorod-at-thc-rn ill cost of pulpwood may be charged on a 
nominal basis.
(5) Dawlops.
Specific data on sawlog stumpages wore not available 
except for stumpages on logs sold by the e.Z. Forest Service 
to its own sawmill at V/aipa, kotorua. This stumpage is set 
by Povcrimen t policy decision and in no way .reflects the true 
market rate for sawlog stumpages. however, the trend in 
deflated stumpage prices is of importance.
Table 'jC shows the actual and deflated stumpages paid
by the forest Service sawmill.
Table 3C.
Stumrages Paid By Vaipa Sawmill For Sawlogs.
Year
OS/m 3 )
Stumpage paid. D e flat c d s l urn p ag o
1969 1.77
paid(Dec 74 values)
2.81
70 1 .77 2.63
71 1 .77 2.39
72 1 .94 2.43
73 2.8 3 3.30
74 2.77 2.91
73 2.76 2.33
76 3.01 2.36
Source:- N.Z. Forest Service, Deport of the
Director-Oencral of Forests 1970 to 1977»
(4) State stumpage sales.
Data on total volume and revenue for sales of standing 
timber from state exotic forests were available. .Tales 
include sawlogs, nulpwood and peeler logo, but exclude 
export logs. Individual figures for sawlogs, pulpwood and 
peeler logs were not available. The bull; of sales is radiata 
pine, but small amounts of other seedes are included.
Table 9D shows the actual mean stumpages and the deflated 
mean stumpa;;es paid for standing timber.
T ab le  51).
I can Stumpages For .S ta te F x o t i c  S a l e s .
Year T o t a l  s a l e s T o t a l  r e v e n u e Fean s tumpago D e f l a t e d  in can
(0C0 m") ( $ 0 0 0 ) ( a / m 3 ) s tumpage 
( Dec 
74 v a l u e s )
1967 1346 1 7 7 4 1 . 3 2 2 .2 9
68 13 9 4 1890 1 . 4 0 2 .3 3
69 1286 2096 1 .63 2 .5 8
70 1510 2958 1 . 9 6 2 .9 2
71 1445 2186 1 . 5 1 2 .0 4
72 1399 2268 1 .6 2 2 .0 4
73 1473 2669 1 .81 2 . 1 1
7L f 1789 4024 2 . 2 5 2 .3 6
75 2142 4868 2 .2 8 2 .0 9
76 2161 5 220 2 . 4 2 1 . 9 0
l o u rc e VI.Zi. F o r e s t  S e r v i c e ,  R epor t  o f  t h e  
D i r e c t o r - G e n e r a l  o f  F o r e s t s  1969 to  1977*
Apnendlx G.
PRICK INDKXES.
The consuüier price index presented in this appendix is 
used throughout this thesis to deflate or inflate prices 
as required. The timber price index is referred to in chapter
Appendix 6.
Price indexes.
1. Consumer price index.
Table 6A shows the consumer price index for all groups 
from 1950 to 1977« The base is December quarter 1974 = 1000.
Table- 6A,
Consumer Price Index.
Year C.P.I. Year C.P.I
1950 299 1964 51 1
51 333 65 529
52 358 66 543
53 375 67 576
54 392 68 601
55 402 69 631
56 416 70 672
57 425 71 742
58 443 72 793
59 460 73 858
60 463 74 953
61 472 75 1093
62 484 76 1277
63 494 77 1439*
*  -  end of june quarter.
Source:- 1950 to 1976 - N.Z. Official Yearbook, 
Dept, of Statistics.
1977 - Iionthly Abstract of Statistics, 
Sept. 1977) Dept of Statistics.
2. Timber rrice index.
Table 6B shows the wholesale timber price index for 
radiata pine. The base is 1958 = 1000. For comparison, the 
consumer price .index for all groups, using the same base 
year, is also shown.
Table 6b.
Tifaber Price Index - radiata Pine (Wholesale).
Year Timber r>rice C.P.I. Year Timber price C.P.I,
index index
1950 693 675 1962 1158 1092
51 721 750 63 1 182 1114
52 740 808 64 1 198 1153
53 850 645 65 1252 1 192
54 946 884 66 1 280 1225
55 967 906 67 1325 1299
56 967 937 68 1342 1355
57 992 957 69 1 397 1422
58 1000 1000 70 1 506 1515
59 1024 1038 71 1744 1672
60 1096 1045 72 1789 1788
61 1064 1096
Source:- 0 i—i 1 N.Z. Official Yearbook, Dept.
of Statistics.
Timber price index - Statistics of the 
Forests and Forest Industries of New 
Zealand to 1974* N.Z. Forest Service.
Appendix 7»
FORESTRY COST TRENDS.
Thin appendix presents the available i nformalion on the 
cost of forestry operations. Table 7A shows the costs in current 
terms, 'urrent costs are aujusted to Dec. 1974 prices using 
the consumer price index (appendix 6), and the adjusted coots 
are shown in table 7B. Trends in real costs are interpreted 
in chapter l \ .
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Appendix 8.
NET ANNUAL INCOME FROM FORESTRY AND GLAZING.
The not annun.1 income from forestry and grazing is 
calculated in this appendix. The results are compared in 
chapter f>*
An pen d i Ö .
Net annual income from forestry.
l'.'ir.nd on Kenton rind Tur.tin (19V^) n sawlog/export log 
regime will produce on on average rite index of 34» a net 
logged volume of 576 rrrVha at age 23« A pulpwood regime on 
the same site index would produce an approximate net volume 
of 600 m'Vha at age 2 3«
The following stumoage rates (Dec. 1974 values) have 
been estimated based on the trends and figures shown in 
appendix 5«
Export logs 09.00/m-5
Sawlogs U 6.00/m-5
Pulpwood U2 .50/m3
The gross income discounted to year 0 is shown in table
OA.
Table 8A.
Discounted Gross Income - Year 0
(1/ha)
Product Interest rate
6 % 8% 10% 1 2!;'. 1 W%
Export logs 1357 883 579 383 255
0awlogs 905 589 386 255 170
Pulpwood 393 255 168 111 74
Kenton and Tustin (1972) give the discounted total
growing costs in year Ü in 1967 values for sawing/export
regime as follows:-
(ft/ha)
6/' 8% 10% 1 2% 14%
Growing costs 79 60 48 ho 34
Oor ts adjusted to Dec. 1 'K/4 prices using' the consumer
price index (appendix 6):-
1 51 5799 79 66
Similar information for pulpwood war not available. 
Assuming the growing coats for pulpwood are 80% of those 
for saw/export logs, the net discounted revenue is shown 
in table 8B.
Table 8B.
Discounted hot Income - Year 0 
(ft/ha)
Product Interest rate
6% 8% 10% 1 2% 14%
Export logs 1226 784 300 317 198
Sawlogs 774 490 307 189 H 3
Pulpwood 288 176 103 38 28
The net income expressed as equal annual payments for 
23 years is shown in table 8C.
Table 8C.
liet Annual Income From Forestry.
(ft/ha)
Product Interest rate
6% 8% 10% 12% 14'/
Exnort logs 99.6 73.6 36.3 41.1 29.1
Sawlogs 62.9 47.2 34.3 24.5 16.6
Pulpwood 23.4 17.0 1 1 .8 7.3 4.1
Nct_ annual income from grazing.
The not income for the farming sector for those farms 
most likely to bo used for grazing purposes and most likely 
to compete with forestry for land i.e. North Island hard 
hill country and North Island hill country, are given on a 
per farm basis by the New Zealand heat and Wool Board Economic 
Service (Anon 1976d), though no average farm size is given.
The keport of the Agricultural keview Committee to the Minister 
of Agriculture and Fisheries (Anon unpubl. 1977) indicates 
the average size of grazing farms sola in the years 1972 to 
1976 were 441, 561, 522, 677, and 532 ha respectively. An 
average grazing farm size of 547 ha is used in the following 
calculations. Table ÖD shows the calculation of the average 
net annual income from grazing in Tec. 1974 prices. More 
specific information was not available.
Table 8D.
Net Annual Income From Grazing.
Year Net annual income per Net annual income Average net
farm Of) (i/ha Dec 74 annual income
values) (ii/ha Dec 74
values)
N.I. hard N.I. hill N.I. hard N.I. hill
hill country hill country
country country
1 970 2682 765? 7.29 20.82 14.06
71 7351 6470 18.11 15.94 17.03
72 10133 8465 23.35 19.51 21 .43
73 25377 22123 54.07 47.13 50.60
74 16271 15977 31 .22 30.65 30.94
75 4801 5803 8.03 9.84 8.94
Mean $23*68 $23.98 ’ #23.63
Source: Net annual income per farm - h.Z. Meat and 
Wool Board.
C.P.I. - append!x 6.
Appendix 9«
THI PAi'K OF HhTUHh FROK FOIAATHY AM D AC AI CULTURE.
deferences and data on the return from forestry and 
agriculture are examined in this appendix in order to support 
the case for using agricultural land values for valuing the 
land owner’s input to afforestation leases. The results are 
discussed in this appendix.
Anpeno i x  9«
The r a t e  o f  r e t u r n f r om f o r e s t r y  and a g r i c u l t u r e .
1. The r a t e  o f r e t u r n  f rom f o r e s t r y .
Mar l y  work ( A'ard e t  a l  1 9 6 6 ) ,  showed t h a t  u s i n g  1 9 6 2 / 3  
v a l u e s ,  which  c o r r e s p o n d e d  t o  a y e a r  o f  a v e r a g e  r e t u r n s  f o r  
f a r m e r s ,  a g r i c u l t u r e  was s l i g h t l y  more  p r o f i t a b l e  t h a n  
f o r e s t r y .  The i n t e r n a l  r a t e  o f  r e t u r n  f o r  a g r i c u l t u r e  was 
7 . 0 / ,  w h i l e  f o r  f o r e s t r y  i t  was 6 . 7 9 / .  I f  s o c i a l  c o s t s  were  
i n c l u d e d  t h e s e  d r o p p e d  t o  5 .5% and 6 . 0 % r e s p e c t i v e l y .
The more  i n t e n s i v e  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  f o r e s t  management  
p r a c t i c e s  c a r r i e d  o u t  by F e n t o n  and  T u s t i n  ( 1 9 7 2 ) ,  and  F e n t o n  
and M e r l e  D i c k  ( 1 9 7 2 a ,  1972b,  1 9 7 2 c ) ,  i n d i c a t e d  t n a t  
c o n s i d e r a b l e  i n c r e a s e s  c o u l d  be a c h i e v e d  i n  t h e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  
o f  f o r e s t r y  t h r o u g h  h i g h e r  l o g  e x p o r t  p r i c e s  and  s h o r t e r  
r o t a t i o n s  t h a n  t h o s e  commonly u s e d  a t  t h a t  t i m e .  The i n t e r n a l  
r a t e s  o f  r e t u r n  f rom t h e s e  s t u d i e s  a r e  s u mm a r i s e d  i n  t a b l e  
9 A. A l l  were  b a s e d  on 19 67 v a l u e s .
T a b l e  9A.
The I n t e r n a l  h a t e  Of Met urn  
F o r  F o r e s t r y .
F i t e  i n d e x  
( h e i g h t  i n  m a ge  20)
S h o r t  r o t a t i o n  r e g i m e s .  
23 
30 
34
Mormal r e g i m e s .
30
74
I n t e r n a l  r a t e  o f  
i t  t u r n  w i t h o u t  
s o c i a l  c o s t s
9 . 6 g
1 2 . 8
13 . 7
#
1 1 . 7
14.0*
I n t e r n a l  r a t e  o f  
r e t u r n  i n c l u d i n g  
s o c i a l  c o s t s
8 . 5 /
1 1 . 2
1 x x
10 . 2
1 2 . 0
*
F s t i r n a t o d  f rom r e s u l t s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  the  l i t e r a t u r e .
i'-ore recent work by Kenton and Tennant (1976) gave a 
return of 11.79 including social costs, on afforestation for 
the Log export trade using 1973 costs and returns for a normal 
regime on site index Z<). They also noted that a drop in the on 
the truck price for logs of 46/' would still leave an internal 
rate of return of 1C° . Forestry based on domestic log prices 
is therefore also likely to show a satisfactory return.
Fenton (1977) reports a consistent error in his whole 
series of profitability studies. 'The net effect of correcting 
the error is a small increase in the calculated profitability. 
The relative ranking of the different analysis remains the same.
All Fenton's profitability studies were based on the 
I araetai block, which was also the basis of the work by Ward 
et al (1966) and Grainger's (1969) work on leasing. Although 
Kenton et al were able to include site index as a variable in 
determining profitability, other factors also have to be 
considered, including topography, initial vegetation and 
location with respect to the market, so that the results 
obtained by Fenton et al cannot be applied generally without 
modification. Furthermore, the studies were based on constant 
costs and returns; relative movements in costs and returns also 
need to be considered. Changes in costs and returns between 
1967 and 1' 73 for a 'normal' regime on site index 30 (Fenton 
and In i e  Dick 1972c, and Fenton and Tennant 1976), indicate 
that returns have risen faster than costs resulting in the 
internal rate of return rising from 1C.2.% to IT.7%,
liacpncrson (l1.74) examined afforestation profitability 
using a 2,9 year rotation to grow sawlogs for the domestic 
market. The forest was located about 50 km from the market and 
had a site index of 33» The internal rates of return obtained 
by Mac phot-con were 9.oa with social costs and 10.0? when they 
were excluded. Facpherson reported that because these figures 
compared more than favourably with returns from agricultural 
development of similar country in the area, the Land .Settlement 
Foard, which had authority over the land, re Leased the block 
to forestry in preference to agriculture.
All the forestry profitability studies described above 
are comparable in that they exclude the cost of land and do 
not ascribe any of the returns to land as a factor of 
production.
2• The rate of return from agriculture.
For the purposes of valuing land, the Government 
Valuation Department divides New Zealand agriculture into 
tue following broad categories:-
Dairy farms 
battening farms 
Grazing farms 
Arable farms
horticultural properties 
Specialist livestock
bach exhibits its own rate of return, («razing farms are 
the most similar, to forestry in that large areas of land are 
used extensively. The other categories are generally more 
specialised, involving greater levels of capital investment 
and tend to be smaller units sueject to more intensive use.
Because farming is a continuing process, and income may 
fluctuate considerably on both a seasonal and annual basis, it 
is difficult to derive an internal rate of return as a measure 
of profitability, three measures of profitability which can be 
applied to agriculture (Anon 197bd) are:-
(a) Deturn on capital - this is the ratio of net farm 
income to total capital involved.
(b) Capital turnover percentage - this is the ratio of 
gross farm income to total farm capital.
(c) Estimated labour and management residual - this is 
an estimate of what the farmer earns ns a reward for his own 
labour and management.
The closest of these to the internal rate of return 
measure used to examine the profitability of forestry is the 
return on capital, as this indicates the rate at which capital 
investment reproduces itself after all costs have been met.
} oth measures give the maximum rate of interest at which money 
could be lent for the project to break even.
however, despite direct requests for data on the net 
returns for agriculture to the Ministry of Agriculture 
Economics Division, Lincoln College Department of Agricultural 
Economics, the Lew Zealand Meat and Wool Boards’ Economic 
Service and Massey University Department of Agricultural 
Economics, only data on gross returns were available. As a 
result, only the capital turnover percentage for agriculture 
could be calculated. However, as the return on capital will 
always be less than the capital turnover percentage, the 
capital turnover percentage will give a useful indication 
of what the return on capital is likely to be.
Table 9B shows the capital turnover percentage for all 
agriculture for the period 1161 to 1975* Gross income specific 
to grazing only was not available. To maintain comparability 
of results with tiiose presented for forestry, the value of the 
land has been excluded from the measure of total farm capital.
Table 9B indicated that the return on farm capital is 
generally declining. The New Zealand Institute of Economic 
Lesearch (Anon 197?e) notes that in late 1977 the "overall 
view of the farming sector is one of static values of gross 
farm output with input cost inflation eroding net farm income". 
Predictions made for the 1977/8 and 1978/9 years for all types 
of farming indicate a general worsening of the farmer’s 
position. Hence the declining trend shown in table 9B may 
continue.
The profitability of agriculture may be further reduced 
relative to forestry in that all the forestry studies refer 
to an afforestation scheme started from scratch, whereas 
a t x culture has been considered as a continuing activity, 
llunkett (1972) examined agricultural development undertaken 
by the Land and Purvey Department on undeveloped blocks, 
taking development to a stage where the block could be run as
T a b le  9B.
C a p i t a l  T u r n o v e r  P e r c e n t a g e  Cor A11 A g r i c u l t u r e .
V e a I1 Value  o f  r e a l T o t a l  farm h e a l  farm C a p i t a l  t u r n o v e r
farm c a p i t a l income income p e r c e n t a g e
U m i l l  19 50 ( f r n i l l ) U m i l l  1930
v a l u e s ) v a l u e s )
1961 1562 356 226 14-5
62 1 625 322 199 12 .3
63 1680 361 219 13.0
64 1756 422 247 14.1
63 1755 432 244 13.6
66 1837 428 236 12.9
67 1875 393 222 1 1 .8
68 1965 398 198 10.0
69 2040 394 187 9 . 2
70 2103 415 185 8 .8
71 2148 432 174 8.1
72 2123 559 21 1 9 .9
73 2050 665 232 n . 3
74 1897 845 265 1 4 .0
73 2012 425 116 5 .8
S o u r c e :  Value o f  r e a l  farm c a p i t a l  -  E l l i s o n  (1 9 7 7 ) ,
,pa b l e  A4 . 'T' h i s  c o n s i s t s  o f  th e  sum o f  th e  v a l u e  
o f  l i v e s t o c k ,  v a lu e  o f  p l a n t  ana  machinery  and 
v a lu e  o f  a l l  im p ro v em e n ts .  I t  does  n o t  i n c l u d e  
a l a n d  v a l u e .
T o t a l  farm income -  Jo h n so n  ( 1 9 7 7 ) .
Consumer p r i c e  i n d e x  -  a p p e n d ix  6.
an economic u n i t ,  U s ing  mean 1 549 -  6 3 p r i c e s ,  he showed t h a t  
t h e  i n t e r n a l  r a c e  c f  r e t u r n  was minus 1.7,  .
5. Qis euer, Ion .
The internal rate of return from forestry based on 
export stumonges are generally greater than the capital 
turnover percentage for agriculture, especially in the period 
since 1969» The internal rate of return based on domestic 
stumpages generally exceeds the capital turnover percentage 
for agriculture from 1969 onwards. In as much as the return 
on capital, a measure of profitability more directly comparable 
to the internal rate of return, will be less than the 
capital turnover percentage, forestry is likely to exceed 
agriculture in profitability.
This further justifies the use of agricultural land 
values for assessing the land owner's contribution to 
afforestation leases.
t
